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I. STATISTICAL SUMMARY
This survey covers the period of March 1972 through July 1973, 1 during
which time the Iowa supreme court filed a total of 141 reported opinions 2
in criminal cases. 3 In the 140 cases with decisions on the merits, 4 the supreme
court affirmed the lower court 69.5 percent of the time and upheld the State's
appellate claim 70.2 percent of the time. Nine of every ten decisions were
1. For earlier surveys, see Dunahoo, Survey of Iowa Criminal Law, 21 DRAKE
L. REv. 488 (1972) (covering Jan. 1970-Feb. 1972) and Yeager, Survey of Iowa Criminal
Law, 20 DRAKE L. REv. 118 (1970) (covering the year 1969).
2. These opinions may be found in volumes 195-209 of the Northwestern Reports,
Second Series. Because of the supreme court's division into two five-justice panels effective October 1972, the number of criminal law opinions recently has increased significantly.
The average number thereof per month has been: 7.4 (January 1970-February 1972),
10.1 (March 1972-July 1973), and 11.0 (October 1972-July 1973). The supreme court
has sat en bane in 16 of the 99 reported criminal law cases decided after September 1972.
3. Twelve postconviction relief petitions and two habeas corpus petitions, while
triggering civil proceedings, are included in this survey total of 141 cases because of
their raising of criminal law issues in these particular cases.
Not included elsewhere in this survey (or in the statistics) are the topics of extradition and forfeiture, both of which are civil proceedings which directly relate to criminal
matters in some cases.
For recent developments concerning extradition, see Hughes v. Waters, 204 N.W.2d
599 (Iowa 1973) and Hill v. Houck, 195 N.W.2d 692 (Iowa 1972).
For recent developments concerning forfeiture proceedings, see Robinson v. Hanrahan, 93 S. Ct. 30 (1972); McReynolds v. Municipal Court, 207 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1973);
State v. One Certain Conveyance, 207 N.W.2d 547 (Iowa 1973); and State v. Kaufman,
201 N.W.2d 722 (Iowa 1972).
4. One case was dismissed without a decision on the merits because the appeal was
taken before a final judgment. See State v. Coughlin, 200 N.W.2d 525 (Iowa 1972)
(trial court's order granting defendant's motion to set aside jury verdict of guilty is not a
final judgment from which an appeal can be taken by the State; IowA R. Civ. P. 331
is inapplicable to criminal cases).
But see State v. Richmond, 207 N.W.2d 546 (Iowa 1973), Bruno v. Haugh, 206
N.W.2d 436 (Iowa 1973 ), Holland v. Brewer, 206 N.W.2d 436 (Iowa 1973 ), and Melka v.
Houge, 206 N.W.2d 85 (Iowa 1973) (summary affirmance per curiam "AFFIRMED, see
rule 348.1, Rules of Civil Procedure" in cases presenting no error and supreme court
feels an opinion would have no precedential value).
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unanimous, with the court experiencing an overall agreement rate of 96.2 percent. 5 All but eight of the 141 survey cases were tried or heard on the district
court level.
5.
a)

DISPOSITIONS
Affirmances
(appeals)
(certiorari)
Reversals
(appeals)
(certiorari)

Survey Period
(3/72-7/73)
(141 cases)
98
(97)

1972-73 Term
(9/72-7/73)
(110 cases)
75
(74)

(1)

(1)

43
(39)

35
(32)

(4)

(3)

Mfirmance rate
69.5%
68.2%
31.8%
30.5%
Reversal rate
(Note: The affirmance rate for the previous period of January 1970-February
1972 was 75.0 percent.)
b)

WINNING PARTIES
State
Defendant

99
42

-·····-····-···

77
33

-················

70.0%
State's winning rate
70.2%
Defendant's winning rate
29.8%
30.0%
(Note: The State's winning rate for the previous period of January 1970February 1972 was 76.9 percent.)
c)

VOTING PATTERNS
9-0 Decisions
8-0 Decisions
7-0 Decisions
5-0 Decisions
8-1 Decisions
7-1 Decisions
4-1 Decisions
7-2 Decisions
6-2 Decisions
6-3 Decisions
5-4 Decisions

32
10
2
82
4
1
1
1
1

3
4

12
2
2
82
2
0
1
1
1
3
4

Agreement rate
96.2%
95.1%
4.9%
Disagreement rate
3.8%
(Note: The justices' agreement rate for the previous period of January 1970February 1972 was 92.6 percent.)
d)

DISSENTING VOTES (Note: All Justices did not participate in all cases)
Justice Harris
3
3
1
0
I ustice LeGrand
Justice McCormick
6
6
4
3
Justice Mason
3
3
Chief Justice Moore
5
4
Justice Rawlings
3
3
Justice Rees
3
3
Justice Reynoldson
7
7
Justice Uhlenhopp

Total
35
32
For a comparable statistical summary for the period of January 1970-February 1972, see
Dunahoo, Survey of Iowa Criminal Law, 21 DRAKE L REv. 488, 490-92 (1972).
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Of the 126 convictions contested on their merits, the supreme court affirmed 91 (or 74.6 percent). Of the 35 convictions reversed, only 24 were
remanded for new trial. 6 In other actions, the court upheld the sentence imposed in five cases but ordered resentencing in four others; affirmed (on a
State's appeal solely to clarify the point of law) the granting of a directed verdict; and upheld an order revoking probation. Finally, in three cases in which
the respective defendants had not yet been tried, the court sustained a writ of
certiorari challenging the overruling of one defendant's motion to dismiss for
lack of speedy trial, reversed the overruling of another defendant's application
for change of venue, and reversed the failure to overrule a third defendant's
demurrer. 7
A total of forty-eight reversible errors 8 were committed in the forty-three
6. Two of these cases were remanded for dismissal of the charges because of denial
of speedy trial. See State v. Gorham, 206 N.W.2d 908, 915 (Iowa 1973) and State v.
Hanysh, 208 N.W.2d 718 (Iowa 1973). The remaining nine cases were expressly or impliedly remanded for entry of judgments of acquittal because of insufficiency of the evidence for conviction. Three of these were reversed because of their resting on circumstantial evidence which at best raised suspicion as to the respective defendant's guilt.
See State v. Jellema, 206 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa 1973), State v. Streit, 205 N.W.2d 742
(Iowa 1973 ), and State v. Barnes, 204 N.W.2d 827 (Iowa 1973 ). Five other cases were
reversed because of failure of proof of an essential element of the respective crime.
See State v. Miller, 204 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 1973) (no competent evidence of defendant
operating the vehicle in prosecution for O.M.V.U.I.); State v. Creighton, 201 N.W.2d 471
(Iowa 1972) (no evidence introduced as to defendant operating the vehicle in O.M.V.U.I.
case); State v. McGuire, 200 N.W.2d 832 (Iowa 1972) (no proof that defendant intentionally simulated intoxication); State v. Hoffer, 197 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1972) (no competent proof of defendant's license still being suspended at the time he was arrested for
driving while operator's license under suspension); and State v. Smith, 196 N.W.2d 439
(Iowa 1972) (larceny in the nighttime requires proof that property was stolen from
within a vessel, building, or vehicle and not from the outside of same). In the remaining
case, both the wrong charge was brought and the wrong venue was set. See State v. Durham, 196 N.W.2d 428 (Iowa 1972) (larceny is not committed when owner consents to
defendant's taking of his property even though the consent is for purposes of apprehending
defendant). As to whether Durham could be retried on the proper charge, see State v.
Cook, 158 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1968) and State v. Folger, 204 Iowa 1296, 210 N.W. 580,
582 (1926).
7.
Remanded for
New Trial or
Affirmed
Reversed
On Appeal
Other Proceedings
On Appeal
(24)
(91)
(35)
CONVICTIONS
4
4
by Court
5
1
by Guilty Plea
18
1
by Jury
19
29
69
(7)
(6)
(7)
OTHER
Acquittal by jury
1
0
2
0
Pretrial orders
3
Probation revocation
1
0
4
s
4
Sentencing
TOTAL
98
42
30
8. See also State v. Kelsey, 201 N.W.2d 921, 927 (Iowa 1972) concerning successful application of the harmless error rule, to wit:
Consequently, the question posed is whether admission into evidence of the one
item of hearsay instantly involved [i.e., defendant's tacit admission] compels a
reversal of this case. We are satisfied it does not. . . • A review of the record
fairly shrieks the guilt of this defendant. It is consequently inconceivable that
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cases reversed by the supreme court, including three errors in one case! 9 Of
these, eleven of the errors occurred on rulings on pretrial matters, while thirtythree errors were made during the trial, and the remaining four errors on sentencing policy. The eleven errors made on pretrial matters consisted of: overrulings of motions to dismiss for lack of speedy trial in three cases; 10 an overruling of defendant's demand for a jury trial on a multi-count contempt
charge; 11 overrulings of defendant's motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence in three cases; 12 the overruling of defendant's application for change of
venue; 13 the acceptance of a guilty plea notwithstanding an improper colloquy; 14
the refusal to overrule defendant's demurrer; 15 and the failure to sustain defendant's demurrer and then to order an amendment to the county attorney's
information. 16 The thirty-three errors during trial included: the empanelling
of a tainted jury panel; 17 the State's improper admission of evidence of other
crimes in two cases; 18 a defective foundation for admission of the State's
breath test evidence in an O.M.V.U.I. case; 19 a prosecutor's improper comment
admission of the hearsay here involved, mentioning neither names, dates nor
places, could have possibly influenced the jury to reach an improper verdict.
We therefore hold the admission of such hearsay was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
But see State v. Davis, 196 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1972) (harmless error not applied to
improperly admitted evidence of another crime in a prosecution for vehicular manslaughter) and State v. Miller, 204 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 1973) (reversal of conviction because of admission of hearsay evidence where there was no competent evidence as to
an essential element). See also State v. Ware, 205 N.W.2d 700 (Iowa 1973) (harmless
error inapplicable, as a matter of law, to admission of unconstitutionally-obtained confession) and State v. Sloan, 203 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Iowa 1972) (harmless error not proven
here beyond a reasonable doubt since "error in instructing the jury is presumed to be
prejudicial unless the contrary appears from a review of the whole case").
9. See State v. Smiley, 201 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1972).
10. See State v. Hanysh, 208 N.W.2d 718 (Iowa 1973), State v. Gorham, 206
N.W.2d 908 (Iowa 1973 ), and Keever v. Bainter, 195 N.W.2d 526 (Iowa 1972), as
discussed in text accompanying notes 514-39 infra.
11. See Sarich v. Havercamp, 203 N.W.2d 260 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text
accompanying notes 72-82 infra.
12. See State v. Johnson, 203 N.W.2d 126 (Iowa 1972) (defective affidavit for a
search warrant), as discussed in text accompanying note 485 infra. See also State v.
Rowland, 202 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1972) and State v. Williams, 201 N.W.2d 710 (Iowa
1972) (both involving improper foundation for breath test evidence in O.M.V.U.I. cases),
as discussed in text accompanying notes 277-88 infra.
13. See Pollard v. District Court, 200 N.W.2d 519 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in
text accompanying notes 504-09 infra.
14. See State v. Clary, 203 N.W.2d 382 (Iowa 1973 ), as discussed in text accompanying note 542 infra.
15. See State v. Vietor, 208 N.W.2d 894 (Iowa 1973) (burden of proof rests on
defendant in accommodation hearing under Uniform Controlled Substances Act), as discussed in text accompanying notes 99-108 infra.
16. See State v. Lavin, 204 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 1973) (Iowa's obscenity statute is
constitutional but scienter must be aileged in indictment and proved), as discussed in
text accompanying notes 213-19 infra.
17. See State v. Lunsford, 204 N.W.2d 613 (Iowa 1973), as discussed in text accompanying notes 577-80 infra.
18. See State v. Wright, 203 N.W.2d 247 (Iowa 1972) (prosecution for statutory
rape), as discussed in text accompanying notes 318-20 infra and State v. Davis, 196
N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1972) (prosecution for vehicular manslaughter), as discussed in text
accompanying notes 194-97 infra.
19. See State v. Hansen, 203 N.W.2d 216 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text accompanying notes 285-87 infra.
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on defendant's refusal to take a breath test in another O.M.V.U.I. case; 20 the
admission of the State's evidence of defendant's bad character notwithstanding
a proper foundation therefor; 21 the exclusion of defendant's proferred evidence
in three cases; 22 improper limitation on defendant's examination of witnesses
for equivocation and unresponsiveness; 23 failure to declare mistrials in two
cases; 24 failure to direct the verdict in nine cas'es; 25 and improper jury instructions in ten cases. 26 The four errors involving the sentencing process 27 included: the trial court's failure to exercise judicial discretion by sentencing defendant according to a judicial district-wide sentencing policy of a twenty-day
minimum jail sentence (subject to probation) notwithstanding the lack of a statutory minimum; 28 the trial court's entry of judgment and sentence ordering an
indigent defendant to make immediate payment of the fine or to be imprisoned
for default thereof; 29 denial of postconviction relief to a defendant claiming
20. See State v. Hall, 203 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1973 ), as discussed in text accompanying notes 282-84 infra.
21. See State v. Sill, 199 N.W.2d 47 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text accompanying
notes 654-58 infra.
22. See State v. McDaniel, 204 N.W.2d 627 (Iowa 1973) (evidence of statutory
rape prosecutrix's other promiscuous acts admissible as to someone else besides defendant
being her attacker), as discussed in text accompanying notes 321-22 infra. State v.
Smiley, 201 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1972) (improper exercise of judicial discretion to exclude, as too remote, defendant's proferred evidence of heavy drinking earlier that
evening by gang members who started the altercation, with defendant's assault-andbattery conviction arising out of defendant's attempt to break up the fighting in his tavern); as discussed in text accompanying notes 642-43 infra and State v. Johnson, 196
N.W.2d 563 (Iowa 1972) (evidence of restitution admissible in prosecution for false drawing and uttering as to lack of intent to defraud), as discussed in text accompanying
notes 135-38 infra.
23. See State v. Smiley, 201 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text accompanying notes 5-97.
24. See State v. Vickroy, 205 N.W.2d 748 (Iowa 1973) (improper opening and closing arguments by prosecutor), as discussed in text accompanying notes 682-87 infra
and State v. Ware, 205 N.W.2d 700 (Iowa 1973) (illegally-obtained confession introduced into evidence), as discussed in text accompanying notes 663-67 infra.
25. See note 6 supra.
26. See State v. Dunn, 199 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1972) (collateral issues improperly
interjected); State v. Hansen, 203 N.W.2d 216 (Iowa 1972) (unconstitutional conclusive
application of statutory presumption of intoxication); State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555
(Iowa 1973) (revision of test for giving of instruction on lesser included offense); State v.
Hocker, 201 N.W.2d 74 (Iowa 1972) (improper exception under hunting by artificial light
statute); State v. Hutton, ·207 N.W.2d 581 (Iowa 1973) (unconstitutional conclusi1•e
application of statutory presumption of intoxication); State v. McGranahan, 206 N.W.2d
88 (Iowa 1973) (defective definition of reasonable doubt); State v. Mays, 204 N.W.2d
862 (Iowa 1973) (improper to give instruction on aiding and abetting where no evidentiary support that more than one person was involved); State v. Milliken, 204 N.W.2d
594 (Iowa 1973) (improper emphasis on evidence adverse to defendant); State v. Sill,
199 N.W.2d 47 (Iowa 1972) (diminished responsibility because of voluntary intoxication
can vitiate specific intent and thus lead to acquittal); and State v. Sloan, 203 N.W.2d 225
(Iowa 1972) (unconstitutional conclusive application of statutory presumption of intoxication). For a further discussion of each of the above, see part III, § B, subsec. 5 infra.
27. See also State v. Milliken, 204 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1973) (trial courts must
avoid making improper reference in sentencing colloquy to court's inability to impose a
jail sentence except if an indigent defendant could not pay the fine when, as here, the
only possible penalties were imprisonment in the penitentiary or a fine or both but not
imprisonment in the county jail).
28. See State v. Jackson, 204 N.W.2d 915 (Iowa 1973), as discussed in text accompanying notes 828-31 infra.
29. See State v. Snyder, 203 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text accompanying notes 823-24 infra.
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his two sentences, under the peculiar circumstances, must only run concurrently rather than consecutively;30 and improper resentencing under the new
Uniform Controlled Substances Act for a crime committed under the former
Uniform Narcotics Act. 31

II.

SUBSTANTIVE LAW

A.

General Principles

Various general principles concerning substantive criminal law were dealt
with during the survey period. These included: corroboration of an accompolice's testimony, the scope of aiding and abetting, and the setting of venue in
the proper county.
1.

Accomplice

Various aspects of the law concerning corroboration of an accomplice's
testimony 32 were discussed during the survey period. Rep'eating the general
rule that an accomplice is a witness who "could be charged with and convicted
of the specific offense for which an accused is on tria/," 33 the court held in
State v. Armstrong34 that the fact that the State's witness was defendant's accomplice in an earlier transaction in which they participated in a similar but
separate offense does not ipso facto make him an accomplice in the instant
offense. In State v. Houston, 35 the court held that when defendant claims
that certain State's witnesses aided and abetted in the crime "the burden was
upon [defendant] to so prove by a preponderance of the evidence,"36 rather
than for the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the State's witnesses
were not defendant's accomplices. That the corroborative evidence can come
from defendant himself was made clear in State v. Williams. 37 This may be
by way of "his admissions, declarations, conduct, writings or other documentary evidence" 38-but, of course, not through his tacit admissions. 39
2.

Aiding and Abetting
Two survey cases illustrated diametrically-opposed appellate results on

30. See Cleesen v. Brewer, 201 N.W.2d 474 (Iowa 1972), as discussed
accompanying notes 835-36 infra.
31. See State v. Wiese, 201 N.W.2d 734 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text
panying notes 837-40 infra.
32. See IowA CoDE § 782.5 (1973 ).
33. State v. Armstrong, 203 N.W.2d 269, 273 (Iowa 1972), quoting State
nings, 195 N.W.2d 351, 356 (Iowa 1972).
34. Id.
35. 206 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1973).
36. Id. at 689.
37. 207 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1973).
38. Id. at 107.
39. Id., citing State v. Kelsey, 201 N.W.2d 921 (Iowa 1972), as discussed
accompanying notes 629-32 infra.

in text

ac.comv. Jen-

in text
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the issue of sufficiency of evidence to convict on the theory of aiding and abetting.4o
The conviction for larceny in the nighttime was revers'ed in State v.
Barnes, 41 with the supreme court stating: "One cannot be convicted of crime
upon a theory of aiding and abetting unless there is sufficient evidence to show
he assented to or lent countenance and approval to the criminal act either by
active participation in it or by some manner encouraging it prior to or at the
time of its commission." 42 Defendant and one Taylor had driven up to a gas
station together and entered-with the announced purposes of Taylor to use
the restroom and defendant to buy cigarettes. Coming into the office from
outside to make change for defendant, the station attendant saw Taylor taking
money from the station's money bag and defendant (with his back to Taylor)
looking out the office door toward the attendant. Whereupon Taylor took
flight, defendant remained there and requested his change. With defendant's
stated purpose for his presence at the scene being lawful and there being no
direct evidence that defendant saw or knew of the theft, the supreme court
reversed the conviction because the circumstantial evidence was insufficient
for the jury to find that he was acting as Taylor's lookout. The court said:
"Even if we accept the State's claim defendant tried to protect Taylor after
the theft, his conduct then would not be enough to prove his earlier complicity . . . ." 43 It added: "[S]ubsequent conduct is relevant only insofar
as it tends to prove defendant's prior encouragement or participation. A defendant may not be convicted as a principal on a theory of aiding and abetting
for conduct which would only make him an accessory after the fact." 44
On the other hand, a conviction for false pretenses involving fraudulent
insurance sales schemes was affirmed in State v. Buttolph. 45 Concerning the
requisite knowledge of the crime prior to its commission, the supreme court
said that such knowledge "may be inferred from circumstances surrounding
the act . . . . [P]articipation may be shown by 'presence, companionship,
and conduct before and after the offense is committed.' " 46 The court pointed
out that the jury could find defendant fraudulently obtained insurance application forms, regularly met with fellow fraudulent insurance salesmen to split
the premiums, and wrongfully endorsed victim-clients' checks. Other evidence
indicated a common plan or scheme to sell fraudulent policies, as well as use
of fictitious names, by defendant and his "business associates."
40. See generally IowA CoDE§ 688.1 (1973).
41. 204 N.W.2d 827 (Iowa 1972).
42. ld. at 828.
43. ld. at 829.
44. ld. at 828-29.
45. 204 N.W.2d 824 (Iowa 1972).
46. ld. at 825; accord State v. Youngbear, 203 N.W.2d 274, 280 (Iowa 1972) quoting
State v. Myers, 158 N.W.2d 717, 720-21 (Iowa 1968): "Participation in criminal intent
may be inferred from one's presence in and near the scene of the crime, and his conduct
before and after the offense is committed."
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Setting Venue

In a rare instance of venue being set in the wrong county, the opinion in
State v. Durham 41 begins: "The wrong charge was brought against the defendant in the wrong county." 4 s While in Des Moines (Polk County), one
Mr. Geesaman, a resident of Indianola (Warren County), agreed to a bizarre
get-rich-quick scheme by which he would give $700 to a defendant, a resident
of Des Moines, and be refunded $2000. Purportedly defendant was involved
with the mafia and Geesaman, although cooling on the scheme but fearing for
his and defendant's well being, reluctantly turned the $700 over to defendant
merely as a loan. When defendant subsequently called Geesaman and said
that both of them had been "ordered" to come up with another $1500, Geesaman went to the police. By arrangement with the authorities, Geesaman then
went to defendant's home and told him that Geesaman had been unable to
get the money. Defendant responded: "You know as well as I do what is
going to happen. That is why I carry this" (presumably a gun). Geesaman
then told defendant he could get the money elsewhere but that defendant
would have to come to Geesaman's house (in Indianola) to get it. Defendant
then went to Indianola and was given the $1500. "[T]his is the first of the
events occurring in Warren County," the supreme court determined, 49 without
further discussion other than noting that the reason for the payoff being made
in Indianola was to raise a charge in Warren County. 5°
B.
1.

Specific Crimes

Abortion

The most celebrated recent development in substantive criminal law was
the United States Supreme Court's voiding of state statutes (similar to Iowa
Code section 701.1) which proscribe abortions during all states of pregnancy
except when necessary to save the life of the mother. However, Roe v. Wade 51
further held that the expectant mother's right to an abortion is not absolute
and she thus is not entitled to terminate her pregnancy "at whatever time, in
whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses," but rather "at
some point the state interests as to protection of health, medical standards, and
prenatal life, become dominant. " 52
47. 196 N.W.2d 428 (Iowa 1972).
48. ld. at 428.
49. ld. at 429.
50. The other three "venue-setting" decisions upheld the propriety of resorting to
judicial notice in establishing venue. See State v. Creighton, 201 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Iowa
1972): "Venue was established by resorting to the helpful circumstantial evidence rule
and the even more friendly principle that in deciding venue questions we may take judicial
notice of the location of towns, geographical boundaries and certain designated places
when shown to be within a certain distance of an established point;" accord State v.
Hackett, 200 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1972) and State v. Hackett, 197 N.W.2d 569 (Iowa 1972).
51. 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
52. ld. at 727-28.
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The following guidelines for a constitutional state criminal abortion statute
were set forth in Roe v. Wade:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the
medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first
trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the
mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways
that are reasonably related to maternal health [e.g., qualifications
of the person performing the abortion, licensure of that person, licensing of the facility where abortion is performed].
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability [i.e., six months] the
State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life,
may, if it chooses, regulate and even proscribe, abortion except
where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.
(d) The State may define the term "physician," . . . to mean on:Iy
a physician currently licensed by the State, and may proscribe any
abortion by a person who is not a physician as so defined. 53
The Supreme Court's conclusion that the s·ection in the challenged Texas
statute exempting abortions "for the purpose of saving the life of the mother"
was unconstitutionally restrictive meant that the Texas abortion statutes, "as a
unit, must fall." The mother-saving exemption "cannot be stricken separately,
for then the State is left with a statute proscribing all abortion procedures no
matter how medically urgent the case." 54 A three-judge federal district court
subsequently held in a declaratory judgment that "the Iowa abortion statute
is unconstitutional and of no force and effect." 55
In the companion case of Doe v. Bolton, 56 the Supreme Court declared
several procedural features of Georgia's "modern" anti-abortion statute unconstitutional. These included the following requirements as summarized in
the opinion: "(1) that the abortion be performed in a hospital accredited by
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals; (2) that the procedure be
approved by the hospital staff abortion committee; and (3) that the performing physician's judgment be confirmed by the independent examinations of the
patient by two other licensed physicians." 57 Additionally, the statutory limitation of abortions to "bona fide legal resident[s] of the State of Georgia" 58 was
voided. Also voided was the statutory provision limiting abortions except
where: (1) the expectant mother's life would be endangered or her health
seriously and permanently injured; (2) the fetus likely would be born with a
serious mental or physical defect; or (3) the pregnancy resulted from forcible
or statutory rape.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

ld. at 732-33.
Id. at 733.
Doe v. Turner, Civil No. 73-57-2 (S.D. Iowa, Aug. 3, 1973) (3 judge court).
93 S. Ct. 739 (1973 ).
Id. at 747-48.
Jd. at 753.

September 1973]

2.

Survey of Iowa Law

65

Arson

In State v. Dunn, 59 the court held that the State is not required in a
prosecution for arson 60 to prove that defendant's unlawful burning of another's
personal property stemmed from defendant's personal hostility or revenge towards the other person. To the contrary, the proof was that defendant was
hired by the owner of a car to burn the car to enable the owner to collect
the insurance proceeds. The court pointed out that, while arson requires
willful and malicious burning, willfully means "purposely, deliberately, intentionally"61 and that "the intentional doing of a 'wrongful act,' without justification or lawful excuse, will permit an inference of a wicked state of mind,
i.e., legal malice, as opposed to actual malic'e. " 62

3.

Assaults

Iowa Code section 694.1, prescribing penalties for assault and for assault and battery, was upheld in State v. Vick 63 against the contention that it
was unconstitutionally vague for lack of statutory definition of these crimes.
The supreme court utilized the familiar principle that common law elements
are ascribed to crimes that are merely named but not defined in the Iowa
Code.
4.

Breaking and Entering

A conviction for breaking and entering 64 was upheld in State v. Bone, 65
notwithstanding th'e fact that neither the owner nor the tenant of the brokeninto premises testified. "Want of consent by the owner or occupant to enter
into his premises may be proved by circumstantial evidence," 66 the court
noted. 67

5.

Burglary
The suprerne court took the occasion in State v. Osborn 68 to define night-

59. 199 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1972).
60. See IOWA CODE§ 707.3 (1973).
61. 199 N.W.2d at 107.
62. ld. at 108.
63. 205 N.W.2d 727 (Iowa 1973).
64. See IOWA CODE§ 708.8 (1973).
65. 201 N.W.2d 80 (Iowa 1972).
66. ld. at 82.
67. See State v. Hougland, 197 N.W.2d 364, 365 (Iowa 1972): "'Breaking' means
making_ an opening into a building by !respass and occurs '_Vhen a!l int~der remoyes or
puts astde some part of the structure rehed en as an obstn1ct1on to mtn.1s10n. Opening an
entrance door is a breaking." See also State v. Mays, 204 N.W.2d 862, 865 (Iowa 1973 ),
quoting State v. Jensen, 245 Iowa 1363, 1373, 66 N.W.2d 480, 485 (1954): "[P]roof of
defendant's possession of recently stolen property when it is also shown that the larceny
took place in connection with a burglary is sufficient to warrant a conviction of breaking
and entering." Cf. State v. Osborn, 200 N.W.2d 798, 805 (Iowa 1972): "It is apparent
the possession of property recently stolen in connection with a burglary is not an 'essential element' of the crime of burglary, even though the unexplained possession of recently
stolen property may give rise to an inference of the guilt of the possessor of the crime of
larceny."
68. 200 N.W.2d 798 (Iowa 1972).
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time within the burglary statute. 69 "It is the general rule, in the absence of a
statutory provision to the contrary, that the 'nighttime,' within the definition of
burglary, is, as was held at common law, a period between sunset and sunrise
during which there is not daylight enough by which to discern a man's face,'' 70
the court pointed out. 71

6.

Contempt of Court

a. Trial by Jury. Reversing Newby v. District Court, 72 the Iowa supreme court held in Sarich v. Havercamp 73 that trial courts can no longer per
se deny a jury trial to defendants charged with contempt. 74 Rather, the view
was adopted therein that "the penalty involved, that is, the statutorily authorized maximum penalty shall be the relevant criterion as the determination
of a contemnor's right to a trial by jury, vis-a-vis the view the penalty actually
imposed shall be determinative of the question." 75 Sarich had been charged
with 28 counts of contempt of court for alleged violation of an injunction forbidding him from practicing dentistry. Thus facing the possibility of 14 years'
imprisonment if convicted on all of these charges, 76 defendant demanded a
jury trial, which was overruled. On trial to the court, he was convicted of five
counts but was sentenced to only six months' imprisonment on these charges.
However, the instant judgment also revoked defendant's probation on a
previous six-month sentence and the sentence on the instant charge was made
to run consecutively with the serving of the earlier sentence. Thus, the supreme court concluded that either the "potential penalty" or "imposed penalty" criterion dictated vacating the judgment and remand for a trial by jury. 77
By implication the pivotal time period for determining the right to a jury
trial was set at six months, in light of the reference in Sarich to Duncan v.
Louisiana, 78 which affords a sixth ameadment right to trial by jury in State
offenses carrying possible penalties ·exceeding six months' imprisonment unless
the particular crime does not otherwise qualify as a petty offense, and to
Baldwin v. New York, 79 which held that a contemnor cannot be denied "the
important right to trial by jury where the possible penalty exceeds six months'
imprisonment." 80 Because the maximum authorized imprisonment for con69. See IowA CoDE§ 708.1 (1973).
70. 200 N.W.2d at 807, quoting State v. Dougherty, 186 Kan. 820, 821, 352 P.2d
1031, 1032 (1960).
71. See also note 63 supra.
72. "This court has repeatedly held for more than a hundred years that a person
may be punished for contempt without a jury trial." Newby v. District Court, 259 Iowa
1330, 1342, 147 N.W.2d 886, 893-94 (1967).
73. 203 N.W.2d 260 (Iowa 1972 ).
74. See IowA CoDE§ 665.2 (1973) and IowA R. Crv. P. 330.
75. 203 N.W.2d at 268.
76. See IowA CoDE§ 665.4 (1973).
77. 203 N.W.2d at 268.
78. 391 u.s. 145 (1968).
79. 399 u.s. 66 (1970).
80. ld. at 72-73.
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viction of one count of contempt under Iowa law is six months, 81 there is still
no right to jury trial unless defendant is charged with more than one count. 82
b. Violation of Injunction. In Sound Storm Enterprises, Inc. v. Keefe, 83
the Iowa supreme court upheld contempt convictions against promoters of a
rock music festival. Their contumacious acts consisted of violation of a modified temporary injunction which enjoined them from: (1) violating health
and safety regulations under Iowa Code sections 444.18 and 332.23 as well
as state health department regulations, and (2) committing or encouraging the
committing of any public offense. Specifically, the first offense consisted of
failing to obtain the requisite permits as well as noncompliance with the health
and safety regulations whereas the second offense was based upon violation
of Code section 204.13 (keeping a place resorted to for illegal using of narcotic drugs).
These dictates of the decree did not come within the general rule that
"equity cannot enjoin the commission of criminal offenses." 84 Rather, as the
supreme court explained: "[W]here as in this case a statutory enactment is
regulatory in nature having for its primary purpose the promotion of public
interest and welfare, then attendant criminality neither gives nor ousts jurisdiction in equity."S5
Turning to the question of sufficiency of evidence to convict, the supreme
court noted that "proof of contempt must be clear and satisfactory." 86 Such
was the case here, with the court finding that "nothing more than futile token
or simulated efforts were made by petitioners to effect compliance with the
terms, spirit and intent of the restraining writs." 87 The "avalanche" was triggered by petitioners having launched the arrangements for the festival "before
requisite health, sanitation and safety permits were secured or essential facilities arranged" 88 and subsequently concluded these arrangements after an adverse temporary restraining order. Discounting petitioners' claim they were
unable to later stop the illegal activities (fostered by 20,000 persons contemporaneously swarming onto the scene), the court responded: "[P]etitioners created and brought on themselves the disability, if any, to comply with
the aforesaid court orders." That is, "the situation did not change after issuance of the writs, but rather continued pursuant to petitioners' self-initiated
premature plans and arrangements." 89 Finally, upholding both corporate and
individual criminal liability, the court said it is clear that "where, [as here],
writs are directed to the corporation and to its officers, agents or employees,
81. See IowA CoDE§ 665.4 (1973).
82. Cf. State v. Fagan, 190 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa 1971) (right to jury trial on indictable
misdemeanors).
83. 209 N.W.2d 560 (Iowa 1973).
84. ld. at 566.
85. ld.
86. ld. at 568.
87. ld.
88. ld.
89. ld.
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all are equally am'enable to punishment."90
7.

Controlled Substances/Drugs

Several of the survey cases dealt with important issues of drug control. 91
While most of these involved interpretations of Iowa's former Uniform Nartocic Drug Act92 and its former stimulant or depressant drug act, 93 the principles
stated therein appear to be applicable to Iowa's successor statute, the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act. 94
a. Exemptions for Lawful Use. The constitutionality of placing the burden of proof on defendant to prove that he did not come within one of the
exceptions of Iowa's former Uniform Narcotic Drug Act under which possession of narcotic drugs was not illegal was upheld in State v. Lynch. 95 While
that statute (like the controlled substances act) 96 prohibited all possession of
narcotic drugs except under certain enumerated circumstances, both statutes
then expressly excuse the State from negating any exemption claimed by defendant. Rejecting defendant's claim that the State "should have been compelled to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not come
within any of the exceptions instead of casting on him the burden to show
he did," 91 the supreme court declared:
If an exception is material in arriving at the definition of the crime,
it is generally held the State has the burden of showing the exception does not apply because it is then one of the essential elements of
the offense. However, where the exception merely furnishes an excuse for what would otherwise be criminal conduct, the duty devolves upon the defendant to bring himself within the exculpatory
provision. 98
b.

DeliveryI Sale.

i. Accommodation offense. The constitutionality of the accommodation offense provision99 in Iowa's new controlled substances act was upheld
in State v. Vietor 1 0° against the principal contention that it improperly shifts
the burden of proof to defendant. Essentially, this provision provides that following a conviction for delivery (or possession with intent to deliver), defendant may move for, and the court shall grant, a pre-sentence accommodation
hearing at which the burden is on defendant to prove (by clear and convincing
90. Id. at 569.
91. See generally Dunahoo, Iowa's Uniform Controlled Substances Act: A Coordi
nated Approach to Drug Control, 21 DRAKE L. REv. 77 (1971).
92. See IowA CoDE ch. 204 (1971) (since repealed).
93. See IowA CoDE ch. 204A (1971) (since repealed).
94. See IowA CoDE ch. 204 (1973 ).
95. 197 N.W.2d 186 (Iowa 1972).
96. See IowA CoDE§ 204.507 (1973).
97. 197 N.W.2d at 190.
98. ld.; accord Hom v. Haugh, 209 N.W.2d 119 (Iowa 1973).
99. See IowA CoDE§ 204.410 (1973).
100. 208 N.W.2d 894 (Iowa 1973) (en bane).
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evidence) that his offense was intended merely "as an accommodation to another individual and not with intent to profit thereby nor to induce the recipi" If defendant carries his burden, then
ent . . . to become addicted .
he shall be sentenced as if he had been convicted of simple possession (an
indictable misdemeanor).
In Vietor, the trial court made a pretrial ruling that the accommodation
offense provision in actuality created a second type of delivery offense, that is,
delivery as an accommodation to another. Accordingly, he further ruled that
a felony conviction for delivery under section 204.401 requires the State to
prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the delivery was made with
intent to profit thereby or to induce the recipient to become addicted. So
viewed, the trial court did not hold these sections totally void, the constitutional infirmities being "cured" by his restructuring of the statute.
On the State's pretrial certiorari proceeding, the supreme court reversed
(by a 5-4 vote) and thus left sections 204.401 and 204.410 intact. This court
concluded section 204.410 "establishes only a postconviction sentencing procedure by which the convicted person may, if he so desires, offer evidence in
mitigation of sentence." 101 Accordingly, this section "defines no crime [and]
adds no essential elements to the crime defined in section 204.401 . . . ." 102
Meanwhile, section 204.401 was construed as creating "a separate and distinct
crime without regard to the purpose or motive of the deliverer," 103 with all
of the essential elements of the crime of delivery being contained therein. 104
Procedural aspects of the accommodation offense provision were dealt
with in two other cases. In State v. Stil/,1° 5 the court pointed out that the
terminology of s'ection 204.410 "clearly indicates it is incumbent upon a convicted defendant to formally request a hearing before the court at the sentencing
stage if he is to preserve error by reason of the trial court's failure to follow
the provisions of this statute." 106 Thus, defendant's appellate claim of excessive sentence for failure to sentence under section 204.410 lacked merit since
defendant had not moved for an accommodation hearing. Furthermore, the
court held in State v. McGranahan 101 that in an accommodation hearing the
trial court "was not bound to accept defendant's testimony because it was not
contradicted. "Hl 8
ii. Lesser included offense. It was held in State v. Habhab 109 that possession of marijuana was not a lesser included offense of the crime of sale of
101. ld. at 898.
102. /d.
103. ld.
104. In another case decided the same day, the supreme court summarily affirmed by
the same 5-4 vote defendant's conviction for delivery and the trial court's subsequent
finding that "defendant failed to prove his alleged ground (accommodation) for mitigation
of punishment." State v. Thomas, 208 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1973) (en bane).
105. 208 N.W.2d 887 (Iowa 1973).
106. /d. at 894.
107. 206 N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 1973).
108. ld. at 93.
109. 209 N.W.2d 73 (Iowa 1973) (en bane).
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marijuana under Iowa's former narcotic drugs act. "Sale" therein had the statutory definition of "sale, barter, exchange, gift, or offer therefor," 110 and accordingly "[a] showing of possession . . . was not required as an element of
the offense." 111 Conceding that the evidence in the instant case "show[s] a
possession of the marijuana in connection with its sale," the supreme court
nevertheless pointed out that "this does not in itself make possession an included offense in the sale." 112 In other words, the existence of such evidentiary facts cannot supply an included offense "outside the elements of the major crime. " 113 Thus, even under the revised lesser included offense test recently enunciated in State v. Hawkins, 114 "it is quite possible to commit one
crime in the act of committing another and yet not have it an included offense. It is not included as a part of the elements of the major offense," 115
the court explained. The definitional language in the new controlled sub'5tances act does not appear to command a different decision.

c.

Possession.

i. Control of premises. In State v. Reeves,l1 6 the Iowa supreme court
for the first time promulgated comprehensive guidelines as to what constituted
possession under Iowa's former stimulant or depressant drug act. These guidelines were expressly made applicable to prosecutions for violation of Iowa's
controlled substances act. They include:
( 1) Unlawful possession of narcotics is established by proof:
(a) that the accused exercised dominion and control (i.e., possession) over the contraband,
(b) that he had knowledge of its presence, and
(c) that the accused had knowledge that the material was a narcotic.
(2) These necessary elements of unlawful possession may be establlished by circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences
drawn from such evidence.
( 3) Proof of opportunity of access to a place where narcotics are found
will not, without more, support a finding of unlawful possession.
( 4) But dominion and control (1-a) by the accused over the narcotics
does not mean the narcotic needs to be found on his person, nor
does it mean that he must have had sole and exclusive use of the
premises on which drugs are found.
110. See IOWA ConE§ 204 (1971) (since repealed).
111. 209 N.W.2d at 75.
112. /d.
113. ld.
114. 203 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1973 ). For a further discussion of this case, see text
accompanying notes 776-770, infra.
115. 209 N.W.2d at 75.
116. 209 N.W.2d 18 (Iowa 1973).
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Constructive possession is all that is necessary and occurs when the
accused maintains control or a right to control the narcotic; possession may be imputed when the contraband is found in a place which
is immediately and exclusively accessible to the accused and subject to his dominion and control, or to the joint dominion and control of the accused and another.
If the premises on which the drugs are found are exclusively accessible to the accused and subject to his use, possession or control, knowledge of their presence on such premises ( 1-b) coupled
with his ability to maintain dominion control (1-a) may be inferred.
Even if the accused does not have exclusive control of the hiding
place possession may be imputed if he has not abandoned the narcotic and no other person has obtained possession.
Knowledge of the narcotic character ( 1-c) of the drug, as well as
of their presence (1-b) may be shown by the conduct, behavior
and declarations of the accused.U 7

Summarizing these principles, the supreme court said that the Iowa procedure in prosecutions for unlawful possession of controlled substances or drugs
will be that "the State must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew of the presence of such substances or premises occupied and controlled by him, either exclusively or jointly with others and the nature of the
material." 11 8 However, the type of proof required varies according to whether
the premises are in the exclusive or joint possession of the accused. If the accused exclusively possesses the premises on which the substances or drugs
are found, "knowledge of their presence on such premises coupled with his
ability to maintain control over such substances may be inferred." This inference of knowledge, of course, "is rebuttable and not conclusive;" however, "no
further proof of knowledge by the State is required . . . ." 119 On the other
hand, if the accused has only joint possession of the premises, "knowledge of
the presence of the substances on the premises and the ability to maintain
control over them by the accused will not be inferred but must be established
by proof." This proof may be by way of evidence establishing the accused's
actual knowledge, his incriminating statements or circumstantial evidence from
which the jury "might lawfully infer knowledge . . . ." 120 Either way, the
question of knowledge is one for the jury upon instructions embodying these
principles.
ii. Quantity of substance. State v. Grady 121 established that even a
miniscule quantity of a drug is sufficient to support a conviction for violation of
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

/d.at23.
ld. at 23.
ld.
ld.

201 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1972).
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Iowa's former narcotic drugs act, rather than requiring that a usable quantity
be involved. Pointing out that the Code "defines marijuana, but makes no
distinction as to the quantitative amount of marijuana in any gross substance
containing the same," the court concluded, th'erefore, that the statute was "qualitative rather than quantitative . . . ." 122 Accordingly, it was immaterial in
the instant prosecution for illegal sale of mariquana that there was "an insufficient quantity of marijuana in the exhibit to be used in the usual manner, that
is, to be smoked," or "to produce a narcotic effect." 123 The terminology in
the successor statute (the uniform controlled substances act) is similar, including the express language "any quantity" in several sections. 124
8.

Driving While Operator's License Under Suspension

A conviction for driving while operator's license under suspension125 was
reversed in State v. Hoffer 126 because of lack of proof that defendant's license
was still under suspension at the time he was driving. Effective April 19, 1970,
defendant's driving privilege was suspended for ninety days, with the suspension to remain in effect until such time as he posted proof of financial responsibility.127 Thus, the fixed suspension period expired July 18, 1970, and
defendant was stopped on October 13, 1970, for a faulty headlight. The State's
claim of sufficiency of evidence rested entirely on the ninety-day notice served
on March 19, 1970, and "absence of license in defendant's possession at the
time he was stopped." 128 The supreme court said: "It is as reasonable to believe defendant may have tolled the suspension by proving financial responsibility as not." 129 With the State having the burden of proving defendant's
license was still suspended on October 13, 1970, there was insufficient evidence
for a jury question since "[p]roof defendant's license might have been suspended at the time does not support a finding it was." 130 The only evievidence of continued suspension of defendant's license was a police teletype
message at the time defendant was stopped that he was under suspension.
This message being hearsay, the State conceded that it was offered only to
show the reason for arresting defendant and "not to establish the truth of the
message." 131 Agr'eeing, the supreme court determined: "What the message
said has no probative value on the issue of license suspension." 132
9.

Failure to Have Motor Vehicle Under Control

A motorist's unreasonable speed while approaching a sharp curve was
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

I d. at 496.
ld.

See, e.g., IOWA CODE§§ 204.204(4), .208(2), and .210(2) (1973).
See IOWA CODE§ 321A.32(1) (1973).
197 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1972).
See IOWA CoDE§ 321A.18 (1973).
197 N.W.2d at 369.
ld.
Id. at 370.
ld. at 369.
ld.
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held in State v. Nelson 133 to be a proper basis for a conviction for failure to have
motor vehicle under control. Code section 321.288 is essentially "a speed statute," the supreme court determined, adding that "[a] speed which is reasonable and proper under some circumstances may be excessive under others." 134
10.

False Drawing and Uttering

a. Evidence of Intent to Defraud. That defendant is entitled to show
restitution, not as a defense but as to evidence of drawer's lack of intent to defraud, in a prosecution for false drawing and uttering135 was determined in
State v. Johnson. 136 The reversible error occurred here during defendant's
cross-examination of the person given the bad check. After the drawee stated
that defendant had given him bad checks in the past and that defendant's
father had paid them, defendant attempted to show restitution of the check instantly involved "for the limited purpose of aiding the jury in determining
whether defendant acted with an intent to defraud." 137 Holding that such evidence could not be excluded, the supreme court added: "It would be proper
to instruct the jury on the limited purpose for which it might consider such
evidence." 138
Another error occurred in this same case when the trial court excluded
evidence of past transactions between defendant and the drawee involving bad
checks. Defendant had attempted to show that because of defendant's previous bad checks to the drawee which subsequently were made good by defendant's father, the drawee was not deceived by the instant bad check. Holding the exclusion of such evidence to be error, the supreme court said: "For
the [limited] purpose of determining whether defendant obtained the money
by intentionally false representations, it was material to know defendant's relations to the bank and the manner in which the business between them had
been carried on." 139
b.
The Ten-Day Presumptive Evidence Rule. The Code section 713.4
ten-day presumptive evidence rule was characterized in State v. Mason 140 as
"merely articulat[ing] an evidentiary rule." Accordingly, "[f]ailure to pay
the check after a ten-day notice is not an element" 141 of the crime of false
uttering of a check and the trial court thus correctly refused to instruct that
defendant could not be convicted unless he was s'erved with a notice of nonpayment at least ten days before filing of the charge. This crime, instead,
is committed "when the check writer receives a thing of value, assuming all
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

207 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa
/d. at 753.
See IowA CODE§ 713.3
196 N.W.2d 563 (Iowa
/d. at 568.
/d. at 570.
ld. at 571.
203 N.W.2d 292 (Iowa
/d. at 295.

1973).
(1973).
1972).

1972).
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other elements are present" 142 and Code section 713.4 does not accord a tenday grace period to make restitution for a worthless check. Nor is defendant
entitled to a ten-day notice, but then the State is precluded from the benefit
of the rebuttable presumption of fraudulent intent. All that this provision imports is that failure of the maker or drawer of the check to pay the holder
the amount due thereon within ten days after sufficient notice that the check
has not been paid by the drawee constitutes "prima facie evidence of intent
to defraud." 143 The State, of course, is free to elect to not rely on section
713.4, as it did instantly.14 4
11.

Flag Desecration

The constitutionality of Iowa's flag desecration statute145 was upheld in
State v. Farrell, 146 against the twin contentions that the act is unconstitutionally overbroad and that it cannot constitutionally be applied to symbolic
political protest. 147 Accordingly, defendant's conviction for burning a United
States flag was upheld on an 8-1 vote. Applying the United States v. O'Brien 148
guidelines, the court agreed that "the State unquestionably has a compelling
vital interest in preservation of the public peace, and in furtherance thereof
may prohibit forms of conduct which constitute a threat thereto." 149 Declaring that section 32.1 "is no longer applicable to the utterance of pure speech," 150
the court determined that this statute, as applied, "is directed to and regulates
the form by which defendant's message was expressed, not the content
thereo£." 151 Thus, the court concluded that Code section 32.1, as here applied, "is sufficiently irrelative to suppression of free expression." 152
That no evidence was presented disclosing that a breach of peac·e was
committed or imminent was considered immaterial, "since the physical act of
burning a United States flag is conduct which could reasonably be expected
to provoke a breach of peace." 153 Moreover, only a minimal restriction on
expression emanates from section 32.1, which is "no more than essential to a
furtherance of the State's legitimate interest in maintaining public order." 154
The overbreadth challenge was not reached because of defendant's lack of
standing under the Raines doctrine. 1 55
142. ld.; accord State v. Kimball, 203 N.W.2d 296, 300 (Iowa 1972): "When the
other elements exist, the crime under § 713.3 is complete whether or not the check is ever
presented to the drawee."
143. See IOWA CODE§ 713.4 (1973).
144. 203 N.W.2d 292, 295 (Iowa 1972).
145. IOWA CODE § 32.1 ( 1973).
146. 209 N.W.2d 103 (1973) (en bane).
147. This latter claim had not been asserted in State v. Waterman, 190 N.W.2d 809
(Iowa 1971 ).
148. 391 u.s. 367, 377 (1968).
149. 209 N.W.2d at 107.
150. ld. at 106, citing Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
151. ld. at 107.
152. ld.
153. Jd.
154. ld. at 108.
155. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960): "[O]ne to whom appli-

September 1973]

12.

Survey of Iowa Law

75

Going Armed with Intent

That the State is not required in a prosecution for going armed with intent156 to introduce proof of the particular person against whom defendant
intended to use his gun was settled in State v. Buchanan. 151 The supreme
court explained that Code section 695.1 "contains no requirement that a person going forth with a pistol have intent to shoot some particular person or
class of persons. If he intends to use the weapon against the person of someone unlawfully, the intent element of the crime is satisfied." 158 Additionally,
the fact that defendant had only proceeded a short distance from his home
does not present a question of sufficiency of evidence. Indeed, "[t]he distance
an armed individual goes from his home might be relevant upon the intent
element in a proper case, but that would be a matter for the jury." 159
13.

Hunting by Artificial Light

In State v. Hocker,l 60 the supreme court found error in the trial court's
instruction in a prosecution for hunting by artificial light 161 that the jury
should find defendant not guilty if it determined that he was on the premises
in question at the request of the landowner for the purpose of tracking down
animals that had been killing the owner's domestic animals. On this State's
appeal following defendant's acquittal,l 62 the supreme court said: "It was
error to instruct on an exception to the statute which is plainly not present in
its language." 163 Here, "[d]ogs were not being used" and "[n]o treed animal
was being pursued" 164 (the only exceptions in the statute).
14.

Interference with the Administration of Justice

The crime of interference with the administration of justice165 was differentiated from that of resisting execution of process 166 in State v. Graham. 16 1
Any willful, improper obstruction of a law enforcement officer's effectuation
of an administrative duty violates the former, the supreme court pointed out.
An officer acts in an administrative capacity while engaged "in the performance of his duties required of him by a court order, judgment or decree, civil
cation of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground
that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in
which its application might be unconstitutional."
156. See IOWA CODE§ 695.1 (1973).
157. 207 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1973).
158. ld. at 786.
159. ld., citing State v. Hunley, 167 N.W.2d 645 (Iowa 1969).
160. 201 N.W.2d 74 (Iowa 1972).
161. See IowA CoDE§ 109.93 (1973).
162. ld. § 793.9.
163. 201 N.W.2d 74, 75 (Iowa 1972).
164. ld.
165. See IOWA CODE§ 723.1 (1973).
166. ld. § 742.1.
167. 203 N.W.2d 600 (Iowa 1973).
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or criminal.
" 168 But when he acts or attempts to act "by virtue of his
general authority he is performing an executive function." 169 Accordingly,
any person "willfully resisting or opposing him in the carrying out of such
functions would be violating Code § 742.1" 170 (i.e., r'esisting execution of
process).
In Graham, the criminal conduct arose when the deputies were ordered (in
a supplemental divorce decree) to take custody of two minor children from
defendant's friend. Upon the. deputies' inquiry at defendant's apartment, and
advisement of the judicial decree, 171 defendant denied the children's presence
and refused entry to the deputies-but the deputies thereupon got a warrant
and the children were found therein. Defendant's conviction for interference
with the administration of justice was affirmed since the sheriff's deputies
were effectuating a judicial decree (for taking custody of minor children) and
thus "any willful, improper obstruction of such administration of justice would
constitute a violation of Code§ 723.1 .
"172

15.

Larceny

A larceny173 conviction was reversed in State v. Durham174 because the
owner turned the property over to defendant. 175 "Th'e owner's nonconsent
has always been an indispensable element to the crime of larceny," 176 the supreme court declared. In fact, as here, "even though an accused conceives
a larcenous scheme, where it becomes known to the property owner and the
property owner informs the police and furnishes the property for taking so
as to apprehend the accused, the owner thereby consents to the taking and
the accused is not guilty of larceny." 1 77
16.

Larceny of a Motor Vehicle

Overruling State v. Everett, 178 the supreme court held in State v. Hawkins179 that operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent180 can be a
lesser included offense of the crime of larceny of a motor v'ehicle. 181 Never168. Jd. at 603.
169. Jd.
170. Jd.
171. "[l]t was the State's burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant
acted 'intentionally' and 'knew' the officers were executing or attempting to execute a
court order." ld. at 604.
172. Id. at 603.
173. See IowA CoDE§ 709.1 (1973).
174. 196 N.W.2d 428 (Iowa 1972).
175. For the factual situation in Durham, 8ee text accompanying notes 47-50, supra.
176. 196 N.W.2d at 430.
177. Id., quoting 10 A.L.R.3d 1126. See also State v. Aossey, 201 N.W.2d 731
(Iowa 1972) concerning defendant's allegedly mistaken belief that his accomplice had
authority to remove the property and thus men8 rea was lacking.
178. 157 N.W.2d 144 (Iowa 1968).
179. 203 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1973).
180. See IowA CODE§ 321.76 (1973).
181. ld. § 321.82.
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theless, the court reiterated that "the evidence must justify the submission of the
included offense" and thus "if there is no evidence from which the jury could
find the defendant guilty of the included offense, then such included offense
need not be submitted." 182 Applying this test to the instant facts, the court
determined that "it would have been impossible for defendant to commit the
offense charged without a showing of each element necessary to convict him
of the lesser offense." 183 This was because the State's evidence showed that
defendant had taken another's automobile without permission and had been
apprehended while driving it. This without more would constitute the crime
of operating a motor vehicle without th'e owner's consent, and proof of one
additional element (i.e., defendant's intent to permanently convert the automobile to his own use) was all that was necessary to constitute the crime of
larceny of a motor vehicle. 184 Accordingly, defendant's conviction for larceny
of a motor vehicle was reversed because of the failure to submit an instruction
on the aforementioned lesser included offense.
17.

Larceny in the Nighttime

That a theft must be made from within (and not from) a building, vessel,
or motor vehicle in order to constitute larceny in the nighttime 185 was made
clear in State v. Smith. 186 Reversing defendant's conviction for stealing a
tire and rim from a wheel on an automobile, the supreme court noted: "There
was no indication that defendant had entered the Buick passenger section,
trunk, or engine compartm'ent." 187 The court said that the word "in" is
"more restrictive than 'from'. We believe that 'in' as used here means 'within
a particular place' or 'on the interior or inner side: within.' " 1 88
18.

Loitering

In its first interpretations of anti-loitering statutes189 since Papachristou
182. 203 N.W.2d at 557, quoting State v. Marshall, 206 Iowa 373, 375, 220 N.W.
106 (1928).
183. 203 N.W.2d at 557.
184. Contrastingly, in State v. Everett, 157 N.W.2d 144 (Iowa 1968) the factual situation was similar but the trial court (and the supreme court) refused to consider the
evidence of the case, relying instead on an abstract proposition that it would have been
possible for the motor vehicle to have been stolen without anyone operating it (e.g., by
using a crane and truck). "Proof of the operation of the car which is an essential element
of section 321.76 would in such instances be irrelevant" and thus the crime of operating
a motor vehicle without the owner's consent is not "necessarily included" in the crime of
larceny of a motor vehicle, the court reasoned, notwithstanding the lack of evidence of
any such bizarre events in the instant case. 157 N.\V.2d at 149. Of course, if this hypothetical ever materializes, then State v. Hawkins would not require the submission of
the lesser included offense, since the evidence of the case would indicate the lack of defendant's operating of the vehicle.
185. See IOWA CoDE§ 709.4 (1973).
186. 196 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa 1972).
187. /d. at 440.
188. /d.
189. IowA CoDE § 746.1 (1973) ("Vagrants" defined) was declared unconstitutional
by the trial court and thus was not reviewed in the instant appeal of defendant's conviction under the municipal ordinance.
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v. City of Jacksonville, 190 the Iowa supreme court upheld a distinguishable municipal ordinance 191 in Henrichs v. Hildreth. 192 Nevertheless, the court "suggested" certain guidelines for a constitutionally-acceptable anti-loitering ordinance. Specifically, the court held that such an ordinance like the instant one,
is not unconstitutional on its face if it is "directed to those persons, grouped
or assembled, who obstruct the free and open use of public walkways by
pedestrians" and if it "is stated in sufficiently definite terms to enable all reasonable persons to know what conduct is proscribed and what acts will make
them subject to the penalty provided." 1 93
19.

Manslaughter

A conviction for involuntary manslaughter194 was reversed in State v.
Davis195 because of the State's testimony regarding defendant's invalid driver's
license "in the absence of a showing of a causal relationship between the invalid license and the collision." 196 After the officer's bare statement indicating a separate offense, "[t]he subject was pursued no further. Whether
defendant's license had expired or was invalid for other reasons does not appear."l97
The supreme court also held in Davis that defendant is not entitled to an
instruction on recklessness that "even if he was aware of a dangerous situation,
recklessness would be shown only if he did not exercise the slightest care to
avoid injury to others . . . ." 198 As to defendant's belated effort to stop, the
supreme court reaffirmed:
One who, by his recklessness has created a hazard which he should
have foreseen and guarded against, is not exonerated from the charge
of gross indifference to the safety of others by a futile last minute
effort to retrieve the situation and avoid the danger and injury. Such
an attempt may have some bearing upon the degree of the indifference but it is not an absolute cleaning of the slate. 199
It was further clarified in Davis that a death caused by a defendant who
was driving "while under the influence" of an alcoholic beverage is a valid
basis for involuntary manslaughter, the same as was the former foundational
190. 405 u.s. 156 (1972).
191. The instant ordinance reads:
It shall be unlawful for persons to collect, assemble or group together and after
being so collected, assembled or grouped together, to stand, or loiter, on any
sidewalk, parking or any street comer, or at any other place in the city to the
hindrance or obstruction to free passage of any person or persons passing on or
along any sidewalk or street in said city.
See Des Moines ordinance § 32-28.01.
192. 207 N.W.2d 805 (Iowa 1973).
193. ld. at 808, citing Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) and Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965).
194. See IowA CoDE § 690.10 (1973 ).
195. 196 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1972).
196. Id. at 894.
197. ld.
198. Id. at 891.
199. /d.
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crime of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. These two expressions
(O.M.V.I. and O.M.V.U.I.) "mean essentially the same thing." And, even
if they did not, "the State's manslaughter charge (predicated on defendant's
driving while under the influence of intoxicants) involves involuntary manslaughter based on death resulting from the commission of a misdemeanor
which is in itself wrongful (malum in se)." 200 On a related matter, the court
also reiterated in Davis that "if the jurors were not persuaded defendant was
intoxicated, they could still take his drinking into consideration under the charge
of recklessness." 201
20.

Obscenity

In an octology of recent significant cases, the United States Supreme
Court has made several revisions in the federal constitutional guidelines for
state anti-obscenity prosecutions.
a. The Tripartite Standard. In Miller v. California, 202 the Supreme
Court redefined "the standards which must be used to identify obscene material
that a State may regulate without infringing the First Amendment as applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment." 203 Specifically, the
new basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: "(a) whether 'the average
person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest [citations], (b) whether
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 204
Thus, the "Burger Court" discarded the " 'utterly without redeeming social
value' test of Memoirs v. Massachusetts" 205 in favor of the less stringent "lacks
serious literary value" prong of the aforementioned three-part test.
i. Statutory adjustments. The Court thereupon added: "Under the
holdings announced today, no one will be subject to prosecution for the sale
or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating
state law, as written or construed." 206 Emphasizing that its function is not to
propose specifics of State regulatory schemes, the Court said: "That must
await their concrete legislative efforts." 207 Rather, the Court's role is "to define the area in which [the States] may chart their own course in dealing with
ZOO. ld. at 890.

201. Id. at 891; see also State v. Boner, 203 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1972): "[T]he
question of intoxication may be considered as bearing upon the wilful and wanton misconduct of defendant in violating an ordinary law of the road."
202. 93 S. Ct. 2607 ( 1973).
203. ld. at 2612.
204. /d. at 2615.
205. /d., citing Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
206. ld. at 2616.
207. /d. at 2615.
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obscene material." 2 os Dictating that "State statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited," the Court "confine[d] the permissible scope of such regulation to works which depict or describe sexual
conduct." 209 That conduct "must be specifically defined by the applicable
state law, as written or authoritatively construed," the Court added. 210 Whether
violations of an existing generally-worded state obscenity statute (like Iowa's
Code sections 725.1-.5) can be instantly prosecuted without benefit of legislative revisions to specifically detail the acts of sexual conduct expressly proscribed is not made clear. The abovementioned reference, in the alternative,
to construction of the applicable State law suggests that prosecutions under existing generally-worded statutes may lie provided that the trial court properly
instructs the jury that obscene references must relate to portrayal of acts of
sexual conduct and the aforementioned three-part obscenity definition is incorporated therein. Nevertheless, prudent State legislatures should hasten to
revise their applicable statutes. 211 Incidentally, the Supreme Court lightened
their burdens in justifying legislative controls of obscene materials. In Kaplan
v. California, the Court said: "States need not wait until behavioral experts
or educators can provide empirical data before enacting controls of commerce
in obscen·e materials unprotected by the First Amendment or by a constitutional right to privacy. We have noted the power of a legislative body to enact
208. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2633 (1973).
209. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607,2614-15 (1973).
210. ld. at 2615.
211. The proposed sections on obscenity in the Final Report of the Iowa Criminal
Code Review Study Committee, which was submitted to the general assembly in January
1973, provide:
Sec. 2505. NEW SECTION. FURNISIDNG PORNOGRAPHY TO MINORS. A person commits a serious misdemeanor when he knowingly exhibits
or furnishes to any minor under seventeen years of age any play, dance, or
other performance, or any picture, writing, recording, or other form of communication, which consists in whole or part of any of the following:
1. A description, portrayal, or exhibition emphasizing human genitalia, or
the pubes, whether covered or not, which goes beyond customary limits of
candor in such matters.
2. A sex act, or sexual contact between humans and animals, or masturbation, or a simulation of any of these.
3. Sadistic or masochistic practices.
Nothing in this section prohibits the use of appropriate material for educational
purposes in any accredited school, or in any educational program in which the
minor is participating with the informed consent of his parent or guardian.
Nothing in this section prohibits the attendance of minors at an exhibition or
display of art works with the informed consent of his parent or guardian.
Sec. 2506. NEW SECTION. PUBLIC DISPLAY OF OFFENSIVE SEXUAL MATERIAL. A person commits a serious misdemeanor when he knowingly exhibits or displays or permits to be exhibited or displayed any of the
following in such a manner that such exhibit or display is easily visible from
any street, sidewalk or thoroughfare, or from any transportation facility, or from
any residence when he knows that the owner of such residence objects to such
exhibit or display:
1. Human genitals or pubes without a full opaque covering, or any graphic
or pictorial depiction thereof, or any depiction of the ~overed male genitals in a
discernibly erect state.
2. An actual or simulated sex act, or sexual contact between humans
and animals, or masturbation, or any graphic or pictorial depiction thereof.
3. Any depiction of sadistic or masochistic practices.
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such regulatory laws on the basis of unprovable assumptions." 212
ii. The Iowa standard. Four months prior to this Supreme Court octology, the Iowa supreme court in State v. Lavin 213 upheld the constitutionality of Iowa's obscenity statute214 on the sole basis that trial courts must incorporate the standards of Memoirs v. Attorney Genera/. 215 That is, the State
must establish the obscene nature of the questioned material through proof
(beyond a reasonable doubt) of the coalescence of the three factors of the
then-existing federal constitutional standard of Memoirs v. Attorney General.
Accordingly, the latest pronouncement of the Iowa supreme court includes a
requirement that the State prove, inter alia, that "the material is utterly without
redeeming social value," 216 whereas the new applicable federal constitutional
standard is less stringent (i.e., that the material "lacks serious literary . . .
value"). 217 This leaves open to question whether Iowa trial courts can immediately apply the new federal standard or whether they must apply the former
federal standard incorporated in State v. Lavin in the interim until a test case is
prosecuted and appealed to the Iowa supreme court. It appears that the Iowa
supreme court will adjust its obscenity test, since all that it required in Lavin
were the minimal federal constitutional requirements of the first amendment
(as the latter was currently interpreted by the United States Supreme Court at
that time), and Miller v. Calijornia 218 has now lessened these minimal federal
constitutional requirements. No State constitutional issues w'ere raised or discussed in Lavin. Indeed, the Iowa supreme court left little doubt that its approach in Lavin was dictated by the federal constiutional standard:
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court also make
plain that a state statute like ours will stand if the courts of the state
incorporate the Memoirs' requirements in the application of [the]
statute . . . .
The Ultimate question on this issue, therefore, is whether we
will apply the Memoirs' definition in the application of our statute.
We believe we shoUld do so . . . . [C]ourts shoUld construe statutes
to avoid unconstitutionality if they reasonably can. 219
b. The "Community". Another major revision made in Miller v.
California was to eliminate the heretofore constitutional requirement that
a "national" standard be utilized in determining whether contemporary community standards are offended by the allegedly obscene material. Specifically, the Court stated in Miller: "We hold the requirement that the jury
evaluate the materials with reference to 'contemporary standards of the
212. 93 S. Ct. 2680, 2684 (1973); accord Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct.
2628, 2636-37 ( 1973 ).
213. 204 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 1973).
214. See IowA CooE § 125.5 (1973): "Whoever sells . . . any obscene, lewd, indecent, lascivious, or filthy book . . . ."
215. 383 u.s. 413 (1966).
216. State v. Lavin, 204 N.W.2d 844, 848 (Iowa 1973).
217. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2615 (1973).
218. /d.
219. 204 N.W.2d 844, 849 (Iowa 1973).
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State of California' . . . is constitutionally adequate." 220 Whether the new
non-national standard must only be a statewide standard or whether an individualized city-by-city standard can be applied was not made clear. 221 Moreover, the Iowa supreme court noted in Lavin that the then-existing Memoirs
standards incorporate "contemporary national community standards," 222 but it
is expected to follow the federal court's lead once the specific non-national
standard is figured out.
c. No Immunity for "Adulf' Materials. The Supreme Court clearly rejected any demarcation of the application of obscenity laws on the basis of
the age of the intended customer. Refusing to carve out an exception from
obscenity laws for materials distributed only to consenting adults, the Supreme
Court said in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton: 223 "We categorically disapprove
the theory . . . that obscene, pornographic films acquire constitutional immunity from state regulation simply because they are exhibited for consenting
adults only." 224 A similar stance was taken concerning "adult" books in
Kaplan v. California, to wit: "[C]ommercial exposure and sale of obscene
materials to anyone, including consenting adults, is subject to state regulation."225
d. Obscene Words, Pictures, Conduct. That the new obscenity standards are applicable to pictureless "adult" books was made clear in Kaplan v.
California, with the Supreme Court holding that "expression by words alone
can be legally 'obscene' in the sense of being unprotected by the First Amendment."226 The book in question contained no pictures but instead consisted
entirely of repetitive explicit descriptions of "(a]lmost every conceivable variety
of sexual contact, homosexual and heterosexual." 227 Applying the obscenity
standards without distinction as to "the medium of the expression," the Supreme Court pointed out: "Obscenity can, of course, manifest itself in conduct, in the pictorial representation of conduct, or in the written and oral
description of conduct."2 2s
220. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2620 (1973 ), accord Kaplan v. California,
93 S. Ct. 2680, 2685 (1973).
221. The confusion arises because of the following conflicting statements, in addition
to the aforementioned reference to "contemporary standards of the State of California":
"Under a national Constitution, fundamental First Amendment limitations of the powers
of the States do not vary from community to community" and "our nation is simply too
big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that such standards could be
articulated for all 50 States in a single formulation . . . ." Contrastingly, the Court also
observed: "The adversary system, with lay jurors as the usual ultimate factfinders in
criminal prosecutions, has historically permitted triers-of-fact to draw on the standards of
their community" and "[i]t is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the
First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City." ld. at 2618-19
(emphasis added).
222. State v. Lavin, 204 N.W.2d 844, 848 (Iowa 1973) (emphasis added).
223. 93 S. Ct. 2628 (1973).
224. Id. at 2635.
225. 93 S. Ct. 2680, 2685 ( 1973).
226. Id. at 2683.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 2684.

September 1973]

Survey of Iowa Law

83

Two other recent United States Supreme Court decisions are illustrative
of the application of obscenity standards to conduct and to words. In California v. LaRue, 229 the Court held that it was constitutionally permissible for
States to broadly regulate "obscene" live entertainment in State-licensed liquor
establishments (e.g., go-go girls in taverns), 23 0 notwithstanding whether such
broad censorship if applied across the board to all other mediums of expression could pass muster under the first and fourteenth amendments. "[T]he
broad sweep of the Twenty-first Amendment has been recognized as conferring something more than the normal state authority over public health, welfare, and morals," 231 the Court pointed out. In Cohen v. California, 232 the
Court reversed a conviction under a State statute proscribing "disturbing the
peace . . . by . . . offensive conduct . . . ." The prosecution was based
upon defendant's wearing of a jacket inscribed "Puck the Draft." The Court
majority pointed out that "this is not . . . an obscenity case" since no one's
prurient interest would be arised by "this vulgar allusion to the Selective Service
System" and since an illegal obscene expression "must be, in some significant
way, erotic." 233
e. Expert Testimony/Best Evidence. The Supreme Court also countenanced not requiring " 'expert' affirmative evidence that the materials were obscene when the materials themselves were actually placed in evidence." 234 In
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, in which the two films were exhibited to the
trial court, the Supreme Court noted: "The films, obviously, are the best evidence of what they represent." 235 Likewise, in Kaplan v. California, the book
not only was received in evidence, but also read, in its entirety, to the jury
as well as being inspected by each juror. Approving, the Supreme Court rejected "any constitutional need for 'expert' testimony on behalf of the prosecution, or for any other ancillary evidence of obscenity, once the allegedly obscene materials themselves are placed in evidence." 236 Nevertheless, defendant "should be free to introduce appropriate expert testimony," the Court
added. 237
f. Seizure of Allegedly Obscene Materials. Three alternative ways of
seizing a film for a judicial determination as to obscenity were discussed.
In Heller v. New York, 238 the Supreme Court upheld the policy of a magistrate,
229. 93 S. Ct. 390 (1972).
230. See also City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 93 S. Ct. 2222 (1973) (municipal corporation is not a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and thus cannot be sued for denial of
petitioners' liquor license because of alleged nude dancing at their retail liquor establishments; i.e., nude go-go dancers in taverns).
231. California v. LaRue, 93 S. Ct. 390, 395 (1972).
232. 403 u.s. 15 (1971).
233. ld. at 20.
234. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2634 (1973).
235. ld. The films were shown in court in this case. A presumably acceptable alternative approach of arranging a private showing of the contested film in the theater
itself for the jury was followed in a recent California jury trial on whether the movie
"Deep Throat" is obscene. See Des Moines Register, July 21, 1973, p. 3-S, col. 8.
236. Kaplan v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2680, 2685 (1973).
237. Id.
238. 93 S. Ct. 2789 (1973).
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at the police's prompting, to attend the public showing of an allegedly obscene
movie and then issue a search warrant for seizure of the film, without benefit
of a prior adversary hearing. However, the&e guidelines must be followed:
(1) only one copy of the film must be seized, (2) the exhibitor must be permitted, upon his request, to copy the seized film when no other copies are
available to him for continued showing, and (3) a prompt judicial determination of the obscenity issue in an adversary hearing must be made at the request of any interested party. 239
On the other hand, the Supreme Court held in Roaden v. Kentucky 240 that
the fourth amendment is violated by a warrantless seizure of an allegedly obscene film being regularly shown to the public even though the seizure is made
incident to the arrest of the exhibitor by a law enforcement officer who has
viewed the film as a customer. Relying on its earlier decisions in Marcus v.
Search Warrant 241 and Lee Art Theater v. Virginia 242 that an officer's mere
conclusory allegations cannot support a warrant for seizing allegedly obscene
material, the Supreme Court held that "a fortiori, the officer may not make
such a seizure with no warrant at all. " 243 Taking judicial notice of a film's
susceptibility to destruction, alteration, or removal to another jurisdiction, the
Court nevertheless said: "But . . . where films are scheduled for exhibition
in a commercial theater open to the public, procuring a warrant based on a
prior judicial determination of probable cause of obscenity need not risk loss
of the evidence." 244 Thus, there were no "now or never" exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless seizure.
A third approach-a civil injunction of th'e exhibition of obscene materials pursuant to a state's caselaw-was approved of in Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton. 245 Indicating that such a proceeding must incorporate the definition
of "obscene materials" used in the criminal (obscenity) statute, the Court
opined that the civil injunction proceeding "provides an exhibitor or purveyor
of materials the best possible notice, prior to any criminal indictments, as to
whether the materials are unprotected by the First Amendment and subject to
state regulation." 246 In the instant case, however, the continued exhibition of
the films was not enjoined. Nevertheless, a temporary injunction was granted
ex parte "restraining petitioners from destroying the films or removing them
from the jurisdiction," with petitioners further ordered "to have one print each
of the films in court on January 13, 1971, together with the proper viewing
equipment." 247
239. See also Alexander v. Virginia, 93 S. Ct. 2803 (1973) (no sixth amendment
right to trial by jury in state civil obscenity forfeiture proceedings).
240. 93 s. Ct. 2796 (1973).
241. 367 u.s. 717 (1961).
242. 392 u.s. 636 (1968).
243. Roaden v. Kentucky, 93 S. Ct. 2796, 2802 (1973).
244. ld. at 2802 n.6.
245. 93 S. Ct. 2628 ( 1973).
246. Jd. at 2634.
247. Jd. at 2632.
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Miscellany.

Several other federal and state developments concerning obscenity prosecutions warrant summary mention.
i. Pre-arrest adversary proceeding. The Iowa supreme court h'eld in
State v. Lavin 248 that defendant has no right to a pre-arrest adversary proceeding similar to that afforded in a case of seizure of obscene material. Here, officers purchased a copy of a book in an "adult" bookstore, examined it, and
thereupon arrested the managers of the bookstore.
ii. Forfeiture proceedings. The United States Supreme Court held
in Alexander v. Virginia 249 that there is no sixth amendment right to trial
by jury in state civil obscenity forfeiture proceedings.
iii. Importation and interstate transportation. In the two remaining cases of its recent octology, the United States Supreme Court upheld broad
Congressional powers under the interstate commerce clause to prevent importation of, 250 as well as interstate transportation of, 251 obscene material. In
United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 252 the Court held that
Congress "may constitutionally prohibit importation of obsc·ene material which
the importer claims is for private, personal use and possession only." 253 Similarly, the Court opined in United States v. Orito: 254 "(W]e cannot say that the
Constitution forbids comprehensive federal regulation of interstate transportation of obscene material merely because such transport may be by private
carriage, or because [the] material is intended for the private use of the transporter. " 255
iv. Scienter. An obscenity conviction was reversed by the Iowa
supreme court in State v. Lavin 256 because scient'er was not alleged in the county
attorney's information and the trial court thus erred in overruling defendant's
demurrer thereto. Holding that "(k]nowledge of the obscene material is an
essential element in obscenity prosecutions," the court nevertheless added that
indictments or informations "need not charge the offense in the language of the
Memoirs' definition, they may charge the ultimate fact of obscenity." 257
21.

Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence

A proliferation of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence
cases (O.M.V.U.I.) continued to command attention of the Iowa supreme
court.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

204 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 1973).
93 S. Ct. 2803 (1973).
19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1970).
18 u.s.c. § 1462 (1970).
93 S. Ct. 2665 (1973 ).
ld. at 2667.
93 S. Ct. 2674 (1973).
ld. at 2678.
204 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 1973).
ld. at 848-49.
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a. Definition of the Offense. The statutory definition of the crime25S was
attacked unsuccessfully in two cases. In State v. Tiernan, 259 the court held
that the proscription on driving while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage is not unconstitutionally overbroad, vague or indefinite so as to require
persons of common intelligence to guess its meaning. Likewise, the court held
in State v. Davis260 that (after the legislative change of the crime from O.M.V.I.
to O.M.V.U.I.)2 61 manslaughter can be predicated upon a vehicular death
caused by a driver who, under the new verbiage, was under the influence of
an alcoholic beverage, just as before when the latter offense was characterized
as driving while intoxicated. Accordingly, the court held that the definition
in the Bar Association's uniform jury instruction number 520.3 262 "applies
equally to both expressions--driving in an intoxicated condition and driving
while under the influence of intoxicants-and the two expr·essions mean essentially the same thing." 263
b. Time of Intoxication. State v. Creighton 264 dramatically illustrates
that the State must prove that defendant was under the influence at the time
he was driving. Here, the only evidence of defendant's intoxicated condition
was adduced in the arresting officer's testimony as to defendant's condition
at the time that the officer arrived at the scene of defendant's one-car accident.
There was no evidence as to the time of the accident, the length of the interval
before arrival of the officer, or "what transpired between the time of the accident and the time of arrest." 265 Because of the lack of this evidence, the court
rejected the State's circumstantial evidence argument, noting contrariwise:
"[T]hat rule becomes applicable only upon a showing of the circumstances
from which it is said the ultimate fact may be found to exist." 266 The court
pointed out that none of the persons at the scene before the officer's arrival
was called to testify and that "[n]o search was made of the car nor of the
surrounding area to disclose evidence--or the lack of it-to refute a claim defendant may have become intoxicated after the accident." 267 Consequently,
the court refused to hold that "one who is under the influence of an alcoholic
beverage at an established time was necessarily in that condition at some earlier
unspecified moment without any evidence concerning the length of the interval
between the two or of the events occurring during it." 2 6s
c. Blood Test Evidentiary Foundation. Three cases involved the foun258. See IOWA ConE § 321.281 (1973 ).
259. 206 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa 1973).
260. 196 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1972).
261. Cf. IOWA CODE§ 321.281 (1966) (O.M.V.I.) with IOWA CODE§ 321.281 (1973)
(O.M.V.U.I.).
262. II Iowa Uniform Jury Instructions, No. 520.3 (1970).
263. State v. Davis, 196 N.W.2d 885, 890 (Iowa 1972).
264. 201 N.W.2d 471 (Iowa 1972); accord State v. Miller, 204 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa
1973) (O.M.V.U.I. conviction reversed because the only evidence of defendant's driving
while under the influence was inadmissible hearsay).
265. State v. Creighton, 201 N.W.2d 471, 473 (Iowa 1972).
266. /d.
267. /d.
268. Id.
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dational requirements for the taking of a blood sample. 269 One issue involved
the qualifications for a medical technologist. In State v. Snyder, 270 the supreme
court concluded that "the legislature did not intend that an individual have
the educational background required by the American Society of Clinical Pathologists in order to qualify as a medical technologist under section 321B.4," 271
and thus being licensed in Iowa as a registered medical technologist is sufficient. Two cases posed questions of the sufficiency of the authorization to the
registered nurse by the licensed physician. Telephonic authorization by the
licensed physician who was on call at the hospital was upheld in State v. Binkley, 272 as was a general authorization as a standing order to all registered
nurses in that hospital in State v. Sloan. 273 On the other hand, it was further
held in Binkley that defendant's failure to object until moving for a new trial
waived the error in admitting blood test results notwithstanding the lack of a
written request by the peace officer for the taking of a blood test. 274
Sanitation requirements concerning the vial in which the blood sample
is placed were established in Binkley also. The supreme court rejected defendant's contention that the statutory requirement that syringes and needles
used for drawing blood be kept "under strictly sanitary and sterile conditions"275 applied also to the vial. Nevertheless, the State must prove that the
vial was "uncontaminated by alcohol or other substances which might affect
the test." 276
d. Breath Test Evidentiary Foundation. Five cases dealt with the admissibility into evidence of the results of breath tests administered under Code
§ 321B.l. Two convictions 277 were summarily reversed under the Rodriquez
v. Fulton 278 precedent that it is reversible error in an O.M.V.U.I. prosecution
to admit breath test results where no blood test had previously been offered
and refused before the officer requested a breath specimen. Even though evidence of the offer and refusal of the blood test is admissible "under the plain
terms of section 321B.l1," 279 one trial court actually granted a pretrial motion
in limine ordering the State to make no such introduction at trial. Appealing
his conviction, defendant claimed prejudicial error in the State's violation of
269. See IOWA CODE§ 321B.4 (1973).
270. 203 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1972).
271. ld. at 285.
272. Telephonic authorization "minimally satisfies § 321B.4 as a designation of the
nurse by a licensed physician." 201 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Iowa 1972).
273. 203 N.W.2d 225 (Iowa 1972).
274. The supreme court noted: "It is equally clear under § 321B.4, The Code, as
interpreted in State v. Wallin, 195 N.W.2d 95 (Iowa 1972) and State v. Boner, 186
N.W.2d 161 (Iowa 1971), proof of such written request was foundationaily essential for
admission of the test results." State v. Binkley, 201 N.W.2d 917, 918 (Iowa 1972).
275. See IowA CoDE§ 321B.4 (1973).
276. State v. Binkley, 201 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Iowa 1972), citing Lessenhop v. Norton,
261 Iowa 44, 52-53, 153 N.W.2d 107, 112 (1967) (enumeration of "the foundational evidence which must be introduced prior to admission of blood test results").
277. State v. Rowland, 202 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1972) and State v. Williams, 201
N.W.2d 710 (Iowa 1972).
278. 190 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa 1971).
279. State v. Tieman, 206 N.W.2d 898, 899 (Iowa 1973).
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the order in limine. Affirming the conviction, the supreme court pointed out
in State v. Tiernan 280 that the error here, inuring to defendant's benefit, was in
the trial court's sustaining of defendant's motion in limine. Indeed, "[e]vidence of the refusal was not only admissible, it was required as a foundation
for any evidence of the breath test." 281
The Rodriquez v. Fulton doctrine was extended in State v. Hall 282 to include admission into evidence the defendant's refusal to take a breath test
when the results of the breath test, if taken, would have been inadmissible
for noncompliance with the Rodriquez procedure. Reversing the conviction,
the supreme court thought a rule (like the Rodriquez rule) "would be anomalous indeed which would permit introduction of evidenc'e of refusal to take a
test when the test itself cannot be shown." 283 The court added: "Defendant
had a right to take manual tests and still refuse a breath test which could not
legally be required of him without the prior offer of a blood test." 284
State v. Hansen 285 set forth the remaining foundation requirements for
admissibility of th'e results of a breath test, following the offer and refusal
of a blood test. Such results "should be admitted only upon a showing (1)
of the devices and methods approved by the Commissioner of Public Saftey
for the taking of such tests . . . and (2) proof that the test was given by use
of the approved devices and methods." 286 The arresting officer's "bare conclusion" that he followed the prescribed procedures "is insufficient," the court
concluded. 287 If this two-part foundational requirement is met, the supreme
court has held in State v. Tiernan 288 that stringent standards of mechanical
precision of the breathalyzer equipment are not required. Specifically, the
court held therein that a showing of p'eriodic testing of the equipment is unnecessary.
e. Statutory Presumption of Intoxication. Four cases dealt with the statutory presumption of intoxication provision of Code section 321.218, which
provides: "[E]vidence that there was, at the time, more than ten hundredths
of one percentum by weight of alcohol in his blood shall be admitted as presumptive evidence that the defendant was under the influence of an alcoholic
beverage."
i. Additional testimony. While noting that the purpose of this statutory presumption is "to permit a case to go to the jury on this issue on nothing
more than a showing of the required blood alcohol content," State v. Boner289
280. 206 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa 1973).
281. Id. at 899.
282. 203 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1973).
283. Id. at 376.
284. /d.
285. 203 N.W.2d 216 (Iowa 1972).
286. /d. at 223. See Iowa Departmental Rules p. 123 (Supp. July 1972), designating
"an indium encapsulation breath crimper" as the device and prescribing collection procedures.
287. State v. Hansen, 203 N.W.2d 216, 223 (Iowa 1972).
288. 206 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa 1973).
289. 203 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1972).
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makes it clear that the State "may prove a stronger case by additional testimony."290 The supreme court approved of the State's calJing of an expert
witness "to express his opinion that defendant was under the influence of an
alcoholic beverage and to describe the effect of alcohol on human behavior." 291
Thus, while defendant may, of course, introduce evidence to rebut this statutory presumption, "there is nothing to suggest that otherwise competent evidence cannot similarly be used to fortify it. " 29 2
ii. Jury instructions. The Bar Association's Uniform Jury Instruction 520.8 293 was declared by a 5-4 vote in State v. Hansen 294 to be an unconstitutional application of this statutory presumption, which itself was considered constitutional. However, the supreme court limited th'e statute's operation
to raising "an inference (sometimes calJed a 'presumption of fact') . . . ." 295
The constitutional flaw thus was not in the first paragraph of the instruction
stating that a stipulated percentage of alcohol in defendant's blood is "presumptive evidence" of being under the influence nor in the second paragraph
permitting the jury to "infer" defendant's being under th'e influence if his
blood-alcohol content exceeded the stipulated proportion. However, the last
sentence of the third paragraph ("[Such inference] may be overcome or rebutted by evidence to the contrary") was considered by the supreme court as
"erroneously convert[ing] this into a conclusive presumtion if evidence is not
produced to rebut it." 296 Agreeing with defendant's contention that this instruction "compels" an accused to forego his fifth amendment right to not testify, the supreme court characterized the latter part of the above-mentioned
instruction as "convey[ing] to the jury the notion that the unrebutted 'presumptive evidence' required, rather than permitted, a finding defendant was
under the influence of an alcoholic beverage." 297 Reiterating that a proper
instruction concerning the Code section 321.281 statutory presumption "should
not place significance on the failure to produce rebutting evidence," th'e court
added that such an instruction "should set out the fact that the test is presumptive evidence and charge the jury to determine under al1 the facts and circumstances in the case whether defendant was under the influence of an intoxicating beverage." 29 S The sam·e instruction was given verbatim in State v.
Sloan, 299 and the supreme court reversed the conviction (by a 5-4 vote) despite the State's contention that giving this improper instruction was harrril'ess
error.
The supreme court added in State v. Hutton 300 that the constitutional
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

ld. at 199-200.
ld. at 199.
ld.

II Iowa Uniform Jury Instructions, No. 520.8 (1973).
203 N.W.2d 216 (Iowa 1972).
ld. at 219.
ld. at 220.
ld. at 222.
ld.

203 N.W.2d 225 (Iowa 1972).
207 N.W.2d 581 (Iowa 1973).
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defect in this uniform instruction was not cured or rendered harmless by the
addition of this fourth paragraph:
You are instructed that despite the permissible infer'ence from the
blood test, the burden remains at all times upon the State to establish
each and every element of the crime and the crime itself beyond a
reasonable doubt and the burden remains at all times upon the State
to go forward with the proof of all matters in issue in the case.
There is no burden upon the Defendant in a criminal case. 301
Reversing the conviction by a 6-3 vote, the supreme court refused to speculate
"whether the jury followed the erroneous part of [the] instruction" (paragraph three of the uniform instruction) "or the curative part" (the aforementioned additional fourth paragraph).so2
22.

Operating an Overweight Vehicle on a Public Highway

In State v. McDonald, 303 an employee of a construction company primarily engaged in road building, was prosecuted for operating an overweight
vehicle on a public highway 304 because he drove a caterpillar on a public
highway to a new work site. On a State's appeal following a directed verdict, the supreme court refused to accept the State's proferred definition of
road machinery within the Code section 321.453 exemption as meaning "special equipment designed for road work, either construction or maintenance,
while being so used at that time for those purposes at or in close proximity
to the site of the road work." 305 The court pointed out that there is little or
no equipment designed exclusively for road work. Moreover, the court also
rejected the State's restrictive reading of the Code section 321.453 exemption
for temporary moving of overweight vehicles to mean that any such moving
must be done "in close proximity to the site of the road work." 306
23.

Possession of Burglar's Tools

A detailed exposition of the rules governing opinion testimony as to the
nature of burglar's tools 307 was made in State v. Knudtson. 308 First, the supreme court concluded that it is proper to permit opinion testimony of properly-qualified witnesses as to whether certain tools which may also have le301. ld. at 582.
302. ld. at 583.
303. 197 N.W.2d 573 (Iowa 1972).
304. See IowA CoDE§ 321.463 (1973).
305. 197 N.W.2d at 574.
306. ld.
307. See IowA CoDE § 708.7 (1973) (possession of burglar's tools).
308. 195 N.W.2d 698 (Iowa 1972). Actually, in the instant case, defendant was
convicted of attempted breaking and entering. See IowA CoDE§ 708.10 (1973). Following the proprietor's hearing of pounding at the unused door at the rear of his building at
3:00 a.m., police apprehended defendant attempting to hide behind a nearby truck and in
possession of, or in close proximity to, burglar's tools. This case is included in this subsection because of the attention being focused therein upon foundational requirements as
to testimony identifying burglar's tools.
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gitimate uses are of the type that could be used as burglar's tools. 309 Next,
it upheld the foundation laid in the instant case for the police officers' testimony. The court, noting that the officers "qualified themselves by showing
they had been involved in investigations of other breakings and enterings or
burglaries," determined that it was unnecessary for these witnesses to show
that their other investigations had been "judicially determined to be breakings
and enterings or burglaries." 310 On the subject of these officers being qualified as expert witnesses, the court agreed with defendant that "a mere showing they were in fact police officers does not in and of itself qualify them as
[experts]." 311 However, the court pointed out that these officers were shown
to have been veteran officers experienced in investigating burglary scenes and
in finding burglar's tools thereat similar to those in the instant case. Moreover, all but one of the testifying officers had attended special institutes with
training in crime scene investigations. Finally, the court confirmed that qualified experts, such as these officers, can state that these are burglar's tools
instead of being limited to testifying that the tools could be burglar's tools. 312
24.

Rape

Two surv'ey cases dealt with sufficiency of the other evidence required
by Code section 782.4 to corroborate a rape 313 prosecutrix's testimony. In
State v. Smith, 314 defendant supplied it himself! He accomplished this by testifying as a witness in his own behalf that he did have sexual intercourse with
prosecutrix on the date in question, albeit claiming it was voluntary intercourse. There being sufficient corroboration, it was a matter for the jury to
decide whose version of the nature of the intercourse to believe--defendant's
voluntary version or prosecutrix's involuntary version. Defendant was less
cooperative in State v. Polson, 315 in which the other corroborating evidence
was garnered from "the ·entire combination of circumstances." 316 These included defendant's "suspicious conduct" as well as his "presence very near
the site of the assault both before and after its commission." 317
Questions involving the introduction of other lascivious acts arose in two
rape convictions which were reversed. The general rule was noted in State
v. Wright 318 that "on a charge of statutory rape evidence of lascivious conduct
with girls other than prosecutrix is inadmissible unless essential to complete
309. "Tools used to accomplish breakings and enterings are commonly called burglar
tools, and consist of tools which may also have a perfectly legitimate use, such as hammers, screwdrivers, punches, pliers, and prybars." 195 N.W.2d at 700.
310. Id. at 701.
311. Id.
312. Id., citing Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 348, 5 N.W.2d
646, 657 (1942).
313. See IOWA CoDE§ 698.1 (1973).
314. 195 N.W.2d 673 (Iowa 1972).
315. 205 N.W.2d 740 (Iowa 1973).
316. ld. at 742.
317. ld. at 741.
318. 203 N.W.2d 247 (Iowa 1972).
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the story of the crime on trial by proving its immediate context of happenings
near in time and place." 319 Here, the State erroneously introduced 'evidence
concerning defendant's fondling of his own daughter (who was prosecutrix's
step-sister) for approximately a two-year period during which time he had sexual intercourse a number of times with his step-daughter. The supreme court
concluded that the State "utterly failed to prove" the relationship of this evidence of other criminal conduct as an integral transaction (which is applicable "only where the separate offenses are so related to each other that proof
of one tends to establish the other"). 320 Thus, this proof of separate offenses
was inadmissible. On the other hand, exclusion of evidence of prosecutrix's
promiscuous behavior was held error under the particular circumstances in
State v. McDaniel, 321 in which defendant's proferred evidence of the statutory
rape being committed by his companion was excluded. Repeating that prior
unchastity of prosecutrix is no defense to a charge of rape, the supreme court
added that such evidence is admissible "not on the issue of consent or justification for the act, but in answer to any inferences which might arise by reason
of the State's offer of evidence on the laboratory tests and physical condition
of the prosecutrix. Defendant had a right to attempt to show another person
. . . was the one responsible for any violation of the prosecutrix." 322

25.

Reckless Driving

State v. Baker323 held that the offense of reckless driving324 "is not an
intentional wrong in the sense that resulting harm is intended." 325 Thus,
Code section 321.283 is violated by "conscious and intentional driving which
the driver knows, or should know, creates an unreasonable risk of harm to
others," 326 irrespective of the lack of intended harm to anyone. Additionally, "[m]omentary nonuse of the traveled way by others certainly could not,
as a matter of law, excuse defendant's violations." 32 7
26.

Simulated Intoxication

In its first interpretation of the crime of simulated intoxication, 328 the
supreme court believed in State v. McGuire 329 that "it is clear the legislature,
when using the word 'simulate' in section 123.42, intended to make it illegal
to pretend or to feign intoxication." 830 Accordingly, the State "must establish
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

ld. at 251.
ld.
204 N.W.2d 627 (Iowa 1973).
ld. at 630.
203 N.W.2d 795 (Iowa 1973).
See IowA CoDE§ 321.283 (1973).
203 N.W.2d at 796.
ld.
ld.
See IOWA CODE§ 123.46 (1973) (formerly§ 123.42).
200 N.W.2d 832 (Iowa 1972).
Id. at 833.
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the intentional or voluntary nature of the acts relied on as one of the elements
of the offense." 331 Defendant's conviction had been based solely on the arresting officer's testimony as to defendant's slow and deliberate movements,
slurred speech, contracted pupils, and fixed-focus eyes. Because of the officer's testimony that he did not know whether those physical characteristics
were normal or abnormal as relating to defendant, there was no evidence that
defendant was intentionally acting intoxicated. Reversing the conviction, the
supreme court was "unwilling to say one who looks and acts as the witness
described defendant-without more-is guilty of violating the statute in question"332 since the unusual movements could have been the unintentional result
of illness, physical peculiarity, or other natural cause. Because the conviction
was reversed for failure of proof, the supreme court did not reach the unconstitutionality-for-vagu'eness challenge.
27.

Sodomy

The supreme court noted in State v. Schurman: 333 "In a prosecution for
sodomy 334 the State must prove penetration, but it may be proved by circumstantial as well as by direct evidence." 335 In this stepfather-stepson involuntary
act of buggery, it was unnecessary for the stepson, a six-year-old, to testify.
C.
1.

Defenses

Entrapment

The United States Supreme Court characterized entrapment as "a relatively limited defense" in United States v. Russell, 336 saying: "It is only when
the government's deception actually implants the criminal design in the mind
of the defendant that the defense of entrapment comes into play." 337 The
thrust of this defense focuses on "the intent or predisposition of the defendant
to commit the crime." 338 The Russell opinion turned on the fact that defendant instantly conceded that "he may have harbored a predisposition to commit
the charged offens'es." 339 Accordingly, the fact that government officers
"merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the offense does
not defeat the prosecution." 340 Here, the undercover agent had supplied an
essential ingredient for the illicit manufacture of a controlled substance. Nevertheless, the Court pointed out that defendant had obtained this ingredient
elsewhere for previous activities and that he could have done so again. Had
the undercover agent been the only possible supplier for this ingredient, it is
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

ld. at 834.
ld.
205 N.W.2d 732 (Iowa 1973).
See IowA CoDE§ 705.1 (1973).
205 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Iowa 1973).
93 S. Ct. 1637 (1973).
Id. at 1645.
ld. at 1641.
Id. at 1643.
Id. at 1644; accord State v. McGranahan, 206 N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 1973).
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possible that the Court may have found entrapment. (This possibility would
be increased in situations, unlike here, where the ingredient itself was contraband.). This premise is based upon the Court's following observation:
"While w·e may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct
of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would
absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a
conviction . . . the instant case is distinctly not of that breed."341
The Iowa supreme court held in State v. Bruno 342 that the defense of
entrapment is not available when defendant denies the very acts upon which
the prosecution is predicated. In the instant prosecution for unlawful sale of
hallucinogenic drugs, defendant testified that the tablets in question really
were aspirin. Affirming the trial court's refusal to instruct on entrapment, the
supreme court said:
Although the doctrine of entrapment may be asserted even though
defendant pleads not guilty, ordinarily the defense is not available
where defendant denies commission of the very acts upon which the
prosecution is predicated. Such a denial is inconsistent with the
defense, which assumes the offense charged was committed but permits accused to seek relief from guilt on the ground the criminal
intent or design was not his, but rather that of employees or agents
of the government who planted the idea in his otherwise innocent
mind by suggestion or solicitation. 343
2.

Intoxication

In State v. Buchanan, 344 the constitutionality of placing on defendant the
burden of proving his intoxication as a partial defense (i.e., to render him
"incapable of forming the requisite criminal intent") 345 was raised. However,
the alleged error in the giving of the Iowa Bar Association's uniform instruction346 was not preserved by defendant and thus the supreme court did not
decide the issue. Four justices nevertheless indicated their views that this
instruction is unconstitutional. Because the other five justices remained silent,
it is open to conjecture what the supreme court will rule when the issue is
squarely before them.
Justice McCormick (concurring specially), 347 arguing that the defense of
voluntary intoxication "is not generically different from the defense of alibi," 348
pointed out that the former Iowa rule of requiring defendant to prove his
alibi was held in Stump v. Bennett349 to violate federal due process. He added:
341. ld. at 1643.
342. 204 N.W.2d 879 (Iowa 1973).
343. ld. at 882.
344. 207 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1973) (en bane).
345. II Uniform Jury Instruction 501.18 ( 1970).
346. ld.
347. Justices Mason and Reynoldson joined in McCormick's opinion. See 207 N.W.2d
at 788. Justice Rawlings, on the other hand, agreed with McCormick's rationale but,
because of CODE§ 793.18, would reverse the conviction. See 207 N.W.2d at 792.
348. ld. at 791.
349. 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 1001 (1968).
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"I believe, as did the court in Stump of our former alibi rule,
there is no
doubt our rule as to the affirmative defense of intoxication shifts the burden
of persuasion to a defendant to disprove an essential element of a crime, in
this case specific intent." 350
In State v. Sill, 351 the trial court committed reversible error by instructing
the jury that intoxication cannot preclude acquittal on a charge with specific
intent as an essential element. "The jury should have been told voluntary
intoxication to a degree preventing defendant from having such intent would
entitle him to acquittal," 352 the supreme court said.
3.

Self Defense

That defendant must interpose the defense of self defense 853 in order to
require the State to disprove it was made clear in State v. Vick. 854 In this
prosecution for assault (with a rifle) defendant testified he shot the rifle "but
never intimated that in doing so he acted in self defense," nor was there "the
slightest hint defendant was ever threatened or felt intimidated. " 355 Indeed,
he testified he was merely taking some target practice. However, the shots
struck the ground a few feet behind an inspector for the state highway commission, with whom defendant was feuding over a proposed fencing project. 356
4.

Statutory Challenges 35 1

a. Constitutionality. In State v. Vick, 358 the Iowa supreme court upheld
the constitutionality of Code section 694.1 proscribing, but not defining, assaults-against defendant's contention that it is "so vague and standardless that
it leaves an individual uncertain as to the particular conduct it prohibit'i
• • • ." 359
Conceding that "a penal statute must define the crime in a manner that permits a reasonable man of common intelligence to comprehend the
type of activity proscribed by the statute," 360 the supreme court relied on the
350. 207 N.W.2d at 790.
351. 199 N.W.2d 47 (Iowa 1972) (prosecution for assault with intent to inflict great
bodily injury).
352. ld. at 49.
353. See IowA CoDE§§ 691.1-.2 (1973).
354. 205 N.W.2d 727 (Iowa 1973).
355. Id. at 731.
356. See also State v. Fields, 199 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 1972) (where there is
conflicting testimony as to self defense "differing inferences might reasonably be drawn"
thus creating a jury issue and accordingly the trial court should not grant defendant's
motion for a directed verdict).
357. In other cases invoiving novei statutory chailenges, see State v. McGranahan,
206 N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 1973) [the passage of Iowa's new Uniform Controlled Substances
Act, and its express repealer of Iowa's former Uniform Narcotics Act therein, does not
preclude conviction under the former Act of a defendant who had been arrested but not
yet indicted under the latter Act at the time (July 1, 1971) the new Act became effective]
and State v. Allison, 206 N.W.2d 893, 894 (Iowa 1973) ("[O]therwise valid statutes are
not invalid because the legislature which enacted them was malapportioned.").
358. 205 N.W.2d 727 (Iowa 1973),
359. Id. at 729.
360. ld. at 730.
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rule that "a statute may punish an offense by giving it a name known to the
common law, without further defining it, and the common-law definition will
·
be applied." 361
b. Exemptions. In State v. Lynch, 362 the supreme court upheld the requirement in Iowa's former Uniform Narcotics Act that defendant prove he
came within one of the lawful exceptions enumerated in the statute rather
than requiring the State to disprove the converse. The supreme court formulated the following general rule:
If an exception is material in arriving at the definition of the crime,
it is generally held the State has the burden of showing the exception does not apply because it is then one of the essential elements
of the offense. How·ever, where the exception merely furnishes an
excuse for what would otherwise be criminal conduct, the duty devolves upon the defendant to bring himself within the exculpatory
provision. 363
ill.

PROCEDURAL LAW

A.

1.

Pretrial

Counsel for Indigents

a. Appointment of Counsel. The major development in this area364
during the survey period was the United States Supreme Court's refusal, in
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 365 to extend the sixth amendment right of counsel to
State misdemeanor prosecutions. Instead, the Court limited its holdings to
precluding the imprisonment of a convicted indigent who stood trial without
counsel and without effectively waiving same366-rather than rendering a
361. ld. at 731, quoting State v. Flory, 203 Iowa 918, 924, 210 N.W. 961, 964
(1926). A comprehensive statement concerning constitutional challenges was made in
Vick, to wit:
Ordinarily, statutes, with notable exceptions, regularly enacted by legislatures will
be accorded a strong presumption of constitutionality. Where the constitution·
ality of a statute is merely doubtful or fairly debatable the courts will not interfere. The burden of proving a legislative enactment to be violative of the constitution rests upon those so asserting to the degree of negativing every reasonable basis of support therefor. A constitutional challenge must specify constitutional provisions invoked and state with precision the details of a claimed defect . . . .
I d. at 729; accord Henrichs v. Hildreth, 207 N.W.2d 805, 806-07 (Iowa 1973) (void for
vagueness challenge).
362. 197 N.W.2d 186 (Iowa 1972).
363. Id. at 190. For a further discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes
95-98 supra.
364. See State v. Kephart, 202 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Iowa 1972): "[Coleman v. Alabama,
399 U.S. 1 ( 1970)] held that a preliminary hearing was a critical stage of the State's
criminal process at which an accused was entitled to aid of counsel." See also Adams v.
lllinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972) (Coleman v. Alabama does not apply retroactively to State
preliminary hearings conducted prior to June 22, 1970). For a discussion of the role of
judicial discretion in the appointment of counsel process, see Dunahoo, Judicial Discretion
in the Iowa Criminal Trial Process, 58 Iowa L. Rev. 1023, 1025-29 ( 1973) [hereinafter
cited as Dunahoo].
365. 407 u.s. 25 (1972).
366. See also text accompanying notes 813-20 infra. (sentencing)
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counselless misdemeanor conviction void. 367 However, the Court left the door
slightly ajar on the question of an unqualified right to counsel on misdemeanor
charges, to wit: "We need not consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as regards the right to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved, however, for here petitioner was in fact sentenced to jail." 368
b. Effectiveness of Counsel. State v. Williams 369 held that a court-appointed counsel's application under Code section 775.5 for public funds for
an investigator must be specific. Indeed, this statute was further interpreted
as "requir[ing] the trial judge to satisfy himself that such services are necessary and to articulate the reasons therefor." 370 It accordingly is within the trial
court's discretion to ascertain if defense counsel's claim is "necessary in the interest of justice" or is "frivolous and unwarranted." 371 The instant application, which was turned down, read: "That there are certain witnesses whose
names are known to the defense counsel, but defense counsel is unable to locate them, and that their testimony is necessary for the defense of defendant. " 372
There is an implication that a Code section 775.5 application does not require
the defense attorney to inform the court and prosecutor of the names and
addresses of the persons he wanted to investigate, but that a trial court can
insist upon specific information concerning "the number of inv'estigators to be
employed, the area to be investigated and probable cost or rate of pay." 373
For a guide in determining these applications, trial courts should familiarize
themselves with the comparable federal provision, 3 74 the supreme court
added. 375
367. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). (State felony conviction
void if tried without counsel and counsel not waived.)
368. 407 u.s. 25, 37 (1972).
369. 207 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1973).
370. Id. at 106.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 103.
373. Id. at 105.
374. Id. at 106, citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006(A)(e) (1969), as amended (Supp. 1973),
which sets forth the following federal procedure: Counsel for a person "financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other services necessary for an adequate defense
may request them" in an ex parte proceeding from the court or U.S. Magistrate. Appointed counsel may, subject to later review, obtain such services for an adequate defense
without prior authorization but the cost cannot exceed $150 plus reimbursement of expenses reasonably incurred. The maximum compensation paid to a person for services
rendered hereunder shall not exceed $300 exclusive of reimbursement of expenses reasonably incurred, unless certified by the court.
375. In the related matter of effective assistance rendered by counsel, the supreme
court consistently upheld the adequacy of the representation:
(a) Access: Effective assistance is not denied merely because of defendant's confinement in a different city during the trial where he "was not otherwise denied access io
his attorneys" and consulted with them both before opening and after closing of the trial
days. State v. Kimball, 203 N.W.2d 296, 299 (Iowa 1972).
(b) Degree of Guilt: Counsel is not inadequate because he waived a possible defense and relied unsuccessfully on a somewhat-supportable theory for reduction of degree of guilt-here to second-degree murder on a felony-murder charge. State v. Kelley,
195 N.W.2d 702 (Iowa 1972).
(c) Mistake: "Counsel are often in error as to an item of fact. When such an
error is a factor in advice to plead guilty it cannot be said later to void the guilty plea."
State v. Jackson, 199 N.W.2d 102, 103 (Iowa 1972).
(d) Multiple Defendants: Multiple representation of several co~defendants does not
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Speedy Indictment

Several issues concerning the Code section 795.1 requirement that a defendant be indicted within thirty days of being held to answer for a public
offense were decided during the survey period. 376
a. Demand-Waiver Doctrine. Following the United States Supr'eme
Court's lead in Barker v. Wingo 377 (viz., the sixth amendment right to a speedy
trial is violated by a State procedural ru1e forever barring dismissals for lack
thereof unless defendant demands a speedy trial), 378 the Iowa supreme court
has dropped its long-standing policy of applying a demand-waiver requirement in the speedy indictment procedure. In State v. Morningstar, 379 the court,
referring to its decision to drop the demand-waiver requirement under the
Code section 795.2 speedy trial provision, 380 said: "[W]e have recently eliminated demand as a prerequisite to operation of the section." 381 This means
that the thirty-day statutory period for indicting a defendant382 begins to run
automatically upon his being "held to answer," 383 irrespective of whether or not
he files a demand for speedy indictment. If the indictment is not returned
during this requisite period, the prosecution must be dismissed unless "good
cause" for the delay is shown. 384 Conversely, the State need not show good
cause for any alleged "delay" when the indictment is returned within the statutory period. 385
ipso facto render counsel ineffective where there is "nothing in the record to establish any
conflict of interest resulting in prejudice to the defendant;" defendant has the burden of
showing such a conflict "to his resultant prejudice." State v. Donohue, 207 N.W.2d 750,
751 (Iowa 1973).
(e) Preparation: "If a review of the [entire] record shows counsel alertly and
capable defended his client's rights throughout the trial, an assertion by counsel before
trial that he needed more information [and time] to prepare his case is not conclusive in
establishing inadequate representation." State v. Massey, 207 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Iowa
1973); accord State v. Kelley, 195 N.W.2d 702 (Iowa 1972).
376. See generally Dunahoo and Sullins, Speedy Justice, 22 DRAKE L. REv. 266
( 1973), which was written before the Iowa supreme court adopted its policy change regarding the demand-waiver doctrine under Iowa's speedy indictment and speedy trial statutes, as discussed below.
See also One Certain Person Named in Indictment v. Grand Jury, 207 N.W.2d 33
(Iowa 1973) (legal existence of a grand jury may not be extended into the calendar year
following its selections even though pursuant to a district court order).
377. 407 u.s. 514 (1972).
378. See also text accompanying notes 515-27 infra. (Speedy trial).
379. 207 N.W.2d 772 (Iowa 1973 ).
380. See State v. Gorham, 206 N.W.2d 908 (Iowa 1973).
381. 207 N.W.2d 772,775 (Iowa 1973).
382. Thirty days is "a reasonable pre-indictment period" which does not violate federal constitutional standards of due process or of speedy trial. State v. Bledsoe, 200
N.W.2d 529, 530 (Iowa 1972).
383. See IowA ConE § 795.1 (1973 ).
384. Cf. State v. Gebhart, 257 Iowa 843, 849, 134 N.W.2d 906, 909 (1965) (a §
795.1 speedy indictment case): "The defendant urges that the court made no finding of
good cause. This was not necessary; it is sufficient if this element is shown by the record." (emphasis added) with State v. Gorham, 206 N.W.2d 908, 914 (Iowa 1973) (a
§ 795.2 speedy trial case): "[A]n accused . . . is entitled to a dismissal if not brought
to trial within 60 days after being indicted unless 'good cause' to the contrary be Prosecutorially shown . •.." (emphasis added).
385. See State v. Bledsoe, 200 N.W.2d 529 (Iowa 1972) ("speedy indictment" not
violated where defendant not formally charged with escape until 23 days after his capture
and return to Iowa).
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b. "Held to answer." The crucial point in time in the criminal trial process concerning speedy indictment (and speedy trial subsequently)3 86 is the
time when an accused is "held to answer" for the offense charged. This is
because, by express terms of Code section 795.1, "speedy indictment" does
not attach until the "held to answer" stage. This stage was defined in State
v. Mays 387 as follows: "§ 795.1 comes into operation by its own language and
as a part of the regular procedure when an accused is held to answer after
preliminary examination or waiver of same." 388 Thus, the speedy indictment provision is not triggered by either an arrest389 or the filing of a preliminary information, or even by taking defendant before a magistrate for preliminary arraignment. 390 Defendant's remedy to cause a "speedy" preliminary hearing lies in habeas corpus, the supreme court pointed out in Mays. 391
c. Incarceration on Unrelated Charges. In State v. Mason, 392 the supreme court held that the thirty-day speedy indictment period under Code
section 795.1 is not applicable when defendant is already incarcerated on an
unrelated charge. The court determined that it was not the legislative intent
"to grant an incarcerated defendant the benefit of a 30 day statute of limitations on offenses unconnected with the one for which he was restrained." 393
Consequently, a section 795.1 dismissal "is not mandated where the public
offense for which a defendant is held to answer is unrelated to the one on
which the allegedly late indictment or information is subsequently filed." 394
d. Motion to dismiss. That a defendant who has been denied his right
to speedy indictment waives his right to dismissal therefor unless he not only
files a pretrial motion to dismiss but also insists upon a ruling thereon was
made dramatically clear in State v. Schiernbeck. 395 Here, defendant "proceeded to trial knowing there had been no ruling on either of his motions
to dismiss and without having called the omission to the attention of the
386. CoDE § 795.2 (speedy trial), by its express terms, is triggered only by an indictment (or county attorney's information).
387. 204 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1973).
388. ld. at 866 (emphasis changed). Accord State v. Morningstar, 207 N.W.2d 772
(Iowa 1973 ).
389. But see United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320-21 ( 1971): "[l]t is either a
formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and
holding to answer a criminal charge that engage . . . the Sixth Amendment. Invocation
of the speedy-trial provision thus need not await indictment, information, or other formal
charge. But we decline to extend the reach of the amendment to the period prior to
arrest."
390. See State v. Morningstar, 207 N.W.2d 772 (Iowa 1973) (defendant taken before
magistrate for preliminary arraignment and posted bail, but no preliminary examination
was held or waived. and so defendant was not "held to answer"). See also Parsons v.
Brewer, 202 N.W.2d 49, 53 (Iowa 1972) (The CoDE § 795.7 requirement that defendant,
when arrested, be taken before a magistrate without unnecessary delay does not apply to
a penitentiary inmate who committed another crime while imprisoned-where he was
confined in a special cell "pending further investigation" and was not arrested "for the
instant offense until taken before a magistrate.").
391. 204 N.W.2d 862, 865-66 (Iowa 1973).
392. 203 N.W.2d 292 (Iowa 1972).
393. /d. at 294.
394. /d.
395. 203 N.W.2d 546 (Iowa 1973).
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court." 396 The supreme court pointed out: "A motion not ruled on in the
trial court, where there has been no r·equest or demand for ruling, preserves
no error." 397
e. Representation of counsel. Code section 795.1, as well as section
795.2, contains a provision exempting a defendant who is neither represented
by counsel nor free on bail from the historical requirement of making a demand for a speedy indictment (or a speedy trial). That is, "the court on its
own motion shall carry out the provisions of this section as to dismissal," notwithstanding defendant's failure to make a demand on a motion to dismiss. 398
The supreme court's recent elimination of the demand-waiver requirement as
to both the speedy indictment399 and the speedy trial400 statutes has rendered
this provision of minimal importance. Nevertheless, the supreme court said
in State v. Gorham: 401 "[W]hen an accused is neither at liberty on bail nor
represented by an attorney, then absence of demand for or assertion of right
to a speedy trial shall under no circumstances be considered ["in an ad hoc
delicate balancing process in evaluating any good cause so shown"] 402 in connection with trial time delay."4oa
In State v. Cennon, 404 the Iowa supreme court held that whether a defendant is "represented" by counsel for purposes of Code section 795.1 depends upon whether he has consulted with an attorney and not upon the time
of formal appointment (or retainer) of counsel. Thus, "a defendant who,
prior to indictment, has the opportunity and actually does consult freely with
an attorney of his choice, but voluntarily elects not to discuss the charge
(known to him) upon which an indictment is subsequently found," 405 is represented by legal counsel for the purposes of Code section 795.1. The record
showed that a few days after defendant waived preliminary hearing and was
bound over to the district court on the instant charge, he had a conference
with his court-appointed attorney on another matter (i.e., a hold order from
California authorities). The same attorney was formally appointed at his arraignment on the instant charge. The supreme court "recognize[d] the frequent practice of assigning an attorney for a defendant, followed by a formal
appointment at arraignment in district court" and "doubt[ed] such an arrangement would result in a holding that defendant was 'unrepresented' during the
pre-indictment period."40 6
396. ld. at 547.
397. ld.
398. See IOWA CODE§§ 795.1, .2 (1973).
399. State v. Morningstar, 207 N.W.2d 772 (Iowa 1973).
400. State v. Gorham, 206 N.W.2d 908 (Iowa 1973).
401. ld.
402. Id. at 914.
403. ld.
404. 201 N.W.2d 715 (Iowa 1972). This decision was prior to State v. Morningstar,
207 N.W.2d 772 (Iowa 1973), but is illustrative as to what constitutes representation by
counsel (although itself turning on defendant's failure to demand a speedy indictment
under the old demand-waiver rule.
405. ld. at 717.
406. ld.
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Double Jeopardy

In State v. White, 401 the Iowa supreme court finally considered the question of the attachment of double jeopardy upon retrials following a hung jury.
In the instant case, defendant was retried and convicted following mistrials in
each of two prior trials because the respective juries were unable to agree.
The supreme court concluded that the United States Supreme Court "has
long favored the rule of discretion in the trial judge to declare a mistrial and
to require another panel to try the defendant if the ends of justice will be
best served." 408 Accordingly, the Iowa court distilled the "flexible rule" that,
in ruling on a demurrer alleging double jeopardy, the trial court "must consider
all surrounding facts and circumstances and in fairness determine when the
accused's right to be finally tried by a particular tribunal outweighs the public
interest in justice." 409 Thus, the supreme court rejected any rigid, mechanical
rule that defendant "may not be retried, regardless of the 'manifest necessity'
or considerations of 'the ends of public justice' for aborting two trials . . . ."410
In White, there was presented "only the stark fact of two mistrials for jury
disagreement" and thus there was "no evidence upon which to review trial
court's discretion in declaring the mistrials . . . ." 411 Consequently, the supreme court found no double jeopardy violation412 and defendant's conviction
was therefore affirmed. 413
4.

Discovery414

a. Alibi rebuttal witnesses. The leading development in the area of discovery was the United States Supreme Court decision in Wardius v. Oregon, 415
in whiCh the Court held that federal due process requires reciprocal discovery
concerning a state's statutory notice-of-alibi rule. 416 Specifically, the Court
held that "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids enforcement of alibi rules unless reciprocal discovery rights are given to criminal
407. 209 N.W.2d 15 (Iowa 1973).
408. ld. at 17, citing Illinois v. Somerville, 93 S. Ct. 1066 (1973).
409. ld.
410. Jd.
411. ld.
412. In a related development, the supreme court refused to overrule State v. Sefcheck,
261 Iowa 1159, 157 N.W.2d 128 (1968) (reprosecution after supreme court's voiding of
first conviction-here, for lack of trial counsel-is not barred by reason of double jeopardy.
413. See also Robinson v. Neil, 93 S. Ct. 876 (1973) (Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S.
387 (1970), which bars on the fifth amendment ground of double jeopardy state and
municipal prosecutions based on the same criminal activity, is fully retroactive).
414. For a discussion of the role of judicial discretion in the discovery process, see
Dunahoo, supra note 364 at 1031-34.
·
415. 93 S. Ct. 2208 (1973 ).
416. Concerning other types of State's discovery, see Cupp v. Murphy, 93 S. Ct. 2000
(1973) (fingernail scrapings), as discussed in note 472(d) infra; United States v. Mara,
93 S. Ct. 774 (1973) (handwriting exemplars), as discussed in text accompanying notes
496-98 infra and note 472(c) infra; and United States v. Dionisio, 93 S. Ct. 764 (1973)
(voice exemplars), as discussed in text accompanying notes 496-98 infra and note 472(f)
infra.
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defendants." 417 At issue was Oregon's statute requiring a defendant to give the
State notice of the particulars of an intended alibi defense but remaining silent
as to any subsequent reciprocation by the State as to pretrial notice of intended
alibi rebuttal witnesses. 418 Holding that such a statutory scheme was "facially
invalid," 419 the Supreme Court dictated that "in the absence of fair notice
that he would have opportunity to discover the State's rebuttal witnesses, petitioner cannot be compelled to reveal his alibi defense. " 420 Thus, the Court
did not retreat from its position in Williams v. Florida 421 that a State's noticeof-alibi statute is not unconstitutional as an infringement of the fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination. Nor did the Court hold that the
State must provide notice-of-alibi rebuttal witnesses. Indeed, the State apparently may, consistent with Wardius, either abandon its notice-of-alibi rule or
add a notice-of-alibi rebuttal witness requirement.
b. Expert witness' reference materials. Copies of an expert witness' reference materials were deemed non-discoverable in State v. Allison. 422 Defendant therein had requested a disclosure order requiring production to him
of the medical texts, treatises, journals, and articles upon which the State's
physician was expected to base his opinion that a blood test of 249 shows
intoxication. "Had the State's physician rendered a report with respect to this
particular case and defendant requested the State to produce it, a different
question would be presented," 423 the supreme court cautioned.
c. Informer's identity. Two survey cases dealt with the general principle
that the identity of confidential informants can be withheld from the defense
subject to disclosure on a case-by-case basis where the requisite showing of
necessity for disclosure is made. 424 That is, such disclosure "is required where
it would be relevant and helpful to the defense, i.e. when the informer was a
participant in, or a witness to, the crime charged." 425 Defendant carries the
burden of showing such need and "[m]ere speculation an informer may be
helpful is not enough to carry the burden," 426 the supreme court determined
in State v. Battle. 421 Defendant's burden in Battle was not met merely by requesting the informer's name during cross examination of a police officer. In
State v. Crawford, 428 the non-disclosure rule was held to extend to reputation
testimony such that a police officer testifying as to defendant's bad reputation
was not required to divulge the identity of informers who were his sources re417. 93 S. Ct. 2208, 2211.
418. Cf. IowA CoDE § 777.18 (1973). See also State v. Kappos, 189 N.W.2d 563
(Iowa 1971) (the name of a rebuttal witness need not be endorsed on the county attorney's information).
419. 93 S. Ct. 2208, 2211 n.4.
420. ld. at 2214.
421. 399 u.s. 78 (1970).
422. 206 N.W.2d 893 (Iowa 1973).
423. Id. at 894.
424. See State v. Battle, 199 N.W.2d 70, 71 (Iowa 1972).
425. Id.
426. Id. at 72.
427. 199 N.W.2d 70 (Iowa 1972).
428. 202 N.W.2d 99 (Iowa 1972).
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garding defendant's reputation. Notwithstanding the general rule requmng
(on cross-examination) identification of the source of reputation statements,
the supreme court held that "public policy favoring the non divulgence privilege
[outweighs] . . . the rule for testing collateral testimony by cross-examination."429 The court added that even if the informants were identified, defendant, "under the present state of our case law, could not have called them
to impeach statements of the witness in this collateral area." 430 Thus, the
trial court "did not abuse its discretion in refusing to require the witness to
name the informants." 431
d. Statements of witnesses. In State v. Aossey, 432 the supreme court
attempted to strike a balance between State v. Eads433 (abuse of court's discretion to order production of statements of all of State's witnesses expected to
testify at trial) and Brady v. Maryland 434 (State must tum over requested
statements which are materially exculpatory). Affirming the trial court's refusal to order the State to produce a written statement of Aossey's accomplice,
the supreme court characterized the statement as "highly inculpatory." 435 So
viewing it, as non-exculpatory, the supreme court held that the State was not
required to produce it-unless it was "necessary to his proper defense," 436
which it was not (since defendant's theory of mistake as to his accomplice's
lack of authority to remove goods from his employer "taxe[d] credulity to the
limit"). 437 And, even if parts of it were exculpatory, the issue of non-production was mooted since other state's witnesses acknowledged these particular
allegedly exculpatory matters at trial. 438 Moreover, since defendant's accomplice himself did not testify, there was no Jencks problem, the supreme court
concluded.
In State v. Houston, 439 the Iowa supreme court upheld the trial court's
refusal to order in-trial turnover of a police officer's summary of a statement
of a state's witness. After the state's witness testified on direct examination
as to the description of defendant he gave to the investigating officer at the
scene of the crime, defendant requested turnover to him of the witness' statement before cross examination. The trial court examined the police report
in camera and, finding no inconsistency in the summary of the witness' statement and his testimony, refused to order turnover of the statement. Affirming, the supreme court noted that defendant "does not claim access to the police
429. ld. at 102.
430. ld.
431. ld.
432. 201 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa 1972).
433. 166 N.W.2d 766 (Iowa 1969). However, the supreme court in Eads did "not
foreclose the possibility that a defendant may be entitled to a particular statement upon
showing it is necessary to his proper defense." ld. at 774.
434. 373 u.s. 83 (1963).
435. 201 N.W.2d 731, 734.
436. ld.
437. ld. at 733.
438. ld.
439. 209 N.W.2d 42 (Iowa 1973).
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report because it is exculpatory or a verbatim, signed or adopted statement
of the witness." 440 Noting that ther·e is a distinction between "a statement
made by a witness and an imprecise summary of what another understood him
to say," the supreme court cited a number of cases in which it had "approved
the federal Jencks Act procedure for determining defendant's right to see statements of witnesses." 441 The test, in making this distinction, is "whether the
statement is the witness' own, rather than the product of the investigator's s·elections, interpretations and interpolations." 442 Moreover, "[i]t must be
shown, unless there is direct evidence the witness prepared, signed or adopted
the statement, that it minimally is a continuous, narrative statement made by
the witness and recorded verbatim, or nearly so." 443 The instant statement
did not meet this test and thus "[t]here was no error in depriving the defense
access thereto." 444 Indeed, the court recalled that it had rejected "a dragnet
demand for all statements, reports or summaries of those persons the State
intended to call as witnesses" 445 in State v. Cunha. 446

5.

Motions to Suppress

Rulings by the trial courts on pretrial motions to suppress 447 provided the
c·entral issue in many of the survey cases, as defendants asserted that incriminatory evidence had been obtained against them in an unconstitutional or
illegal fashion. 448

a.

Identification Procedures.

i. Individualized Confrontations. The leading development in the
area of identification procedures 449 was Kirby v. Illinois, 450 in which the United
States Supreme Court sharply limited United States v. Wade. 451 The latter had
set forth a sixth amendment standard of per se exclusion of identification testimony based upon a post-indictment lineup when defendant was not afforded
right to assistance of counsel. Kirby held that the Wade doctrine does not
extend to identification testimony based upon "a police station showup that
took place before the defendant had been indicted or otherwise formally
440. ld. at 46, distinguishing State v. Mayhew, 170 N.W.2d 608 (Iowa 1969), on
appeal after remand, 183 N.W.2d 723 (Iowa 1971).
441. ld.
442. ld. Cf. State v. Hodge, 252 Iowa 449, 105 N.W.2d 613 (1960), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 402 (1962) (State witness' "work product" not discoverable).
443. ld.
444. ld.
445. ld.
446. 193 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa 1971).
447. For a discussion of the scope of judicial discussion in rulings on motions to
suppress, see Dunahoo, supra note 364 at 1041-42.
448. For a discussion of challenges to blood-test and breath-test evidence in
O.M.V.U.I. cases during the survey period, see text accompanying notes 269-88 supra.
449. In the related areas of compelled handwriting and voice exemplars, see text
accompanying notes 496-98 infra.
450. 406 u.s. 682 (1972).
451. 388 u.s. 218 (1967).

September 1973]

Survey of Iowa Law

105

charged with any criminal offense. " 4 ~ 2 Thus, while there is no federal constitutional requirement of counsel at a lineup or in an individualized confrontation until a criminal suspect has been formally charged, the states were left
free to apply a broader right of counsel.
Iowa is one of the states 453 that has stuck with the Kirby minimal standards.
In SUlte v. Jackson, 454 the Iowa supreme court observed that Kirby "held admissible evidence of pieindictment identification at a police station where accused was without counsel." 455 In Jackson, the robbery victim was asked to
come to the police station because the police had detained suspects fitting the
description of his assailants, and as he entered the station he recognized defendant coming down the stairs. Noting the similarity with the factual situation
in Kirby, the Iowa supreme court said: "The identification was spontaneous
and was received without prompting from any law enforcement officer." 456
Similarly, a counselless one-man showup was upheld in Williamson v.
State. 451 The robbery victim obtained defendant's name from a third party
and reported to police that he had been robbed by defendant. Two or three
hours later, defendant was arrested and the victim was called to the police station. Upon entering, the victim spotted defendant and immediately confronted
him about the stolen billfold. Applying Kirby, the Iowa supreme court held
that this procedure was not "unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification," 458 even though defendant was the only black
defendant in the station at the time. The court noted, inter alia, that the
counselless confrontation "occurred soon after the offense while the victim's
memory was fresh" and that the identification was "spontaneous." 459 Moreover, an in-court identification was made. 460
ii. Photographic displays. In a related matter, the United States
Supreme Court held in United States v. Ash461 that "the Sixth Amendment
does not grant the right to counsel at photographic displays conducted by the
Government for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification
452. 406 u.s. 682, 684 (1972).
453. See State v. Saint Andre, 263 La. 48, 267 So. 2d 190 ( 1972); State v. Carey,
486 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. 1972) (counsel applies only to post-indictment lineups); People v.
Faulkner, 28 Cal. App. 3d 384, 104 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1972); contra, Arnold v. State,
484 S.W.2d 248 (Mo. 1972).
454. 199 N.W.2d 102 (Iowa 1972).
455. Id. at 103 (emphasis added).
456. ld. at 102.
457. 201 N.W.2d 490 (Iowa 1972).
458. Id. at 491.
459. ld.
460. On the related matter of an independent origin for in-court testin10ny, the supreme
court said in State v. Houston, 209 N.W.2d 42 (Iowa 1973): "Assuming there was an
illegal identification procedure used prior to trial, the in-court identification testimony is
admissible if the State proves by clear and convincing evidence the in-court identification
had an independent origin." Here, the above test was met by witness' identification having "untainted origin" in his observations of defendant (from 3-4 feet away in a welllighted area) at the scene of the crime. Thus, he could identify defendant in court notwithstanding an arguably illegal police station lineup (the evidence of which was partially
"suppressed" by an order in limine).
461. 93 S. Ct. 2568 (1973 ).
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of the offender." 462 This holding covers both pre-indictment and post-indictment photographic displays, 463 both of which were used in Ash. Only the
post-indictment display was argued to the Supreme Court in Ash, since defendant recognized that Kirby, in the Court's words, "forecloses application
of the Sixth Amendment to events before the initiation of adversary criminal
proceedings." 464 The Court's rationale was based on its formulation of the
following test for determining when a pretrial event constitutes a "critical
stage" thus necessitating the right to assistance of counsel, viz., "whether the
accused require[s] aid in coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting
his adversary." 465 Concluding that requiring counsel in the instant case would
require a "substantial departure" from the abovementioned historical test, the
Court reasoned: "Since the accused himself is not present at the time of the
photographic display, and asserts no right to be present, . . . no possibility
arises that the accused might be misled by his lack of familiarity with the law
or overpowered by his professional adversary. Similarly, the counsel guarantee would not be used to produce equality in a trial-like adversary confrontation."466
b.

Search and seizure evidence.

i. Standing to challenge. A comprehensive standard for determining a person's standing to challenge the legality of a search, and the admissibility of evidence derived therefrom, was expressed in State v. Osborn. 461 Specifically, the court held that standing proceeds from any of the following: "Invasion of privacy may be claimed by that person [1] who is charged with an
offense of possession; or [2] who has a proprietary or possessory interest in the
property seized; or [3] who is legitimately on the premises when the search
occurs." 468 But the court then proceeded to qualify all three bases for standing, which are discussed below in the context of the instant factual situation.
Here, the supreme court held that a guest in another's automobile has standing
to challenge the legality of the search of that automobile when the fruits of
the search are being used against the guest on a burglary charge provided that
he alleges that the search invaded his expectation of privacy.
462. ld. at 2579.
463. See also State v. Houston, 206 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1973) (no showing that
counselless photographic identification "was so impermissibly induced or suggestive as to
create a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification;" counsel issue not
raised).
464. 93 S. Ct. 2568, 2570 n.3 (1973 ).
465. Id. at 2575.
466. ld. at 2577.
467. 200 N.W.2d 798 (Iowa 1972).
468. I d. at 804, accord Brown v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 1565, 1569 (1973):
[T]here is no standing to contest a search and seizure where, as here, the defendants: (a) were not on the premises at the time of the contested search and
seizure; (b) had no proprietary or possessory interest in the premises; and (c)
were not charged with an offense that includes, as an essential element of the
offense charged, possession of the seized evidence at the time of the contested
search and seizure.
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While the court pointed out that standing is automatic for anyone charged
with an offense of possession, it nevertheless noted that possession of the
seized evidence must itself be an essential element of the crime charged in
order for the automatic standing rule to apply. Thus, there is no automatic
standing on a charge of burglary (as opposed, e.g., to a charge of unlawful
possession of marijuana). Next, the court qualified the automatic-standing rule
where the accused has a proprietary or possessory interest in either the premises
searched or the property seized by saying that it is unlikely that the accused
bas standing by virtue of an interest in stolen goods seized as evidence. In
other words, it appears that a thief (such as the accused here in a burglary
case) lacks standing generally. Finally, the court held that an automobileguest normally would have standing-since standing normally evolves when
the accused is legitimately on the premises in an area in which there was "a
reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion" 469 (such as
in a friend's automobile). However, the court ruled that it is proper to require
that an otherwise 'aggrieved person' "allege, and if the allegation be disputed,
that he establish, that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy." 470
In other words "it is an invasion of his personal right of privacy of person or
premises due to an unreasonable search and seizure that Osborn must verify
to obtain standing to question the legality of the search of Nott's automobile." 471
Because defendant did not so allege, he lacked standing, the supreme court
concluded.
ii. Warrantless searches with consent. The United States Supreme
Court provided the major development concerning warrantless searches, 472 by
469. /d. at 805, quoting Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).
470. Id. at 806, quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960).
471. /d. at 804.
472. In other warrantless search and seizure cases, the United States Supreme Court
held:
(a) Business records. No fourth amendment claim arises when petitioner's records, which have been turned over to her accountant, are subpoenaed from the accountant
by the government for criminal investigative purposes. "[T]here can be little expectation
of privacy where records are handed to an accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of much of the information therein is required in an income tax return." Couch
v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 611, 619 (1973).
(b) Exigent circumstances-Impounded Vehicles. The fourth amendment is not
violated by a warrantless search of an impounded automobile (including its locked trunk)
pursuant to a standard police procedure of carrying out "community caretaking functions,
totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to
the violation of a criminal statute." Here, the impounded automobile was stored in a
rural area seven miles from the police station and a revolver was suspected to be in it
since the car belonged to a police officer who was unconscious following an accident.
The search was for the purpose of removing the gnn as a matter of public safety and not
for discovery of evidence of criminal activity (here, a murder). Cady v. Dombrowski,
93 S. Ct. 2523 (1973).
(c) Handwriting exemplars: "We have held today in Dionisio, [United States v.
Dionisio, 93 S. Ct. 764 ( 1973)] that a grand jury subpoena is not a 'seizure' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and further, that that Amendment is not violated by
a grand jury directive compelling production of 'physical characteristics' which are 'constantly exposed to the public'. . . . Handwriting, like speech, is repeatedly shown to the
public, and there is no more expectation of privacy in the physical characteristics of a
person's script than there is the tone of his voice." United States v. Mara, 93 S. Ct. 774,
775-56 (1973).
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holding in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 473 that Miranda-type 474 warnings ar'e not
a prerequisite to a valid consent search. That is, an accused's knowledge of
a right to refuse is not an indispensable element of a valid cons'ent. Nevertheless, this knowledge is a consideration:
We hold only that when the subject of a search is not in custody
and the State attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent,
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate
that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of
duress or coercion, express or implied. Voluntariness is a question
of fact to be determined from all the circumstances, and while the
subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into
account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent. 475
111.
Warrantless searches based on exigent circumstances. In State
v. Simmons, 476 the Iowa supreme court reaffirmed the principle that "a police
officer may make a valid search of a vehicle on a public highway without a
warrant or consent or prior to arrest where exigent circumstances and probable
cause exist." 477 Here, police officers stopped a car containing four blacks while
investigating a reported robbery by four black juveniles. One of the occupants
fit the reported description of one of the robbers. After the stopping, one occupant (Smith) was observed bending over and apparently shoving something
under the front seat. Meanwhile, the driver (Colton) alighted and started
walking back to the police car. Based upon their experience that "such conduct
was often an attempt to keep them from observing the contents and occupants of the vehicle," 478 the officers return'ed Colton to the car. One of the officers then shined his flashlight through the open car door and saw a brown
paper bag protruding from under the front seat. Upon questioning, Colton
(d) Incident to arrest. The Chimel v. California [395 U.S. 752 (1969)] doctrine
of a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest applies to a limited station house
seizure of highly evanescent evidence (here, fingernail scrapings) from a person who was
not under arrest at the time but was voluntarily being generally questioned. This limited
intrusion was constitutionally permissible in light of defendant's attempted destruction of
this evidence; however, the Court added that it did "not hold that a full Chime! search
would have been justified in this case without a formal arrest and without a warrant."
Cupp v. Murphy, 93 S. Ct. 2000, 2004 (1973).
(e) Stop and Frisk. Reasonable cause for a stop-and-frisk "search" need not be
based upon the officer's personal observation and thus can rest upon an informant's tip
provided that the tip has some indicia of reliability. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972).
(f) Voice exemplars. "It is clear that a subpoena to appear before a grand jury is
not a 'seizure' in the Fourth Amendment sense . . . . The required disclosure of a person's voice is thus immeasurably further removed from the Fourth Amendment protection
than was the intrusion into the body effected by the blood extraction in Schmerber
[Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)]." United States v. Dionisio, 93 S. Ct.
764, 769, 772 (1973).
473. 93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973).
474. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
475. 93 s. Ct. 2041, 2059 (1972).
476. 195 N.W.2d 723 (Iowa 1972).
477. Id. at 724-25. See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 2535,
2537-38 (1973): "[T]he Carroll doctrine [Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)]
does not declare a field day for the police in searching automobiles. Automobile or no
automobile, there must be probable cause for the search."
478. Id. at 724.
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repeatedly said nothing was in the bag and kept inching it out when directed
to remove the bag. The officer thereupon reached in and pulled out the bag
which contained blasting caps. Affirming the conviction of the defendant
(another occupant of the car) for unlawful possession of explosive devices, the
supreme court concluded: "Exigent circumstances and probable cause existed
for the warrantless seizure of the caps. In so holding we find the actions of
Smith and Colton added some weight to the probable cause issue." 479
iv. Searches with warrant. The only significant new general development concerning search warrants during the survey period 480 was the holding
in State v. Dodson481 that Miranda warnings 482 ar·e not necessary before execution of a search warrant provided that there are "no tainted elicitation of incriminatory statements. . . ." 483 Thus, any of defendant's attendant statements or admissions were admissible.
In other cases, the supreme court reaffirmed a number of standard principles-e.g., that a warrant "may issue upon [reliable] hearsay supplied by an
unidentified informant" 484 and that probable cause for a warrant cannot rest
upon the unsupported conclusions of the affiant-officer. 485 State v. Lynch486
is the only case in which the Iowa supreme court discussed probable cause for
a warrant in detail. 487 In Lynch, the content of the police officers' affidavit
was summarized as follows:
That they had made a complete investigation into defendant's activities and knew all of the facts in the police file; that they were aware
of defendant's suspicious actions during the previous two weeks; that
they had reliable information from a reliable informant who is a
credible resident of the state of Iowa that defendant has been selling
narcotic drugs and marijuana, and that defendant left several days
previous to the date of the application for California to pick up a
load of drugs; that during a flight into Cedar Rapids defendant had
offered to obtain drugs for the airline stewardess; that defendant was
arrested on or about June 5, 1968, in California on a narcotics
charge; that an official from United Air Lines informed affiants that
defendant had offered to obtain narcotics for the stewardess on his
flight on December 19, 1968. 4 88
479. ld. at 725.
480. On the specific topic of necessity for a search warrant for seizure of allegedly
obscene materials, see text accompanying notes 238-44 supra.
481. 195 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1972).
482. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
483. 195 N.W.2d 684, 686 (Iowa 1972).
484. State v. Dodson, 195 N.W.2d 684, 685 (Iowa 1972).
485. "[I]t is not the arresting officer's determination which counts: it is that of
the_ magistrate, who must reach his conclusion solely upon information supplied to him at
the time the warrant is requested." The Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 ( 1959)
probable cause standard for an officer making a warrantless arrest (and search incident
thereto) does not apply to an officer's stating probable cause in his affidavit for a search
warrant. State v. Johnson, 203 N.W.2d 126, 128 (Iowa 1972).
486. 197 N.W.2d 186 (Iowa 1972).
487. For other cases, in which the supreme court summarily upheld the affidavits for
search warrants, see State v. Dodson, 195 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1972) and State v. Simmons,
195 N.W.2d 723 (Iowa 1972).
488. 197 N.W.2d 186, 191 (Iowa 1972).

110

Drake Law Review

[Vol. 23

The supreme court said that "except for the recitation that defendant had
offered to supply narcotics to the stewardess on the flight into Cedar Rapids,
we have no hesitancy in saying that probable cause for issuance of the warrant
could not be found." 489 The court continued:
Nothing else appears except the conclusions of the police officers,
who asserted they had the defendant under surveillance for several
weeks and that his actions were "suspicious." This conclusion was
entirely unsupported by facts. They also stated they knew everything that was in the police files; but the writ cannot issue on what
they secretly know. It can issue only on information communicated
to the issuing officer who then makes his own determination of probable cause. 490
The supreme court held "it is reasonable to conclude that one traveling on an
airliner who offers narcotics to the stewardess may have such narcotics on his
person or among his effects." This reported offer "[s]upported by the statements of an official of the airlines . . . was sufficient to furnish probable
cause," the supreme court concluded. 491
b. Privilege against self incrimination. During the survey period, the
United States Supreme Court handed down three major opinions concerning
the fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination. These cases are all
discussed in this section on evidentiary standards, although not all of them
involved motions to suppress.
i. Production of records in another's possession. In Couch v. United
States, 492 the Court, stating that this is "a personal privilege," 493 held that a
taxpayer-defendant may not invoke the fifth amendment to prevent the subpoena-coerced production of her business records in the possession of her accountant (albeit title remained in the taxpayer). Noting that the accountant
was "the on:ly one compelled to do anything" 494 by the subpoena, the court
recalled Justice Holmes' observation: "A party is privileged from producing
the evidence but not from its production." 495
ii. Non-testimonial evidence. That this fifth amendment privilege
protects on:ly against compelled disclosure of incriminatory testimonial evidence
sought for its communicative content was once more made clear. In United
States v. Mara 496 and United States v. Dionisio, 497 respectively, the Supreme
Court held that this privilege does not preclude grand jury subpoenas ordering
certain named witnesses to appear and produce handwriting and voice exemplars. It has long been held that "the compelled display of identifiable
physical characteristics infringes no interest protected by the privilege against
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.

Id. at 192.
Id.
Id.
93S.Ct.611 (1973).
Id. at 616.
ld.
Id., quoting Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457,458 (1913).
93 S. Ct. 774 (1973 ).
93 S. Ct. 764 (1973).
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compulsory self-incrimination," 498 the Court pointed out. Thus, defendants'
contempt convictions for refusal to abide by the subpoenas were affirmed in
both cases.
ill.
Confessions. The standard for determining the voluntariness of
defendant's confession 499 was set forth in State v. Fetters, 500 to wit: "[W]hen
a confession of a criminal defendant is challenged at a pretrial suppression
hearing as involuntary, the burden is on the state to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the confession was voluntary as a prerequisite to its admissibility into evidence at his trial." 501 The Iowa supreme court thus adopted
the less-stringent standard after the United States Supreme Court502 had "left
States free, pursuant to their own law, to adopt the higher standard." 503
6.

Change of Venue

A new dimension in deciding applications for change of venue 504 was
added in Pollard v. District Court. 505 The supreme court held therein that the
application must be considered in the context of the publicity attending the
entire matter and not merely the isolated publicity concerning an individual
wrongdoer. Accordingly, it was reversible error to deny defendant's application for change of venue based upon considerable media coverage of a city
council meeting in which there was considerable bickering between the State
Auditor and the city councilmen but only casual reference to defendant being
named in the state audit as the only city employee who had possibly violated
any law. Rejecting the traditional approach of requiring defendant to "demonstrate conclusively she cannot receive a fair trial," 506 the court said: "When
498. ld. at 767.
499. See Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2046 (1973 ), a consent search
case, as to the nature of voluntariness. See also State v. Ware, 205 N.W.2d 700 (Iowa
1973) (confession is inadmissible when induced by officer's promissory leniency), as
discussed in text accompanying notes 663-67 infra. (Trial-mistrial).
500. 202 N.W.2d 84, 89 (Iowa 1972) (defendant's subnormal intelligence by itself
does not render a confession involuntary if he can "understand the meaning and effect of
the confession," but this is a factor to be considered in the court's determination).
501. ld. at 88. However, the admissibility of confessions made before Miranda
[Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)] must be determined "by application of concomitant case law explicating the due process standard of voluntariness." On a postconviction relief petition, the burden thus is upon defendant to establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that his confession, viewed reasonably in light of the totality of circumstances,
was involuntarily given. See Parsons v. Brewer, 202 N.W.2d 49, 52 (Iowa 1972).
502. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
503. 202 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Iowa 1972).
504. For a discussion of the scope of judicial discretion in ruling on applications for
change of venue, see Dunahoo, supra note 364, at 1047-52.
505. 200 N.W.2d 519 (Iowa 1972).
506. Id. at 521. On the other hand, the court upheld denials of defendant's applications for changes of venue in three other cases involving allegedly prejudicial publicity
concerning defendants alone. [In these cases, defendants failed to show actual excitement and the material was not "so potentially prejudicial that prejudice must be presumed." Pollard v. District Court, 200 N.W.2d 519, 520 (Iowa 1972).]. See State v.
Davis, 196 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1972) (not prejudicial that one newspaper account was
subject to misinterpretation in two respects since it was in "substantial accord with the
facts"); State v. Elmore, 201 N.W.2d 443 (Iowa 1972) (insufficient showing of local excitement and prejudice to require a change of venue although a minor reference was
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the spotlight's glare comes to rest on a certain individual in a matter of large
public interest involving widespread and intensive publicity of a prejudicial
nature, the test is whether a 'reasonable likelihood' exists that the voir dire
jury examination or a continuance will not be sufficient to allow a fair trial." 507
The supreme court also made a policy change regarding the scope of its
review of rulings on change of venue applications. In State v. Elmore, 508 it
said: "We are required to make 'an independent evaluation of the circumstances' on change of venue issues in criminal cases involving the right to an
impartial jury, i.e., our review is de novo whether the questions comes to us
on certiorari in advance of trial, or on direct appeal following judgment.
To this extent only our pronouncement in Harnack v. District Court
. is no longer controlling." 509
In other cases involving procedural aspects, the court held: that mer·e conclusions or generalities in a supporting affidavit (unlike in the motion itself)
will not support a change of venue and thus the grounds therefor must be
stated with definiteness and certainty; 510 that the State's failure to file affidavits
in resistance to defendant's motion does not convert defendant's motion and
affidavit from a prima facie to a conclusive showing; 511 and that sustaining
of defendant's motion for continuance renders moot his motion for change of
venue when alternative relief was sought in the two concurrently-filed motions.512 The court also suggested: "[W]hen motions to change venue are
overruled, counsel on both sides would be well advised to have voir dire examination of the jury reported." 513
7.

Speedy Trial 5 14

The survey period evidenced a major change in the area of speedy trial,
which was occasioned by a monumental ruling of the United States Supreme
Court.
a. Demand-waiver doctrine. Prompted by the United States Supreme
Court's June 22, 1972 holding in Barker v. Wingo 515 that rejected a State's
demand-waiver rule that "a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial forever waives his right," 516 the Iowa supreme court belatedly did an aboutface 517
made in one newspaper account during the trial to a parole violation being the reason
defendant was not free on bond); and State v. Williams, 207 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1973) (insufficient showing of local excitement and prejudice to preclude retrial in same county
only two weeks after a mistrial).
507. 200 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Iowa 1972).
508. 201 N.W.2d 443 (Iowa 1972).
509. Id. at 445, referring to Harnack v. District Court, 179 N.W.2d 356, 359 (Iowa
1970).
510. State v. Dague, 206 N.W.2d 93 (Iowa 1973).
511. Id.
512. State v. Weiland, 202 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1972).
513. State v. Davis, 196 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Iowa 1972).
514. See generally Dunahoo and Sullins, Speedy Justice, 22 DRAKE L. REv. 266
(1973). See also note 517 infra.
515. 407 u.s. 514 (1972).
516. Id. at 528.
517. Prior to its dropping of the demand-waiver rule under CoDB §§ 795.1 and 795.2
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in State v. Gorham: 518 "In light of contemporary standards we now reject
the rule that absent a demand an accused, per se, waives his right to a Code
§ 795.2 speedy trial." 519 This means that "an accused, on bail and represented by counsel, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application is
entitled to a dismissal if not brought to trial within 60 days after being indicted
unless 'good cause' to the contrary be prosecutorially shown, and (2) courts
must engage in an ad hoc delicate balancing process in evaluating any 'good
cause' so shown." 520
This new procedural rule represents a policy change on the part of the
Iowa supreme court, which "[s]ince 1943 . . . has repeatedly held . . . an
accused, unless not admitted to bail and unrepresented by counsel, waives
right to dismissal for failure to demand a speedy trial." 521 Thus, once a case
is not brought to trial within sixty days of indictment, 522 defendant must file
in State v. Gorham, 206 N.W.2d 908 (Iowa 1973) on April 25, 1973, the Iowa supreme
court had expressly maintained same in State v. Kimball, 203 N.W.2d 296 (Iowa 1972)
on December 20, 1972 (and thus differentiated "speedy trial" under the CoDE and the
sixth amendment). In Kimball, the supreme court held that "a defendant represented by
counsel or at bail is required to demand trial in order to take advantage of the time limitation" (of CoDE § 795.2) and accordingly "[s]ince a demand for trial was not filed,
the trial court properly refused to dismiss the case under the statute." ld. at 300 (emphasis added). The court then noted that "[t]he federal constitutional right to speedy trial
was recently expounded by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo," and
upon applying the four-part Barker balancing test, concluded: "We hold, under the
Barker decision, that defendant's federal constitutional right to speedy trial was not violated. ld. at 300, 301 (emphasis added). Then, in Gorham, the supreme court observed: "Now, for the first time since issuance of the opinion in Barker v. Wingo . . .,
we are called upon to determine the propriety of our aforesaid demand-waiver rule."
Jd. at 910 (emphasis added). The court, without mentioning Kimball, thereupon held
that "to the extent Pines v. District Court [233 Iowa 1284, 10 N.W.2d 574 (1943)] and
its successors conflict herewith they are no longer controlling." ld. at 913. The apparent
explanation for this Kimball-Gorham discrepancy is that in Gorham, presumably unlike
in Kimball, defendant "argue[d] the so-called demand waiver rule, specifically and by
judicial construction inherent in § 795.2, is constitutionally proscribed." _/d. at 909.
518. 206 N.W.2d 908 (Iowa 1973).
519. Id. at 913.
520. Id. at 914.
521. Jd. at 909 [new text added].
522. This sixty-day period is subject to computational rules recogmzmg certain excluded periods. In State v. Gorham, supra, the court constructed the following chronology: indictment on April 26, defendant's committal (upon defendant's request) to a State
medical facility for mental evaluation on May 17, defendant's return to local jail on July 14
and September 3 order setting trial for October 11, and defendant's request for replacement
counsel on September 13. The supreme court observed: "Stated briefly, absent any defense initiated cause for delay, ( 1) 61 full days elapsed from the time Gorham was incarcerated in the Linn County Jail on return from the medical facility and his request for
replacement counsel; . . . (3) the initial trial date fixed by court order was 89 days after
defendant's aforesaid return to jail." 206 N.W.2d at 914-15 (emphasis added). Thus, the
court placed considerable emphasis upon the time that defendant returned from the medical evaluation, however, the fact remains that the State failed to try him within 60 days
after his return from commitment. It, of course, remains to be seen what it will do with
this type of scenario (medical commitment on 50th day after indictment, trial begun on
50th day after defendant's return from commitment, motion to dismiss on the basis that
any period of the State's unexcusable delay in getting defendant committed should be
tacked on to the time period following release from commitment).
As to recommended excluded periods, see ABA, PRoJEcr ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL, § 2.3, at 25-26 (Approved Draft
1968):
The following periods should be excluded in computing the time for trial:
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a motion to dismiss 523 which must be granted unless the State can show good
cause for the delay, irrespective of defendant's making or not making demand
for speedy trial. What constitutes good cause remains a matter of the trial
court's determination within its sound judicial discretion. 524 The language in
Gorham (i.e., "courts must engage in an ad hoc delicate balancing process in
evaluating any 'good cause' so shown") 525 suggests that the courts, in determining good cause, should consider, inter alia, the four factors of the Barker
balancing test, to wit: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the
delay, (3) the existence of absence of resultant prejudice to defendant, and
( 4) defendant's demand or lack thereof. 526 This premise is further sup(a) The period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the
defendant, including but not limited to an examination and hearing on competency and the period during which he is incompetent to stand trial, hearings
on pretrial motions, interlocutory appeals, and trial of other charges.
(b) The period of delay resulting from congestion of the trial docket when
the congestion is attributable to exceptional circumstances.
(c) The period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request or with the consent of the defendant or his counsel. A defendant without
counsel should not be deemed to have consented to a continuance unless he has
been advised by the court of his right to a speedy trial and the effect of his consent.
(d) The period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the prosecuting attorney, if:
(i) the continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence
material to the state's case, when the prosecuting attorney has exercised due
diligence to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe
that such evidence will be available at the later date; or
(ii) the continuance is granted to allow the prosecuting attorney additional time to prepare the state's case and additional time is justified because of
the exceptional circumstances of the case.
(e) The period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the
defendant. A defendant should be considered absent whenever his whereabouts
are unknown and in addition he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution or his whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. A defendant
should be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but his
presence for trial cannot be obtained or he resists being returned to the state for
trial.
(f) If the charge was dismissed upon motion of the prosecuting attorney
and thereafter a charge is filed against the defendant for the same offense or an
offense required to be joined with that offense, the period of delay from the date
the charge was dismissed to the date the time limitations would commence running as to the subsequent charge had there been no previous charge.
(g) A reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial
with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and there is good
cause for not granting a severance. In all other cases the defendant should be
granted a severance so that he may be tried within the time limits applicable to
him.
(h) Other periods of delay for good cause.
523. See Foster v. Brewer, 197 N.W.2d 366, 367 (Iowa 1972): "Our ruling [in State
v. Allnutt, 261 Iowa 897, 156 N.W.2d 266 (1968)] that defendant waived his right to
speedy trial by failing to move to dismiss until after trial surely applies to this petitioner,
who never made such motion."
Of course, the motion to dismiss requirement does not apply to a defendant who is
both incarcerated and unrepresented. See IowA ConE § 795.2 (1973 ).
524. See, e.g., Maher v. Brown, 225 Iowa 341, 280 N.W. 553 (1938). However,
when it becomes apparent that there is good cause, "giving the accused the full benefit of
the evidence . . . no such discretion lies." State v. Jackson, 252 Iowa 671, 677, 108
N.W.2d 62, 66 (1961).
525. 206 N.W.2d 908, 914 (Iowa 1973).
526. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
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ported by the following statement in Gorham: "[W]hen an accused is neither
at liberty on bail nor represented by an attorney, then absence of demand
for or assertion of right to a speedy trial shall under no circumstances be considered in connection with trial time delay." 5 2 7
In Gorham, the State made no attempt to show good cause for the delay,528 relying instead entirely on the then-operative demand-waiver rule. It
appears that the reason for the delay is the paramount factor in the four-part
Barker balancing test as it seemingly was applied to Iowa law in Gorham, and
that the State must carry its burden as to the factor irrespective of the presence
or absence of the other factors (e.g., lengthy delay, prejudice, and demand)
in order to show good cause to the contrary why the prosecution should not
be dismissed. Even so, a sufficient showing as to the reason for the delay
might possibly still be offset by other factors, 529 in application of "the ad hoc
delicate balancing process." That is, an extraordinarily lengthy delay coupled
with actual prejudice to defendant and/or defendant's demand for speedy trial,
could possibly "tip the balance" against the State's showing of a legitimate or
plausible reason for the delay, thus requiring a dismissal for lack of speedy
trial. Because the State made no attempt to show good cause in Gorham, it
remains to be seen exactly how the Iowa supreme court will oversee "the ad
hoc delicate balancing process" it voiced, but did not definitively describe, in
Gorham. 530
b. Remedy. There being no good cause shown for the delay in Gorham,
the supreme court concluded: "This case must be reversed and remanded for
dismissal." 531 Thus, whether this dismissal for lack of speedy trial is with
prejudice was not expressly made clear. 532 However, it appears that this is
the case in light of the court's notation of the ABA Standards Relating to Speedy
Trial, to wit: "If a defendant is not brought to trial before the running of the
time for trial, as extended by excluded periods, the consequence should be absolute discharge. Such discharge should forever bar prosecution for the offense
charged and for any other offense required to be joined with that offense." 533
That this remedy is dictated is strongly implied, if not made absolutely clear, in
Barker:
The amorphous quality of the right also leads to the unsatisfactorily
severe remedy of dismissal of the indictment when the right has
been deprived. This is indeed a serious consequence because it
means that a defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime will
527. 206 N.W.2d 908, 914 (emphasis added).
528. See note 384 supra.
529. 206 N.W.2d 908, 914 (Iowa 1973).
530. But see State v. Kimball, 204 N.W.2d 296 (Iowa 1972) in light of the discussion
in note 517 supra.
531. 206 N.W.2d 908, 915 (Iowa 1973).
532. Cf. Keever v. Bainter, 195 N.W.2d 526, 527 (Iowa 1972) (denial of speedy trial
because of delay in bringing committed-for-incompetency defendant back for another
competency-to-stand-trial): "[R]espondent [trial court] is ordered and directed to
dismiss the above case with prejudice forthwith." (emphasis added).
533. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL, § 4.1 (Approved Draft 1968).
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go free, without having been tried. Such a remedy is more serious
than an exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial, but it is the
only possible remedy.5 34
That dismissal of the indictment remains "the only remedy" 535 for speedy
trial violations was recently made clear by the United States Supreme Court
in Strunk v. United States. 536 It reversed an order by the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit which had fashioned a new substitute remedy of reducing defendant's sentence to the extent of the unnecessary delay. That the
Supreme Court does not contemplate reindictment and retrial is apparent in
its observation that speedy trial is "unlike some of the other guarantees of the
Sixth Amendment. For example, failure to afford a public trial, an impartial
jury, notice of charges, or compulsory service can ordinarily be cured by providing those guaranteed rights in a new tria/." 53 1
It remains to be seen what the Iowa supreme court will do regarding
whether the State can reindict defendant following the trial court's granting
of his motion to dismiss for lack of speedy indictment. Thus, unlike the
situation in State v. Bowers, 538 in which defendant's motion to dismiss for lack
of speedy indictment was improperly overruled and he then stood trial, such
a hypothetical defendant would not have been placed in jeopardy.5 39
8.

Guilty Pleas

a. Scope of the interrogation colloquy. With the exception of one aberration, trial courts experienced little difficulty with the Sisco colloquy standards540 in accepting guilty pleas. 541 In State v. Clary, 542 the entire colloquy
actually consisted merely of the judge asking defendant if he wished to withdraw his plea of not guilty and to enter a guilty plea. Otherwise, the supreme
court took the general position that the trial court's interrogation "need not
follow a ritualistic or rigid formula" 543 so long as there is substantial compliance
with the Sisco guidelines. Accordingly, a guilty plea was upheld in State v.
Slawson 544 even though the name of the offense charged was not mentioned
during the taking of the plea since during the sentencing interrogation defendant "admitted acts constituting the offense to which he pleaded guilty." 545
534. 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972) (emphasis added). "[Barker] lays to rest any existing
doubt that the appropriate remedy-in fact the 'only possible remedy'-for a deprivation of
the constitutional guaranty is dismissal operating as a bar to subsequent trial." Godbold,
Speedy Trial-Major Surgery for a National Ill, 24 ALA. L. REv. 265, 294 (1972).
535. Strunk v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 2260, 2263 (1973) (emphasis added), quoting
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,522 (1972).
536. 93 S. Ct. 2260 (1973).
537. ld. at 2263 (emphasis added).
538. 162 N.W.2d 484 (Iowa 1968).
539. See generally State v. Gebhart, 257 Iowa 843, 134 N.W.2d 906 (1965).
540. See State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1969).
541. For a discussion of the scope of judicial discretion in the taking -of guilty pleas,
see Dunahoo, supra note 364, at 1036-40.
542. 203 N.W.2d 382 (Iowa 1973).
543. State v. Bledsoe, 200 N.W.2d 529, 531 (Iowa 1972).
544. 201 N.W.2d 460 (Iowa 1972).
545. ld. at 461-62.
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Moreover defendant's equivocation in admitting his guilt was held in State v.
Quinn5 4 6 to not vitiate the plea.
All attempts to expand the scope of the interrogation were unsuccessful,
with the supreme court variously holding that the trial court is not required
to interrogate defendant regarding each essential element of the crime charged547
nor as to any plea arrangement. 548 Neither is the trial court required to warn
defendant as to "the effect of [this] conviction on any future conviction." 549
b. Competency to stand trial. A new twist was put on a trial court's
jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea from a person whose mental competency
has been put in issue. 550 In State v. Thomas, 551 the supreme court held that
the Sisco guidelines "require the trial court to personally make a determination
of the validity of the plea" 552 notwithstanding a prior jury's adjudication that
defendant is competent to stand trial. "[S]uch a determination is a factor to be
considered, but is not controlling," the supreme court declared. 553 The trial
court's task is to determine whether there are "circumstances present" that
demand "further demonstration of defendant's competency before accepting
the proffered plea." 554 Then on appellate review, the supreme court "examine[s] all the circumstances before the trial court to determine if there then
existed reasonable doubt as to defendant's competency to plead guilty . . . ." 555
c. Waiver of defenses. That a guilty plea waives defendant's right to
reversal of his conviction because of lack of speedy indictment or speedy trial
was suggested, but not determined, in Foster v. Brewer. 556 The supreme
court volunteered: "It is also unnecessary for us to decide whether petitioner's
plea of guilty was a waiver of his right to speedy trial, although this issue has
been decided against defendants in several jurisdictions." 557

B.

Trial

The Iowa supreme court dealt with a variety of significant trial matters
during the survey period. These included the topical areas of methods of jury
selection, the scope of examination of witnesses, the admissibility of evidence,
the propriety of motions for mistrial, and the content of instructions to the jury
-all of which are discussed in detail below. In related matters not discussed
in this section, the supreme court: extended the right to jury trial in contempt
546. 197 N.W.2d 624, 625 (Iowa 1972), quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25, 37 (1969): " . . . An individual accused of crinle may voluntarily, knowingly,
and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime."
547. State v. Hackett, 201 N.W.2d 487 (Iowa 1972}.
548. State v. Christensen, 201 N.W.2d 457 (Iowa 1972).
549. ld. at 459.
550. See IowA CoDE§ 783.1 (1973 ).
551. 205 N.W.2d 717 (Iowa 1973).
552. ld. at 719 (emphasis added).
553. ld. at 720.
554. Id. at 719.
555. ld. at 721.
556. 197 N.W.2d 366 (Iowa 1972).
557. Id. at 367.
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cases involving multiple counts; 558 reiterated that the "right" to a jury trial on
a simple misdemeanor charge is waived if not demanded before the taking
of any evidence; 559 held that a jury conviction is not invalidated because of
failure to record defendant's plea of not guilty; 560 and continued to uphold a
liberal policy of permitting the State to amend the charge after the trial has
begun so long as a new offense is not charged thereby. 561
1.

Jury Selection

Questions involving various aspects of jury selection 562 arose in three Iowa
supreme court cases. Additionally, a United States Supreme Court decision
in this area of the law could have some impact on Iowa criminal procedure.

a.

Scope of Voir Dire

While the Iowa supreme court accords broad discretion to trial courts in
ruling on questions regarding the scope of voir dire of prospective jurors, 563
the United States Supreme Court recently held in Ham v. South Carolina 564
that such discretion is curtailed whenever issues with federal constitutional
overtones are involved. Ham, a black civil-rights activist, claimed that he was
being framed by the police. Accordingly, he requested trial court to interrogate the prospective jurors specifically as to racial prejudice. 565 "[T]he essential fairness required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that under the facts shown by this record the petitioner be permitted to have the [prospective] jurors interrogated on the issue of racial
bias," the Supreme Court concluded. 566 It was not sufficient for the interrogation to consist of the three statutorily-prescribed general questions (concerning bias, prejudice, or partiality). 567 Nevertheless, the trial court "was
558. See Sarich v. Havercamp, 203 N.W.2d 260 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text
accompanying notes 72-82 supra.
559. State v. Baker, 203 N.W.2d 795 (Iowa 1973).
560. "Defendant was not prejudiced by the inadvertent omission of recording a formal not guilty plea. He stood trial without objection and his position was precisely the
same as if such a plea had been entered. The jury, in fact, was told that the defendant
had entered a not guilty plea." State v. Lynch, 197 N.W.2d 186, 188 (Iowa 1972).
561. See State v. Bruno, 204 N.W.2d 879 (Iowa 1973) (OK for amendment to
eliminate surplusage which had merely defined the alleged crime more specifically by citing the definitional section) and State v. Osborn, 200 N.W.2d 798 (Iowa 1972) (OK for
amendment to substitute the name of the correct owner of the property burglarized).
562. For a discussion of the scope of judicial discretion in the jury selection process,
see Dunahoo, note 364 at 1060-67.
563. See Elkin v. Johnson, 260 Iowa 46, 148 N.W.2d 442 (1967).
564. 93S.Ct.848 (1973).
565. The two questions about specific racial prejudice defendant sought to be asked
were the following:
1. Would you fairly try this case on the basis of the evidence and disregarding the defendant's race?
You have no prejudice against negroes? Against black people? You would
not be influenced by the use of the term "black"?
93 S. Ct. 848, 849 n.2 (1973).
566. Id. at 850.
567. These included:
1. Have you formed or expressed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence
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not required to put the [specific racial prejudice] question in any particular
form, or to ask any particular number of questions on the subject, simply because requested to do so by petitioner." 568
On the other hand, Ham held further that the trial court's refusal to inquire "as to particular bias against beards, after his inquiries as to bias in
general, does not reach the level of a constitutional violation." 569 The Supreme Court stated: "Given the traditionally broad discretion accorded to the
trial judge in conducting voir dire, . . . and our inability to constitutionally
distinguish possible prejudice against beards from a host of other possible similar prejudices, we do not believe the petitioner's constitutional rights were violated when the trial judge refused to put this question (i.e., "Would you disregard the fact that this defendant wears a beard in deciding this case?"). 570
b.

Segregated Voir Dire

That segregated voir dire of prospective jurors is not required upon a
party's request was reaffirmed in State v. Elmore. 511 Discounting defendant's
claim of excitement and prejudice engendered against him by a "constant barrage"572 of media coverage of his arrest, the trial court nevertheless required
that counsel not ask prospective jurors to repeat what they had read or heard
about the case. Rather, they were merely asked if, as a result of any of this
pretrial publicity, they had formed an opinion as to defendant's guilt or innocence. After all, "the real issue was whether any of the prospective jurors
has formed or expressed an opinion . . . which would prevent them from being
fair and impartial jurors," the court opined. 573 On the other hand, this approach strictly leaves it to the individual veniremen to determine if he has been
prejudiced by the publicity rather than forcing a disclosure on the record as to
what he heard or read for purposes of challenges for cause by the parties. 574
c.

Challenges for Cause

The trial courts' "broad discretionary power" in ruling on challenges for
cause to prospective jurors was upheld in State v. Houston 515 even though the
contested venireman initially indicated some difficulty in being able to return
of the defendant, Gene Ham?
2. Are you conscious of any bias or prejudice for or against him?
3. Can you give the State and the defendant a fair and impartial trial?
93 S. Ct. at 850 n.3.
568. /d. at 850.
569. /d. at 851.
570. ld. at 850 n.3.
571. 201 N.W.2d 443 (Iowa 1972).
572. /d. at 444.
573. /d. at 446.
574. Cf. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 440 Pa. 342, 351-52, 269 A.2d 752, 757 (1970):
"When there is present in a case inflammatory pretrial publicity which creates the possibility that a trial could be prejudiced, there are exactly those circumstances present
which require each juror to be questioned out of the hearing of the other jurors."
575. 206 N.W.2d 687, 689 (Iowa 1973).
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a verdict of not guilty. In response to questioning by defense counsel, the
venireman not only expressed doubt about defendant's innocence if, as hypothesized, defendant's picture was on file with the police but also said it was
doubtful he could disregard an accomplice's testimony even though not corroborated. Nevertheless, upon further questioning, he "clearly demonstrated
he could base his decision on the evidence presented and would follow instructions given by the court." 576
d.

Tainted Panel

State v. Lunsford577 held that it is ipso facto reversible error for defendant to be tried before the same jury panel which was previously dismissed
and told that defendant, who was named, had pled guilty. Here, defendant
subsequently changed his mind and his guilty plea was allowed to be withdrawn, and he was tried two weeks after his abortive guilty plea. Noting the
general rule that "admission into evidence of a withdrawn plea of guilty deprives a defendant of a fair trial," the court reasoned that "[t]he prejudicial
impact would seem to be nearly as great from such a communication before
trial as during trial." 578 Conceding that the jurors, like other members of the
public, could have learned of the guilty plea anyway since it was reported routinely in the local newspaper, the supreme court opined: "Unlike the situation
with an ordinary news report, there is little doubt the panel received the message, associated it with defendant, and remembered it two weeks later." 579
Holding that the burden was not on defendant to demonstrate prejudice, the
court reasoned: "The unfortunate sequence of events compels an inference
of prejudice." 580
2.

Examination of Witnesses

The principal issues concerning the scope of 'examination of witnesses discussed in this section include: proper serving of notice of State's additional
witnesses not listed on the indictment, proper limiting of cross examination to
avoid attacks on the credibility of witnesses through collateral matters, and improper controlling of equivocation and unresponsiveness of witnesses' testimony
on direct examination. In other cases, the Iowa supreme court: reaffirmed
that a defendant (consistent with the federal Constitution) can be impeached
with his prior felony convictions; 581 noted that correcting one's own witness'
576. Id.
577. 204 N.W.2d 613 (Iowa 1973).
578. Id. at 619.
579. ld.
580. ld.
581. Requiring a defendant testifying in his own behalf to state whether he had ever
before been .convicted of a felony "is not prohibited by any provision of the United
States Constitution." State v. Hackett, 200 N.W.2d 493, 494 (Iowa 1972) (majority
opinion confined "to the constitutional issue here posed"). Cf. Justice McCormick's special concurring opinion (joined by Justice Mason), in which he suggests there is nothing
in CoDE § 622.17 conferring upon a cross-examiner "an absolute right in all circumstances
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testimony does not constitute impeaching his own witness; 582 held that a witness is not disqualified from testifying becuse he may have been granted
extra-legal immunity from prosecution; 583 reaffirmed the trial courts' discretion
in considering juvenile witnesses competent to testify; 584 and even had the occasion to differentiate a "witness" from an accomplice brought into the courtroom merely to be identified. 585
a. Additional WUnesses. Wide discretion was accorded trial courts in
determining whether due diligence was followed before granting a motion to
introduce additional testimony586 by a State's witness whose minutes of testimony were not endorsed on the indictment. 587 In State v. Bruno, 588 the state
had delivered a "four-day" notice of additional testimony to the local sheriff
for service on defendant, and the sheriff ultimately served defendant's counsel
when he was unable to locate defendant in the county at least four days before
trial-notwithstanding the Code section 780.10 requirement that the notice be
served on defendant himself. "To authorize service of the notice of additional
testimony on the attorney, instead of the accused, it is not essential that the
latter should have gone beyond the boundaries of the county. It is sufficient
to inquire of a witness as to prior felony convictions" but rather that the admissibility lies
within the trial court's sound discretion. 200 N.W.2d at 497. Accordingly, McCormick
proposed that the trial courts should, in determining the admissibility or exclusion of such
evidence, consider "the nature of the crime which resulted in the conviction and its remoteness in time." /d. at 498.
582. Impeachment of a witness consists of "showing contradictory statements which
have been made out of court and which are at variance with the testimony at trial," and
thus does not arise through attempts to correct "testimonial inconsistency or contradiction." State v. Fields, 199 N.W.2d 144, 146 (Iowa 1972). See also State v. Fetters,
202 N.W.2d 84, 93 (Iowa 1972): "Relative to the contention the State was attempting to
impeach its witness, see Rule 607, Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States Courts
and Magistrates which provides: 'The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any
party, including the party calling him.'"
583. A county attorney's extra-legal granting of immunity to defendant's alleged
confederates "did not disqualify them from testifying or negate their testimony;" rather,
"an assurance of prosecutorial abstinence, regardless of its effectiveness, goes only to
credibility of the promisees." State v. Houston, 206 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Iowa 1973).
584. The determination of the competency of a juvenile witness (here, that of a
ten-year old prosecutrix in a sodomy case) lies within the trial court's sound discretion.
State v. Hackett, 200 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1972). A youthful witness' competency to
testify "is not refuted by mere testimonial inconsistency, going more to the weight to be
accorded his evidential statements by the fact finding body.'' State v. Cartee, 202 N.W.2d
93, 96 (Iowa 1972).
585. This novel issue arose in State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 63 (Iowa 1972), in which
the brief courtroom appearance of defendant's accomplice solely to be identified by the
State's witness testifying at the time was asserted by defendant to be a violation of a pretrial order of sequestration of witnesses. However, the accomplice did not come within
the supreme court's following definition of a witness: "[O]ne who gives evidence under
oath or affirmation, in person or by affidavit or deposition, in any pmceeding in any
court of justice. . . ." /d. at 65.
586. See IowA CoDE§ 780.10 (1973).
587. In a related development, the supreme court reiterated its position that "[a]
witness whose name is endorsed on the indictment (or information), and minutes of
whose testimony are filed, is not limited to those minutes in his actual testimony.'' In
State v. Habhab, 209 N.W.2d 73 (Iowa 1973), the State's witness testified as to his
meeting with defendant for buying drugs (as listed in the minutes) as well as to a previous meeting (not listed in the minutes) at which other drugs were purchased.
·
588. 204 N.W.2d 879 (Iowa 1973).
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that the officer, after diligent search, failed to find him," 589 the court explained. " 'Matters concerning due diligence . . . are so much in the discretion of the trial court that we cannot say the ruling was improper,' " 590 the supreme court added.
b. Credibility of Witnesses. That trial courts in Iowa have broad discretion in "defin(ing] the ambit of permissible cross examination in an attack
on the credibility of a witness by questions concerning collateral acts of alleged
misconduct" was reiterated in State v. Crawford. 591 Thus, the Iowa rule rejects
both extreme minority approaches of "imposing no limitations of any kind upon
such examination" and "entirely prohibiting such cross-examination;" and instead follows the majority rule under which "repression of possible abuses is
left to the discretion of the trial judge and questions upon facts relevant to
character may still be forbidden by him where he believes under the circumstances it is unnecessary and undesirable." 592
That this task is delicate is evidenced in the supreme court's observation
that there is a "dim line where evidence which in an important and material
way bears directly on the veracity of the witness fades into that evidence which
has little bearing on that factor but excites prejudice against the witness and
needlessly besmirches and degrades him." 593 However, that the supreme court
accords great weight to the trial court's actions was evidenced in Crawford, in
which the supreme court upheld the trial court's refusal to permit defense counsel to ask a policeman, a state's witness, if he had ever been reprimanded for
drinking while on duty. Distinguishing In re Thorman's Estate, 594 which upheld the trial court's requiring a witness to answer in a will contest if he had
ever been disbarred from law practice, the supreme court noted as one of the
two "important distinctions": "In Thorman, trial court exercised its discretion
in p'ermitting the examination. In this case, discretion was exercised in restricting cross-examination. In both cases the ruling was within the area where
trial court's discretion may permissibly range." Concerning the second distinction, the supreme court added: "(T]he nature of the disclosed misconduct [in Crawford] would have had little bearing on the issue of the detective's inclination to be truthful under oath," whereas in Thorman "the question
was directly relevant to an issue in the case concerning the professional competency of the witness." 595
c. Equivocation. The supreme court held in State v. Smiley 596 that it
was error for the trial court to sustain the prosecutor's objections grounded on
a defense witness' equivocation in giving answers on direct examination. The
witness was attempting "to qualify his answer by saying that he believed the
589.
590.
591.
592.
593.
594.

ld. at 886.
ld., quoting State v. Gilliland, 252 Iowa 664, 669, 108 N.W.2d 74, 77 (1961).

202 N.W.2d 99, 105 (Iowa 1972).
Id. at 104.
ld. at 103.
162 Iowa 237, 144 N.W.2d 7 (1913).
595. 202 N.W.2d 99, 105 (Iowa 1972).
596. 201 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1972).
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facts to be as he testified," 597 and the supreme court said that such equivocation merely affects the testimony's probative force rather than its admissibility.
d. Unresponsiveness. In Smiley, the supreme court also held it error for
the trial court to sustain the prosecutor's objections that witnesses being examined by the defense counsel were not responding to the questions asked. The
supreme court said: "Only the attorney conducting the examination at the
time may object to the lack of responsiveness on the part of a witness. Such
objection is never available to opposing counsel." 598
3.

Evidence

The Iowa supreme court dealt with a wide variety of issues concerning
admissibility of evidence 599 during the survey period. The major categorks
of issues, which are discussed in detail below, included: hearsay, opinion
evidence, relevancy of evidence, and reputation evidence. In other cases, the
supreme court: reversed two convictions based solely upon circumstantial evidence and raising nothing more than suspicion of defendant's guilt; 600 confirmed an unbroken chain of custody of evidence in several cases notwithstanding the fact that not everyone with access to the seized exhibit testified
at trial, where, however, there was unlikelihood of tampering; 601 discussed the
597. Jd. at 731.
598. ld.
599. As to evidentiary rules concerning the trial on habitual criminal charges, see
text accompanying notes 807-12 infra.
600. See State v. Jellema, 206 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa 1973) (breaking and entering) and
State v. Streit, 205 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1973) (arson). See generally State v. Johnson,
196 N.W.2d 563, 566 (Iowa 1972): Where circumstantial evidence is relied upon, it
must be "so convincing as to exclude a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of the
offense charged."
See also State v. Tokatlian, 203 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Iowa 1972): "Unless defendant's
motion for directed verdict is renewed at the close of all evidence, it is deemed waived,"
notwithstanding the motion being made (and overruled) at the close of the State's case.
601. See State v. Battle, 199 N.W.2d 70 (Iowa 1972) (only the chemist testified out
of the three persons with access to laboratory where drug analysis was made; a second
police officer with a key to the evidence-being-held-for-trial locker testified); State v.
Burton, 201 N.W.2d 492 (Iowa 1972) (prosecutor, to whom exhibit was delivered a few
days before trial, did not testify); State v. Grady, 201 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1972) (front seat
passenger in informer's car in which drug-buy exhibit is stashed on floor of back seat did
not testify); and State v. Lunsford, 204 N.W.2d 613 (Iowa 1973) no testimony by informant who arranged the purchase by an undercover agent and subsequent to seller's
arrest drove by himself, with marijuana exhibit in the car, briefly to police station to get
more officers). But see State v. Bruno, 204 N. W.2d 879 (Iowa 1973) (chain of custody
of evidence defect waived by defendant's failure to object until after the witness' testimony).
As to the requisite foundation for a chain of custody of substances such as marijuana, which are ne.ither hard objects nor readily identifiable articles, see State- v. Lunsford, 204 N.W.2d 613,616-17 (Iowa 1973):
Marijuana is susceptible to tampering or substitution. . . . A more elaborate foundation to establish identification is therefore required than as to readily
identifiable articles. . . .
Determination of the sufficiency of identification is made by the trial
judge. "Factors to be considered in making this determination include the nature of the article, the circumstances surrounding the [nature] and custody of
it, and the likelihood of intermeddlers tampering with it. . . ."
It is not essential for admissibility that the State negative the possibility of
tampering or substitution absolutely. It is sufficient to establish that is reason-
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nature of the other evidence necessary to corrorborate an out-of-court confession;602 held that a witness' failure to identify defendant in a lineup does
not render inadmissible in-court identification; 603 and upheld the introduction
of portions of defendant's first-trial testimony at his retrial despite a contention
that defendant's original testimony was impelled by the state's use of illegallyseized evidence. 604 On procedural matters, the supreme court: approved of
the taking of judicial notice of the alcoholic content of beer sold in lowa;605
of departmental rules of state agencies; 606 and of federal legislation and regulations;607 upheld reopening of the record after the State had rested its case
without admitting the contraband exhibit into evidence; 608 reaffirmed that a
party whose pretrial motion in limine was overruled must make his record at
ably probable tampering or substitution did not occur. . . . Contrary speculation affects the weight of the evidence but not its admissibility. . . .
602. The "other evidence" or other proof besides defendant's confession (unless made
in open court) required under CoDE § 782.7 to warrant a conviction "need not per se,
and independent of a confession, be sufficient to prove commission of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt. It will suffice if, when considered with the confession, it
establishes beyond a reasonable doubt the offense was committed by someone." (Here,
the "other proof" in prosecution for arson of personal property (a car) consisted of the
car being "unexpectedly found in a remote wooded area where it would not normally be,
burned almost beyond identification, with the two front wheels missing."). State v.
Dunn, 199 N.W.2d 104, 108-09 (Iowa 1972).
603. "The question of line-up procedures was brought up only on cross-examination
as defendant sought to show the witnesses had previously been unable to identify defendant. This, of course, was entirely proper and might well have destroyed the in-court
identification, but it went only to the weight of the testimony." State v. Masters 196
N.W.2d 548, 551 (Iowa 1972), accord State v. Hinsey, 200 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 1972).
604. The State may introduce portions of defendant's first-trial testimony at a retrial notwithstanding defendant's original conviction being reversed because of introduction
of illegally-seized evidence-where defendant's first-trial testimony was designed to prove
another point (i.e., that someone else was driving the car) and the illegally-seized evidence went to proof of another point in this O.M.V.U.I. case (i.e., that defendant was
intoxicated). Thus, the impellation rule of Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968)
was deemed inapplicable. State v. Boner, 203 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1972).
605. "[l]t was permissible to take judicial notice of the fact that by law . . . beer
sold in this state has an alcoholic content of four percent by weight." State v. Boner,
203 N.W.2d 198, 200 (Iowa 1972).
606. "Courts may . . . take judicial notice of . . . departmental rules and regulations
adopted pursuant to statutory authority . . . ." State v. Armstrong, 203 N.W.2d 269, 272
(Iowa 1972).
607. "The court properly took judicial notice of the Federal Drug Act and regulations
promulgated pursuant to the act to further define the term 'hallucinogenic drug.' " State
v. Bruno, 204 N.W.2d 879, 888 (Iowa 1973).
608. "Trial courts have discretion to permit a party to reopen the record and introduce evidence which was previously omitted." (In this prosecution for sale of hashish, the
State introduced evidence of the facts of the case but not the hashish itself. Mter the
State rested, defendant moved for a directed verdict. Over defendant's objection, the
record was then reopened for introduction of the hashish into evidence. Mfirming, the
Supreme Court noted the remarkable ·similarity to that in United States v. Keine, 424 F.2d
39 (lOth Cir. 1970), where there was expert testimony identifying the drug, an unbroken
chain of custody of evidence, testimony concerning the drug, and jury viewing of the drugbut failure to admit drug via mere inadvertence. The supreme court added: "[W]e do not
intimate that the State had to introduce the hashish in order to make a prima facie case."
State v. Moreland, 201 N.W.2d 713, 714 (Iowa 1972); accord State v. Mason, 203 N.W.2d
293, 296 (Iowa 1972): "The testimony introduced in this case after reopening was supplemental to and clarified previous evidence. It could arguably be deemed directed to an
oversight, if not a mistake." Here, the State was allowed to reopen to introduce further
evidence on the issue of the car title, in this prosecution for false drawing and uttering.
State v. Mason, 203 N.W.2d 292, 296 (Iowa 1972).
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trial on that evidentiary point;60 9 discussed the effect of admitting by stipulation a State criminalistics laboratory report; 610 and dealt with a host of sufficiency of, 611 as well as timeliness of, 612 objections to, 613 and curative measures for, 614 asserted errors in admitting or excluding evidence. 615
a. Hearsay. 616 An O.M.V.U.I. conviction was reversed in State v.
609. ''The overruling of the motion in limine, even though wrong, is not reversible
error. Relief must be predicated on a record made during trial when the objectionable
evidence is sought to be introduced." No objection was made at trial and thus there
was no record for appeal. (The rule is different where the motion is granted, thus not
requiring a subsequent record by opponent.). State v. Hinsey, 200 N.W.2d 810, 817
(Iowa 1972) (emphasis added). See also State v. Tieman, 206 N.W.2d 898, 899 (Iowa
1973) (State's witness' violation of pretrial order in limine is not prejudicial to defendant
where the trial court had erred in granting the order, i.e., that the controverted evidence
was admissible).
610. Defendant's stipulation "to introduction of the State criminalistics laboratory report which identified the substance as marijuana . . . eliminated any need to resort to
statutory definition" on the question of identification of the substance. State v. Boose,
202 N.W.2d 368, 369 (Iowa 1972).
611. See, e.g., State v. Armstrong, 203 N.W.2d 269, 271 (Iowa 1972) (Objection to
witness' proferred testimony on the basis of a "no proper foundation, irrelevant and immaterial objection" is insufficient and "actually presents nothing for review") and State
v. Binkley, 201 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Iowa 1972) (Objection phrased "Yes, I would have
some objection to it" was "so unspecific trial court did not err in overturning it");
accord State v. Williams, 207 N.W.2d 98, 109 (Iowa 1973) ("One attempting to exclude
evidence, whether the attempted exclusion is by objection or motion, has a duty to indicate the specific grounds to the court so as to alert him to the question raised and enable
opposing counsel to take proper corrective measures to remedy the defect, if possible").
612. "The record does not preserve the claim since the objection was not made until
after answer, no reason for delay appears and no motion to strike was made." State v.
Taylor, 201 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Iowa 1972).
613. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 207 N.W.2d 98, 109-10 (Iowa 1973) ("A failure to
assert promptly and specifically an objection to an offer of evidence at the time the offer
is made is a waiver upon appeal of any ground of complaint against its admission");
State v. Schurman, 205 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Iowa 1973) ("Relevant evidence admitted
without proper objection, and not excluded upon a motion to strike, has the same effect
as though it were admissible, even though it might have been excluded under the rules
of evidence"); and State v. Boose, 202 N.W.2d 368, 369 (Iowa 1972) ("The right to suppress was waived in this case because the evidence was received without objection and
the motion was made long after its ground became apparent").
However, State v. Miller, 204 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 1973) makes it clear that a prior
objection in chambers obviates the necessity for objection (in the jury's presence) when
the objectionable evidence or testimony is introduced. Here, defendant already had made
clear his position (by way of sufficient objection in chambers) that any testimony by
third persons as to alleged statements made by his companion would be inadmissible
hearsay and "[t]he trial court by overruling defendant's objection made it abundantly
clear that any similar objections to like evidence would be overruled." Thus, "[o]nce a
proper objection has been urged and overruled, counsel is not required to make further
objections to preserve his right on appeal when a question is asked raising the same issue
subsequently in the course of trial." Id. at 841.
614. "[A] motion to strike or withdraw evidence is not timely where it comes
without prior objection and the grounds of such motion should have been apparent before
it was made." State v. Houston, 206 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Iowa 1973): accord State v.
Boose, 202 N.W.2d 368, 369 (Iowa 1972).
·
··
615. On the specific subject of waiver in the Iowa criminal trial process, see Sullins,
Preservation of Error: Providing a Basis for Appellate Review, 22 DRAKE L. REV. 435
(1973). See generally State v. Tokatlian, 203 N.W.2d 116, 120 (Iowa 1972): "Ordinarily, matters not raised in the trial court, including constitutional questions, cannot be
effectively asserted the first time on appeal. Even more appurtenant, the constitutionality
of a statute may not be considered on appeal where the question was not raised in the
lower court." Accord State v. Armstrong, 203 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa 1972).
616. The latest definition of hearsay used by the Iowa supreme court is that in rule
801, Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, viz. "'Hear-
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Miller 611 because of the improper admissibility of hearsay evidence. 618 Defendant and his companion Fallstone had both been heavily drinking together
before their one-car accident which was witnessed by no one. The central
issue on appeal was sufficiency of competent evidence as to defendant being
the driver. At the scene of the accident, neither defendant nor Fallstone admitted being the driver. A city police officer testified that he was present during a highway patrolman's subsequent interrogation of Fallstone at the hospital, stating: "I was in the room when Patrolman North talked to him,
and asked him if Cal [defendant] was driving the vehicle, and he said,
'Yes.' " 619 Fallstone did not testify, however, thus making the statement hearsay. Applying Gibbs v. Wilmeth 620 for "the controlling standards in testing
admissibility of res gestae statements," the supreme court "conclude[d] Fallstone's statement at the hospital does not qualify as res gestae." 621 Therefore, this testimony was admitted improperly.
Another error concerning hearsay was committed in Miller when the highway patrolman was permitted to testify he knew defendant was driving at the
time of the accident. The supreme court, noting that the patrolman had also
testified that he had not witnessed the accident himself and that neither defendant nor Miller confessed at the accident scene, concluded: "It is obvious
the witness did not have personal knowledge of the matter about which he was
questioned. The answer must of necessity have depended on what some third
party [i.e., Fallstone] had told the witness." 622
A third asserted instance of hearsay evidence was denied by the supreme
court in Miller, however. The issue arose when the highway patrolman was
permitted on direct examination to testify as to the following regarding a conversation he allegedly had with defendant: "As night went on, I asked himthat his partner had said that he had been driving, . . . and he said, 'Yeah,
what about it,' or something to this effect." 623 Recognizing a distinction "between hearsay and nonhearsay utterances of a declarant not offered as a witness for cross-examination when such assertions are offered by a testifying witness," the supreme court said the test was whether the instant testimony "was
being offered . . . for the purpose of showing the truth of that statement or
was it being offered merely as reporting a fact that an utterance had been made
say' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." See State v.
Miller, 204 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Iowa 1972) and State v. Kelsey, 201 N.W.2d 921, 924
(Iowa 1972). Cf. State v. Kelsey, supra: "In substance, the hearsay rule does not prevent a witness from testifying only as to what has been heard, being rather a restriction
on the proof of fact through extrajudicial statements." I d.
617. 204 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 1972).
618. Cf. State v. Schurman, 205 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Iowa 1973) (hearsay evidence
which was not objected to at time of its admission remains in the record "and alone or
in part may support a verdict or finding").
619. 204 N.W.2d 834, 839 (Iowa 1972).
620. See Gibbs v. Wilmeth, 261 Iowa 1015, 1024-25, 157 N.W.2d 93, 98-99 (1968).
621. 204 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Iowa 1972).
622. Id. at 842.
· 623. Id.
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to [the highway patrolman], a matter of which he had personal knowledge."6 2 4
The supreme court characterized it as being within the latter classification and
concluded therefore that the statement "his partner said he had been drinking" was not hearsay. In a related fourth hearsay aspect of this case, the supreme court agreed that the highway patrolman's recounting of defendant's response ("Yeah, what about it") was not hearsay. "[D]efendant's statements
offered against him are not hearsay on the theory their admissibility in evidence
is the result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions
of the hearsay rule," 625 the supreme court pointed out.
i. Res Gestae Exception. As noted above, the supreme court held in
State v. Miller 626 that the statements of the defendant's accomplice made while
he was being questioned by a highway patrolman "sometime later at the hospital"627 did not come within the res gestae exception. By way of contrast,
the supreme court, noting that "[t]he trend is to extend, rather than to narrow,
the res gestae doctrine," upheld the application of the res gestae exception
in State v. Crawford. 628 In the latter case, the statements were made by the
13-year old rape prosecutrix upon being driven by her attacker back to near
her home and complaining of the attack upon entering her house. Her statements, testified to by her sister, met the res gestae admissibility standards, viz.
"(1) spontaneity, and (2) such closeness of connection with the transaction
as to exclude any presumption of fabrication." 629

ii. Tacit Admissions. In State v. Kelsey, 630 the supreme court held
that "evidential use of 'tacit admissions' by an accused offends the proscription
included in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution against selfincrimination and is therefore no longer permissible in criminal trials within
this jurisdiction." 631 The instant admission-through-silence arose in testimony
by a State's witness as to a conversation in which one of defendant's accomplices told a third person, in defendant's immediate presence and without him
protesting, that they had robbed and shot a man. The supreme court concluded that this testimony "was for the purpose of proving the facts, i.e., commission of the robbery attendant murder of a man by Kelsey and his three
accomplices. Surely it was not testimonially offered merely to prove the utterance was made in [the State's witness'] presence." 632 Nevertheless, applying
the harmless error rule, the conviction was upheld since "[a] review of the
624. ld. at 843.
625. ld. at 842.
626. 204 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 1972).
627. Id. at 840.
628. 202 N.W.2d 99, 101 (Iowa 1972).
629. Id.
630. 201 N.W.2d 921 (Iowa 1972).
631. I d. at 927. See also State v. Williams, 207 N.W.2d 98, 107 (Iowa 1973)
(Corroboration of an accomplice's testimony "may come from defendant himself in the
way of his admissions, declarations, conduct, writings or other documentary evidence.
Of course, tacit admissions by an accused may not be relied on in this connection").
632. Jd. at 924.
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record fairly shrieks the guilt of this defendant," 633 th'e supreme court concluded.
b. Opinion Evidence. On the subject of opinion evidence, the supreme
court noted in State v. Armstrong634 that the best evidence rule does not prevent a witness from expressing his opinion as to whether an unlicensed person
could effect a valid sale of insurance under existing law since "this witness
was not called upon to prove existence or content of any statute or regulation."635 Similarly, in State v. Taylor 636 the court, upholding admissibility of
a fingerprint identification expert's testimony regarding comparison of the fingerprint found at the crime scene and defendant's prints, reiterated: "Where,
as here, inquiry is directed to a proper subject of expert testimony, an objection that it invades the province of the jury is invalid."6 37
An element of mutuality regarding admissibility of nonexpert state of

mind evidence was added in State v. Milliken, 638 in which sustaining of the
State's objections to defendant's proferred evidence after the State had admitted an officer's opinion evidence on this point was determined to be an abuse
of discretion. The officer had expressed his opinion in this O.M.V.U.I. case
that there was danger of collision of defendant's car with an oncoming truck.
Testifying in his own behalf, defendant attempted to counter the officer's opinion testimony by giving his own opinion on the sanie question, but the trial
court sustained the State's "calling for opinion and conclusion" objection. Noting that the admission of opinion evidence, including that relating to nonexpert
state of mind, rests largely in the trial court's discretion which nevertheless
must be exercised fairly and impartially, the supreme court implied that a lay
witness like defendant was entitled to give such an opinion and added that
"since officer Sunken's opinion evidence was initially admitted it fairly follows
defendant's attempt to counter same should have been allowed." 639
c. Relevancy. As already discussed, two cases were reversed because
of improper ·exclusion of defendant's proffered evidence on the grounds of relevancy:640 viz. evidence of a statutory rape prosecutrix's other promiscuous
acts in an attempt to show someone else was her attacker 641 and evidence of
restitution made in a prosecution for false drawing and uttering of a check in
633. ld. at 927.
634. 203 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa 1972).
635. ld. at 272.
636. 201 N.W.2d 724 (Iowa 1972).
637. ld. at 727.
638. 204 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1973).
639. ld. at 598.
640. "Relevancy means the logical relation between the proposed evidence and a fact
to be established. Evidence must generally have probative value to be relevant. . . .
We have often held the question of relevancy and materiality of evidence rests within the
sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Battle, 199 N.W.2d 70, 72 (Iowa 1972)
(officer's testimony "had some probative value on the question of a separation of identities as between defendant and [one] Chin").
641. State v. McDaniel, 204 N.W.2d 627 (Iowa 1973), as discussed in text accompanying notes 321-22 supra.
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order to show lack of intent to defraud. 642 Likewise, in State v. Smiley, 643
the trial court abused its discretion in excluding for remoteness certain evidence
proffered by defendant. Defense counsel (for the tavern proprietors being
prosecuted for assault and battery) had sought to explore the drinking earlier
that evening by gang members who started the original altercation with another
patron. Conceding that it is within a trial court's sound judicial discretion
"to exclude relevant evidence too remote to be material or have any probative
value," the supreme court mused that "it scarcely qualifies as sound discretion
to exclude 'evidence of the immediate drinking experience of the participants
of a brawl giving rise to a criminal charge." 644
On the other hand, the supreme court upheld the admissibility of the
State's evidence, over the respective defendant's objections, in five other cases.
Two of these involved introduction of certain photographs, 645 and another
the results of experimental evidence. 646 Moreover, in State v. Lynch, 641
the objectionable testimony "was based on the agent's experience in narcotics
investigations and described in some detail the manner in which marijuana
is measured out and packaged for resale purposes," which the supreme court
believed was a relevant description from which "the jury could properly find
the marijuana in defendant's possession was intended for sale." 648 Similarly,
it was left within the trial court's discretion in State v. Kimbal/ 649 to admit into
evidence bank records of defendant's other accounts besides the account on
which the instant bad check was written in this prosecution for falsely uttering
a check. Because the State had to prove defendant's fraudulent intent, including lack of arrangement with said bank, its proof that "defendant did not
have funds in either of the accounts to pay the check negatived any contention that the check was mistakenly drawn on the wrong account and established
that defendant did not have 'funds with such bank' sufficient to pay the
check," 650 the supreme court reasoned.
642. State v. Johnson, 196 N.W.2d 563 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text accompanying notes 135-39 supra. But see State v. Graham, 203 N.W.2d 600 (Iowa 1973) (within
trial court's discretion to exclude defense-profferred testimony concerning out-of-court
statements allegedly made by defendant's acquaintance that she intended to comply with a
child custody decree, in this prosecution for interference with administration of justice
arising out of defendant's thwarting of execution of that decree), as discussed in text
accompanying notes 165-71 supra.
643. 201 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1972).
644. Id. at 731.
645. See State v. Youngbear, 202 N.W.2d 70 (Iowa 1972) (The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in permitting admission of numerous photographs which may have
been merely cumulative) and State v. Williams, 207 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1973) (The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in permitting admission into evidence of photographs of
decedent's fatal head wound).
646. "Admissibility of experimental evidence rests within the sound discretion of the
trial court." State v. Lunsford, 204 N.W.2d 613, 615 (Iowa 1973) (discretion not
abused in permitting experimental evidence as to driving time from scene of arrest to police
station in order to minimize speculation of tampering with contraband exhibit seized
from defendant).
647. 197 N.W.2d 186 (Iowa 1972).
648. Jd. at 190.
649. 203 N.W.2d 296 (Iowa 1972).
650. ld. at 299.
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By way of contrast, the supreme court noted in State v. Hinsey 651 that it
is improper for the trial court to allow the State to introduce into evidence defendant's statements of hatred toward police which were made at the time of
his arrest. Noting that the State attempted to justify such evidence as "show[ing] defendant's state of mind," the supreme court granted as much for what
the comments showed but added that this was "on a matter totally irrelevant to
the charge for which he was being tried." 652 "Defendant's general hatred of
policemen, standing alone, could hardly be relevant evidence in his trial for
robbing and shooting a storekeeper," 653 the supreme court concluded. Nevertheless, the conviction was upheld notwithstanding this error because of defendant's failure to object to this testimony when it was offered at trial, thus
leaving no record to be reviewed. 654
d. Reputation evidence. Reversible error was committed in State v.
55
Sill6 by the admission of "truth and veracity reputation testimony over proper
objection when the foundation requirements of Hobbs 656 were not met." 657
Here, three State rebuttal witnesses testified defendant had a bad reputation
for truth and veracity, notwithstanding the fact that they "did not say whether
there were in fact comments about his reputation for truth and veracity, nor
how many, their type, place, time, duration or representative nature." 568 Thus,
the foundation requirements cannot be weaker where, as here, evidence goes
to credibility than where, as in Hobbs, the evidence went to probability or
non-probability of guilt. 6 5 9

4.

Mistrial

The principal cases concerning
tionally-proscribed evidence, evidence
guments, and in-trial interrogation of
which are discussed in detail below.

motions for mistrial involved constituof other crimes, the bounds of jury arjurors concerning media publicity, all of
In other cases, the supreme court af-

651. 200 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 1972).
652. ld. at 817.
653. ld.
654. For a discussion of the related area of relevancy of evidence as it concerns
admissibility of evidence of other crimes, see text accompanying notes 668-80 infra.
655. 199 N.W.2d 47 (Iowa 1972).
656. See State v. Hobbs, 172 N.W.2d 268, 272 (Iowa 1972):
When introducing reputation evidence as a means of proving defendant's
character strict foundation requirements must be met. Several evidentiary facts
must be established before a witness may testify as to what he has heard concerning defendant's reputation. These include: ( 1) The background, occupation,
residence, etc., of the character witness, (2) His familiarity and ability to identify the party whose general reputation was the subject of comment, (3) Whether
there have in fact been comments concerning the party's reputation for a given
trait, ( 4) The exact place of these comments, (5) The generality of these comments, many or few in number, (6) Whether from a limited group or class as
opposed to a general cross-section of the community, (7) When and how long
a period of time the comments have been made.
657. 199 N.W.2d at 49.
658. Id.
659. See also State v. Crawford, 202 N.W.2d 99 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text
accompanying notes 428-31 supra.
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firmed the trial courts' refusals to declare mistrials in the following situations:
a prosecutor's bringing of several boxes with FBI markings into the courtroom temporarily and intermingling these with other exhibits which were admitted into evidence; 660 coaching of a witness (the ten-year old prosecutrix
in a sodomy prosecution) by a spectator; 661 and bringing defendant's alleged
accomplice attired in non-distinctive prison garb into the courtroom for identification purposes. 6 62
a. Constitutionally-Proscribed Evidence.
The general rule as to
whether interjection into the trial of prejudicial, inadmissible evidence requires
a mistrial or whether the problem can be cured through the standard strikeand-admonition approach is as follows: "If evidence is improperly admitted
but is later withdrawn with a cautionary statement to the jury to disregard it,
there is no error except in extreme instances where the prejudicial effect
would probably remain to influence the verdict despite its exclusion." 663
However, in State v. Ware, 664 the supreme court interpreted Chapman v. California665 as "clearly indicat[ing] certain types of constitutional error require
an automatic reversal"-including "involuntary confession, right to counsel
and an impartial presiding judge." 666 Accordingly, it held that "the constitutionally proscribed evidential use of . . . defendant's confession or admission
was [not] dispelled by giving to the jury an oral in-course-of-trial ejaculatory
instruction." 667 The instant mistrial situation arose when a violation of defendant's Miranda rights first came to light upon cross examination of a police officer following prior introduction of defendant's tainted confession into
evidence. 668
b. Evidence of Other Crimes. During the survey p'eriod, two of the
three cases involving introduction of other crimes into evidence 669 were re660. State v. Peterson, 196 N.W.2d 436 (Iowa 1972).
661. State v. Hackett, 197 N.W.2d 569, 573 (Iowa 1972): Even if it could be
argued that the trial court had a duty to take some sort of curative action after it had
observed or had its attention called to the fact that a spectator was coaching a witness,
much must, of necessity, be left to the sound discretion of the trial court since it had
the opportunity to see and hear everything that transpired. Such discretion will not be
disturbed unless it clearly appears it has been abused.
662. The prisoner was not attired in "any readily discernible prison garb. Neither
does the record disclose presence of improper official escort or custodial restraint of
Kelsey in the courtroom." State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Iowa 1972).
663. See State v. Coffee, 182 N.W.2d 390, 392 (Iowa 1970); accord State v. Osborn,
200 N.W.2d 798, 807-08 (Iowa 1972) (Striking-and-admonition was sufficient where
sheriff was asked on cross-examination how he could be so sure of his identification and
he answered "I have had him in custody on prior occasions," because this "did not imply
that [defendant] had ever been tried, convicted or even charged with any crime or in any
way intimate defe.ndant was of bad character or guilty of prior criminal conduct.").
664. 205 N.W.2d 700 (Iowa 1973).
665. 386 u.s. 18 (1967).
666. 205 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Iowa 1973).
667. ld.
668. Ware's confession was prompted by the arresting officers following up their giving of the Miranda rights [Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)] with the statement
that it would go easier on him if he wanted to tell them anything. This " 'not so subtle'
promissory leniency expressed by [the officers] induced the then frightened defendant to
incriminate himself," the supreme court opined. ld. at 703.
669. See also State v. Osborn, 200 N.W.2d 798, 807-08 (Iowa 1972) (Sheriffs testi-
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versed because the purpose for introducing such evidence did not come within
any of the recognized exceptions to the general rule barring such evidence. 670
In State v. Wright, 611 the State persistently interjected allusions to defendant's incestuous behavior with his own daughter into the instant prosecution for statutory rape of his step-daughter, notwithstanding the trial court's
repeated sustaining of defendant's objections. Reversing the conviction because of the introduction of evidence of these other crimes without their coming within any of the recognized exceptions, the supreme court rejected defendant's twin contentions that this evidence was being offered as corroboration as well as being part of an integral transaction. That evidence of a
crime other than the one being prosecuted is offered as "corroboration" of
that crime "is not a recognized exception permitting its use." 672 Such evidence "would be corroboration only in the sense of proving defendant's alleged
criminal character and thus that he was more likely to have committed the
crime. This is exactly why it may not be introduced. . . . A defendant
must be convicted only if it is proved he committed the offense charged and
not because he is a bad man," th'e supreme court reiterated. 673 The court
added that the integral transaction exception to the general rule barring proof
of other crimes in the instant prosecution "is applicable only where the separate offenses are so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish
the other." 674 Generally, on a charge of statutory rape, as in the instant case,
"evidence of lascivious conduct with girls other than prosecutrix is inadmissible unless essential to complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its
immediate context of happenings near in time and place." Because the State
had "failed utterly to prove that relationship here," the conviction was reversed. 675 In what appears to be somewhat of a new stance, th'e court added,
however, that "even if the evidence could have been brought within some
recognized exception, [the] trial court had discretion to exclude it." 676
mony that he had had defendant "in custody on prior occasions" did not require a mistrial
since the statement "did not tend to put defendant's character in issue since it did not
imply that [defendant] had ever been tried, convicted or even charged" (and it was
stricken); however, this type of testimony is not approved of).
See generally State v. Hinsey, 200 N.W.2d 810, 817 (Iowa 1972) (error for State to
introduce into evidence defendant's statements of hatred toward police since "[d]efendant's general hatred of policemen, standing alone, could hardly be relevant evidence in
his trial for robbing and shooting a storekeeper;" however, error not preserved here by
timely and sufficient objection at trial).
670. "We have long held, subject to well-circumscribed exceptions, that the State cannot prove against a defendant any crime for which he is not being tried, either as a foundation for separate punishment or as aiding the proof in the case being tried." State v.
Wright, 203 N.W.2d 247, 250 (Iowa 1972). See also State v. Wright, 191 N.W.2d 638,
639 (Iowa 1971) listing the five exceptions as permitting proof of: (1) motive, (2) intent, ( 3) absence of mistake or intent, ( 4) a common scheme with two or more crimes
so related in an integral transaction that proof of one tends to prove the other, and
(5) identity of the accused.
671. 203 N.W.2d 247 (Iowa 1972).
672. Id. at 250.
673. Id.
674. Id. at 251.
675. Id.
676. Id. This leeway of discretion empowers the judge to exclude the other-crimes
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In State v. Davis, 677 a conviction for manslaughter arising out of a traffic
death was reversed because the State's case brought out at trial that defendant did not have a valid driver's license at the tinie of the accident. Because
the subject was not pursued further, it did not appear whether his license "had
expired or was invalid for other reasons." 678 This evidence was inadmissible
for lack of relevancy "in the absence of a showing of a causal relationship
between the invalid license and the collision," 679 the supreme court opined. It
concluded a new trial was required in light of this evidence revealing a separate offense without the above showing of relevancy or connection to the crime
being instantly prosecuted.
On the other hand, State v. Fetters 680 held that evidence of other breakings and enterings involving thefts in which defendant participated both before and after the one being instantly prosecuted was admissible for the State
to establish the specific felonious intent of breaking and entering with intent
to commit larceny. Moreover, the State could elect to introduce this evidence
even though defendant attempted to remove his intent as an issue through
his admission as a witness. 68 1
c. Jury Arguments. Although it generally affords trial courts wide latitude in ruling on motions for a mistrial because of prosecutorial misconduct
in the making of improper remarks 682 during jury arguments, the supreme
court nevertheless determined in State v. Vickroy 683 that the court erred in refusing to order a mistrial for prejudicial remarks during both the opening and
closing arguments. In his opening argument, the prosecutor told the jury he
knew defendant was guilty. He thus "improperly commissioned himself an expert witness, then exceeded his prerogative as such by expressing an impermissible opinion as to defendant's guilt. " 684 Th'en, on closing argument, he
called upon the jurors "to place themselves and members of their families in
a hypothetical position of peril created by a drunken, car operating defendant."685 He thus undertook "to inflame the fears, passion and prejudice of the
jury as against defendant," 686 the supreme court determined. Observing that
"[p]rejudice flowing therefrom is self-evident," 687 the supreme court appears
to have dictated that such arguments as the above necessitate a mistrial rather
evidence, even when it has substantial independent relevancy, if in his judgment its probative value for this purpose is outweighed by the danger that it will stir such passion in
the jury as to sweep them beyond a rational consideration of guilt or innocence of the
crime on trial. !d., quoting C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 190, at 453-54 (2d ed. 1972).
677. 196 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1972).
678. !d. at 894.
679. /d.
680. 202 N.W.2d 84 (Iowa 1972).
681. ld. at 91.
682. On the somewhat related matter of the propriety of remarks made by the judge
during trial and in the jury's presence, see State v. Taylor, 201 N.W.2d 724 (Iowa 1972).
683. 205 N.W.2d 748 (Iowa 1973).
684. ld. at 751.
685. /d.
686. /d.
687. Id.
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than a mere strike-and-admonition "remedy" (which was not even done
here). 688
On the other hand, the prosecutor's impropriety by being argum'entative
in his opening argument in State v. Schiernbeck 689 was effectively cured by the
trial court's admonition for the jury to disregard the argumentative portion.
Here, the prosecutor "argued" that since defendant was the only one in the
motel that night then the person who entered the motel and was robbed had
to have been robbed by defendant. The supreme court believed that the
trial court acted "within its permissible range of discretion in finding the
county attorney's statements did not deprive defendant of a fair trial." 690
d. Publicity and Jury Interrogation. A new policy for dealing with the
prejudicial effect of during-trial publicity was established in State v. Bigley.691 Until Bigley, the trial court could decide, in its discretion, whether or
not to interrogate jurors concerning their knowledge of inflammatory media
accounts of the trial. In Bigley, the trial court refused to do so, relying instead on its earlier giving of the standard admonition that jurors are not to read
(or listen to) news accounts of the trial. Determining that defendant had
failed to demonstrate prejudice, the supreme court affirmed the conviction and
thus gave only prospective application to the following new procedural rule.
In all trials started after November 15, 1972, the procedure when an issue
arises during trial about possible jury exposure to potentially prejudicial material
going beyond the record has been as follows: "[T]he court may on its own
motion or shall on motion of either party question each juror, out of the presence of the others, about his exposure to that material." 692 This examination
"shall take place in the presence of counsel, and an accurate record of the ·examination shall be kept." 693 The A.B.A. Standards Relating to Fair Trial and
Free Press 694 shall serve as guidelines for excusing a juror challenged for exposure to prejudicial publicity.

5.

Instructions

The Iowa supreme court dealt with a wide range of issues concerning jury
instructions during the survey period. These are discussed below under the
general headings of preservation of the record for appellate review, substan688. See also State v. Moreland, 201 N.W.2d 713 (Iowa 1972) (Improper in closing
argument for the prosecutor, in rebuttal, to say one of the reasons that the informant had
not testified was that if an informant testifies then his life might be imperilled-where
there was no evidence introduced as to danger to this particular informant's life and so
the court was right in promptly directing the jury to disregard that part of the argument
thus obviating a mistrial; moreover, this argument was in rebuttal and "[d]efense counsel
should certainly have anticipated a strong response from the prosecutor.").
689. 203 N.W.2d 546 (Iowa 1973).
690. ld. at 548.
691. 202 N.W.2d 56 (Iowa 1972).
692. Id. at 58.
693. ld.
694. A.B.A. Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Fair
Trial and Free Press§ 3.4(b).
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tive content of the instructions given, propriety of giving certain instructions,
and propriety of failing to give certain instructions.
a. Preservation of the Record for Appellate Review. Defense counsel
fr'equently failed to make a proper record for appellate review of jury instructions.695
Requisites for the sufficiency of objections timely made were discussed
in two cases. In State v. Y oungbear, 696 the supreme court pointed out that
Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 196 "requiring that objections to instructions set
out the grounds for complaint governs in criminal cases as well as civil. . . .
Except that the time for making such objections is enlarged by section 787.3,
this condition applies whether instructions are challenged by motion for new
trial or by objections made during trial." 697 The instant objection asserted
that the instruction "did not embody the law applicable to this case and clearly
misled the jury and prejudiced this defendant." 698 "Such a blanket objection without specifying the nature of the claimed defects present[ed] no issue" for the supreme court to consider. 699 The court added that while the
Code 700 permits a defendant to postpone making his objections until filing a
motion for a new trial, "he is not thereby relieved of the duty to state what he
complains of." 701 Similarly, the defense counsel stated in his objection in State
v. Buchanan702 that he "believe[d] that is no longer the law." 703 "This is
tantamount to saying that the instruction does not state the law, which is insufficiently specific to constitute a basis for error," the supreme court concluded.704 The supreme court also made it clear in Buchanan that an objection made at trial cannot be amplified subsequently in the motion for new trial.
"This ground of the motion must stand or fall on the exception taken at trial,
for if a defendant undertakes to except the instructions at trial he must rest on
those exceptions [and he thus] cannot in a post-verdict motion amplify them
or add new ones," the supreme court ruled. 705
Timeliness in making objections was at issue in several cases that dealt
with exceptions to the rule that "[i]n a criminal case it is permissible to postpone objections to instructions until after trial and to make them a basis for
a new trial." 706 The exceptions are: "A party may waive the right . . . or
if the instruction was correct as given but not as explicit as a party may
have desired, he must request an additional instruction before the jury is
695.
Review,
696.
697.
698.
699.
700.
701.
702.
703.
704.
705.
706.

See generally, Sullins, Preservation of Error: Providing a Basis for Appellate
22 DRAKE L. REV. 435,469-73 (1973).
202 N.W.2d 70 (Iowa 1972).
Id. at 72.
Id.
Id.
See IowA CODE§§ 787.3(5), (7) (1973).
202 N.W.2d 70, 72 (Iowa 1972).
207 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1973).
Id. at 787.
Id.
Jd.

See, e.g., State v. Cox, 196 N.W.2d 430, 432 (Iowa 1972).

136

Drake Law Review

[Vol. 23

charged." 707 Defendant waived his right to raise objections in his motion for
new trial in State v. Cox 708 and State v. Dagne 709 by making express disclaimers
of objections at the time of submission of the instructions to the jury. Likewise,
the supreme court upheld a waiver in State v. Youngbear 710 in which defense
counsel at trial not only indicated he had not requested instructions and made
no objections to the instructions given but also "did not indicate an intention of
reserving the right to take later exceptions." 711 That defendant should specifically reserve the right at trial to take exceptions later (in a motion for new
trial) is suggested by the statement in State v. Cox712 (as well as the abovementioned reference in Y oungbear): "Defendant did not indicate an intention
of reserving the right to take later exceptions. He cannot be permitted thus to
change his position after the verdict. " 713 The "record" made at trial in Cox
consisted of defendant objecting to other instructions not involved in this appeal and thereafter advising the court: "Defendant has no other objections
and makes no further exceptions to the instructions . . . . " 714 Lastly, State
v. Hackett1 15 reaffirmed that the issue of improper jury instructions cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal.
b. Substantive Content of the Instructions Given. As already discussed
in detail above, the United States Supreme Court not only changed one part of
the tripartite test for determining obscenity from whether the entire work "is
utterly without redeeming social value" to whether the entire work "lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value" 716 but also eliminated the
hypothetical national community for determining contemporary community
standards. 717 Moreover, as already discussed above, the Iowa supreme court
held that "it was error to instruct on an exception to the [hunting by artificial
light] statute which is plainly not present in its language." 718 Likewise, the
latter court held that it is improper to instruct that intoxication cannot preclude
acquittal on a charge with specific intent as an essential element. 719 Finally,
it determined that the Iowa Bar Association's Uniform Jury Instruction
707. ld. But see State v. Youngbear, 203 N.W.2d 274, 277 (Iowa 1972) (§ 787.3
(5) waiver rule does not apply "when the court has misdirected the jury in a material
matter of law . . . or has refused properly to instruct the jury. . . .").
708. 196 N.W.2d 430, 432 (Iowa 1972): "Defendant has no other objections and
makes no further exceptions to the instructions. . . ."
· 709. 206 N.W.2d 93, 95 (Iowa 1973): ("We don't have any objections to the instructions, your honor)."
710. 203 N.W.2d 274 (Iowa 1972).
711. Id.at277.
712. 196 N.W.2d 430 (Iowa 1972).
713. Id. at 432.
714. ld.
115. 197 N.W.2d 569 (Iowa 1972).
716. See Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 ( 1973), as discussed in text accompany·
·
ing notes 202-05 supra.
717. See Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 ( 1973 ), as discussed in text accompanying notes 219-22 supra.
718. See State v. Hocker, 201 N.W.2d 74, 75 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text accompanying notes 160-64 supra.
719. See State v. Sill, 199 N.W.2d 47 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text accompanying
notes 351-52 supra.
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520.8 is an unconstitutional application of the Code section 321.281 "presumption" of intoxication arising from the presence of a specified p'ercentage
of alcohol in the accused's blood. 720
i. Accomplice's testimony. The United States Supreme Court held in
Cool v. United States 121 that it is reversible error to instruct the jury that an
accomplice's testimony must be believed beyond a reasonable doubt in order
for the jury to give it the same effect as any other witness' testimony, i.e., the
jury was to ignore this defense testimony unless jury believed it true beyond a reasonable doubt. The supreme court explained:
No constitutional problem is posed when the judge instructs a jury
to receive the prosecution's accomplice testimony 'with care and caution'. . . . But there is an essential difference between instructing a
jury on the care with which it should scrutinize certain evidence in
determining how much weight to accord it and instructing a jury,
as the judge did here, that as a predicate to the consideration of
certain evidence, it must find it true beyond a reasonable doubt. 722
In State v. Houston, 723 the Iowa supreme court held that it is improper for
an instruction to place the burden on the State to prove (beyond a reasonable
doubt) that certain State witnesses were not defendant's accomplices where
defendant had raised the issue that they had aided and abetted him in the commission of the crime. Rather, the burden should have been placed on the defendant to prove (by a preponderance of the evidence) that they were his accomplic'es (and, if so, then their testimony needed to be corroborated 724).
Thus, this error inured to defendant's benefit and defendant's conviction was
upheld.
ii. Emphasis on adverse evidence. It was determined in State v.
Milliken 125 that reversible error is committed when jury instructions place
undue emphasis upon evidence adverse to one party, here, the defendant.
"[I]nstructions reciting facts militating against one party, without a recitation
of facts favorable to his contention, are improper and erroneous," 726 the supreme court pointed out. One of the instant instructions noted that if the jury
found there was the odor of alcohol on defendant's breath at the time of his
arrest for O.M.V.U.I. then it could "consider that fact with all the other pertinent facts and evidence in arriving at whether or not the Defendant was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage."7 27 In another instruction, 728 the
720. See State v. Hutton, 207 N.W.2d 581 (Iowa 1973); State v. Hansen, 203 N.W.2d
216 (Iowa 1972), and State v. Sloan, 203 N.W.2d 225 (Iowa 1972), as discussed in text
accompanying notes 293-302 supra.
721. 93 S. Ct. 354 (1972).
722. Id. at 357.
723. 206 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1973). See also the text accompanying notes 35-36
supra.
723. See IOWA CooE § 782.5 (1973).
725. 204 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1973).
726. Id. at 596, quoting State v. Proost, 225 Iowa 628, 635-36, 281 N.W. 167, 170
(1938).
727. Id. at 595.
728. Cf. 11 Uniform Jury Instructions 520.6.
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jury was told that "it is not necessary for the State to prove or show how many
drinks the defendant had or what quantity or kind of alcoholic beverage the
Defendant consumed, or when or where he consumed it, and it is often difficult,
if not impossible to do so," 729 but rather that the State merely need show that
he was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage. Disapproving, the supreme court admonished: "The evil attendant upon [these] instructions . . .
is that they tend to lead a jury to dissociate the evidence thus emphasized
from all other evidence they are duty bound to consider." 730 A proper instruction, the supreme court intimated, would be a general instruction "applicable to all witnesses alike, 731 which would list altogether all of the facts which
the jury should consider in reaching its decision.
111.
Reasonable doubt. The general requisites of a valid jury instruction defining reasonable doubt were spelled out in State v. McGranahan. 732
Here, the instruction merely rearranged the words by defining reasonable
doubt as "a doubt which is based upon reason." 733 This instruction was considered by the supreme court to be fatally defective because it contained no
definition of reasonable doubt and thus made no reference to any standard
to aid the jury in determining the reasonableness of any doubt they might entertain. The court pointed out in passing that the Iowa Bar Association's uniform jury instruction on reasonable doubt 734 contains at least three acceptable
standards, but that it also is defective in another respect. A proper instruction on reasonable doubt "should limit its reference to the lack or failure of
evidence of such a lack or failure o[f] evidence produced by the state," 135
the supreme court declared.
c. Propriety of Giving Certain Instructions. In several survey cases
involving jury instruction matters, the central issue was the propriety of giving the instruction (i.e., any instruction on this point). 736
i. Aiding and abetting. This problem was best illustrated in State
v. Mays, 737 in which it was held reversible error to submit an issue completely
"unsubstantiated by evidence." 738 Specifically, the trial court erred in giving
an instruction on aiding and abetting when "no evidence at all was introduced
729. 204 N.W.2d 594, 595 (Iowa 1973).
730. ld. at 596.
731. ld. at 596-97.
732. 206 N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 1973).
733. ld. at 91.
734. Uniform Jury Instruction No. 501.11.
735. 206 N.W.2d 88, 92 (Iowa 1973).
736. See generally State v. Sill, 199 N.W.2d 47, 49 (Iowa 1972): "Since the case
will be remanded for new trial [because of an erroneous instruction on voluntary intoxication] we also note there was no evidence of involuntary intoxication and no reason to
instruct on it."
See also State v. Cartee, 202 N.W.2d 93, 97 (Iowa 1972) (reaffirmation of prospective application only of State v. Kimball, 176 N.W.2d 864 (Iowa 1970) doctrine that it
is reversible error to instruct the jury, absent defendant's request or objection, that it
should draw no inference from defendant's failure to testify).
737. 204 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1973).
738. Id. at 865.
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that anyone beside[s] defendant was involved." 739 That is, there was "want
of proof that anyone else had anything to do with the crime." 740 Rejecting
the State's claim on appeal that the instruction was not prejudicial since "under the evidence, defendant was the on1y one who could possibly be convicted
of committing the crime," the supreme court admonished: "But that is the
very reason the instruction should not have been given. It opened up to speculation participation by others, without any proof of such participation." 741
ii. Circumstantial evidence. Defendant's objection in State v. Peterson142 went to the trial court's giving of the Iowa Bar Association's uniform
jury instruction defining both direct and circumstantial evidence, 743 with defendant contending that "the State's case was based entirely on circumstantial
evidence." 744 In this prosecution for possession of burglar's tools, however,
the supreme court determined that each of the following constituted direct evidence: establishment of the character of the tools by testimony of police officers-witnesses, identification of defendant as a passenger in the car in flight
from which these tools were thrown during a police chase, and introduction
into evidence of burglar's tools found in the same car.
iii. Collateral issues. It was deemed reversible error in State v.
145
Dunn
to give a jury instruction on a collateral issue. Here, defendant was
charged with arson for the burning of one Rogers' automobile, although the
facts smacked of collusion between defendant and Rogers to defraud Rogers'
insurance company. Over various objections, Rogers' insurance company's
agent (Thompson) was allowed to testify concerning statements allegedly
made to him by Rogers on the theory that if a conspiracy between defendant
and Rogers were established "then any hearsay statements made to Thompson
by Rogers would be admissible." 746 The jury subsequently was instructed that
if they believed beyond a reasonable doubt that such a conspiracy existed
then they could consider Thompson's testimony concerning Rogers' alleged statements. Reversing the conviction, the supreme court, pointing out that defendant was charged with arson and not with conspiracy, concluded:
We are satisfied the questioned instruction was erroneously given in
that it compounded the confusion resulting from extended introduction of prosecutorial evidence regarding collateral issues and separate
offenses, possibly stemming in part from absence, at times, of sufficiently specific testimonial objections; it improperly allowed the jury
to inceptionally determine whether or not there was sufficient evidence of a conspiracy, apart from statements by Rogers to Thompson, to justify a consideration of those statements in determining
whet.'J.er defendant was guilty of the offense charged; in effect the
739.
740.
741.
742.
743.
744.
745.
746.

ld. at 864.
ld.
ld. at 865.
196 N.W.2d 436 (Iowa 1972).
Uniform Jury Instruction 501.13.
196 N.W.2d at 438.
199 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1972).
Id. at 108.
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jury was thereby wrongfully allowed to pass under admissibility of
evidence after the court had permitted its introduction. 747
iv. Verdict-urging instructions. Two survey cases concerned the
trial court's propriety in giving a verdict-urging instruction similar to the Iowa
Bar Association's Uniform Jury Instruction 501.1. The gist of this instruction
is to encourage the jury to reach a verdict, thus prompting each juror, in case
of deadlock, to re-examine his views and to change his opinion if such can
be done without violating his conscience.
In State v. Hackett 148 the original instructions included the admonitions that
"[a]n inconclusive trial is always highly undesirable" and that jurors in the
course of their upcoming deliberations should "not hesitate to reexamine
[their] own views and change [their] opinions if convinced it is [sic] erroneous," if not done so "for the mere purpose of reaching a verdict." 749 Noting this instruction was part of the original charge to the jury, the supreme
court was satisfied this type of instruction "is not subject to the abuses said
to attend the giving of an 'Allen' [or dynamite] charge." 750
The uncertainty left in Hackett as to the supreme court's view toward the
giving of a so-called "Allen" or "dynamite" charge 751 during the jury's deliberation to prompt the breaking of a deadlock and thus encourage a verdict
was subsequently dispelled in State v. Quitt. 152 Refusing to hold that the giving of an "Allen charge" to a deadlocked jury per se deprives defendant of a
fair trial, th'e supreme court instead left it to the trial courts' "considerable discretion in determining whether it should be given." 753 With each case to be decided, "on its own circumstances," the test for determining whether the giving of a verdict-urging instruction forced or helped to force an agreement, or
merely started a new train of real deliberation which ended the disagreement."754 This unsatisfactory test thus means that a trial court can exercise
his "considerable discretion" only at the peril of reversible error subsequently
arising through a quick verdict thereafter, with jurors attempting to impeach
the verdict with affidavits as to the co·ercive impact of an "Allen charge" on
the subsequent deliberations. In Quitt, however, there was a total elapsed
deliberation time of four hours between the giving of the "Allen charge" and
the return of the verdict of guilty. The supreme court, affirming the conviction, determined: "The record her·e does not suggest coercion. In fact, it
rather demonstratively negatives it." 755
d. Propriety of Failing to Give Certain Instructions. One last category
of jury instruction matters concerns the propriety of the trial court's failure to
747.
748.
749.
750.
751.
752.
753.
754.
755.

Id. at 110.
200 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1972).
Id. at 496.
ld.
See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
204 N.W.2d 913 (Iowa 1973).
Id. at 914.
Id.
Id.
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give certain instructions desirable to defendant. As the discussion below indicates, 75 6 this facet can involve either the court's rejection of defendant's request for instructions or the court's affirmative duty to instruct sua sponte.
i. Entrapment. Defendant's request for an instruction on the affirmative defense of entrapment was properly refused in State v. McGranahan.757
The only evidence offered at trial relating to defendant's contention
that he had been induced by Officer Keenley to make the illegal sale of marijuana was the following testimony by Officer Keenley: "Well, Mr. McGranahan was the first to speak. He said, 'What is it that you need?' And I said,
'Well, what have you got?' And he answered with the word, 'Marijuana'." 75 S
The supreme court pointed out that "there is no entrapment when narcotics
agents merely afford an accused the opportunity to commit the offense." 759
Here, the agent "merely afforded the opportunity for the defendant to commit
the crime. He did not induce the defendant to commit it." 76 0
ii. Evidential basis. The cardinal principle that there must be
evidence in the record to support an instruction was unsuccessfully challenged
in State v. Armstrong. 761 First, the trial court correctly sustained the
State's objection to a qualified hypothetical question for which there was no
evidential support. Then it correctly refused defendant's requested instruction
concerning that hypothesis. "This request, interlaced with mUltiple quali~
fying 'ifs,' stems from the same faUlty premise heretofore considered regarding the hypothetical question put by defense counsel to the witness Lewis," 762
the supreme court observed. The impropriety of defendant's request stems
from the principle that th'e trial court's duty to instruct "is confined to 'Material
questions of law in the case' . . . [but] only where relevant evidence was
produced which woUld make apparent the materiality of the law claimed
applicable thereto." 763
m. Impeachment with prior felony convictions. A new procedural
rule concerning impeachment of a previously-convicted defendant testifying in
his own behalf was established in State v. Mays. 764 In trials commencing after February 21, 1973, the trial court must instruct sua sponte that "consid756. Although the survey cases raising issues of self defense did not specifically
arise on refusal of requests for instructions, see text accompanying notes 353-56 supra.
See also State v. Davis, 196 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1972) (defendant in vehicular
homicide case is not entitled to instruction ·on recklessness that "even if he was aware of
a dangerous situation, recklessness would be shown only if he did not exercise the slightest care to avoid injury to others"), as discussed in text accompanying notes 198-99 supra.
757. 206 N.W.2d 88 (Iowa 1973). See also text accompanying notes 336-43 supra
for a discussion of two cases in which entrapment instructions were given contrary to
defendant's contentions that entrapment had been shown as a matter of law (thus requiring dismissal of the charges).
758. 206 N.W.2d at 90.
759. Id.
760. ld.
761. 203 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa 1972).
762. ld. at 274.
763. ld., quoting State v. Perry, 246 Iowa 861, 866, 69 N.W.2d 412, 415 (1955).
764. 204 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1973).
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eration of defendant's previous convictions must be limited to defendant's
credibility as a witness." 765
iv. Lesser included offenses. As already discussed above, the
Iowa supreme court has reversed State v. Everett, 166 and now applies this test in
determining whether instructions on certain lesser included offenses should be
submitted to the jury: "[T]he evidence of the case must be considered in determining whether one offense is includable within another." 767 In State
v. Hawkins, 168 the supreme court said:
Under the facts presented in this case it would have been impossible
for defendant to commit the offense charged without a showing of
each element necessary to convict him of the lesser offense. Under
the rule announced by the majority in State v. Everett, supra, this
would not make the lesser offense includable because situations,
though not involved or presented in the case, can be imagined in
which the major offense might be committed by means other than
those which would constitute a commission of the lesser offense .
. . . We now believe and hold the dissenting opinion [in Everett]
expresses the sounder view. 7 69
The court nevertheless reiterated in Hawkins that "the evidence must justify the submission of the included offense" and thus "if there is no evidence
from which the jury could find the defendant guilty of the included offense,
then such included offense need not be submitted." 770 Similarly, in State v.
Osborn 111 the trial court did not err in this prosecution for burglary by failing to
give defendant's requested instruction regarding the lesser included offense of
breaking and entering. "There is not a scintilla of evidence that the breaking
and entering at the Rock home occurred other than in the nighttime as that
term is ordinarily defined," 772 the supreme court determined, thus apparently combining principles of evidence of the case and matters of law.
Hawkins merely changed the rule as to whether lesser included offenses
are submitted in a particular case, but did not change the definition of a lesser
included offense, to wit:
Every crime charged consists of certain specific elements, and if from
the elements of the crime charged certain elements thereof may be
taken, thereby leaving the necessary elements of another crime, the
latter would be an included offense; or, to state it in another way,
if certain elements are necessary to a criminal charge, and these elements, plus certain other elements, make the necessary elements of
a higher crime, then the lower crime is included in the higher one. 7 73
765. Id. at 867.
766. 157 N.W.2d 144 (Iowa 1968).
767. State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Iowa 1973 ).
768. Id. For a discussion of the factual situation in Hawkins, see text accompanying notes 178-84 supra.
769. Id. at 557.
770. ld., quoting State v. Marshall, 206 Iowa 373, 375, 220 N.W. 106 (1928).
771. 200 N.W.2d 798 (Iowa 1972).
772. Id. at 807. For a further discussion of this point, see text accompanying notes
68-71 supra.
773. State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555, 551 (Iowa 1973), quoting State v. Marshall,
206 Iowa 373, 375, 220 N.W. 106 (1928).
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That Hawkins does not stand for the proposition that a crime becomes a
lesser included offense merely because of the evidence of the case notwithstanding the fact that the greater offense did not require certain essential elements of the lesser offense was made clear in State v. Habhab. 114 Pointing
out that "[a] showing of possession . . . was not required as the element of
the offense [of illicit drug selling]," the supreme court conceded that the evidence in the instant case "show[s] a possession of the marijuana in connection with its sale." 775 Nevertheless, the court pointed out that "this does not
in itself make possession an included offense in the sale." 776 In other words,
the existence of such evidentiary facts cannot supply an included offense "outside the elements of the major crime." 777 Thus, even under the revised lesser
included offense test in Hawkins, "[i]t is quite possible to commit one crime in
the act of committing another and yet not have it an included offense. It is not
included if its elements are not entirely included as a part of the elements of
the major offense," 778 the court explained.
In a related matter, the supreme court upheld the convictions in two cases
in which certain apparently-proper lesser included offenses were not submitted to the jury. In State v. Cox, 119 defendant failed to make timely objection to the trial court's failure to submit the lesser offenses, waiting instead to
object in his motion for new trial after stating at the time of submission of the
instructions that he had no objections to them. The supreme court repeated
its general rule "requir[ing] submission of all offenses which are necessarily
included in the criminal charge and upon which there is sufficient evidence to
justify a finding of guilty," 780 but then added: "[R]eversible error will not
appear because of failure to submit included offenses unless two elements concur: (1) the claimed included offense must be necessarily included in the offense charged; and (2) the record must contain evidence justifying a finding
of such included offense rather than of a higher offense." 781 In other words,
the supreme court "separate[s] the 'abstract question of what is an included
offense' from 'the question of when included offenses should, under the evidence in the case, be submitted.' " 782 The instant record so viewed, the supreme court concluded that the trial court did not commit reversible error
by failing to instruct on certain lesser included offenses. The precedential
value of this case was muddied somewhat by the court's further observation:
774. 209 N.W.2d 73 (Iowa 1973). For a discussion of the instant factual situation,
see text accompanying notes 109-15 supra.
775. Id. at 75.
776. /d.
777. /d.
778. /d.
779. 196 N.W.2d 430 (Iowa 1972).
780. /d. at 433, citing State v. Pilcher, 158 N.W.2d 631, 633 (Iowa 1968). See
State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555, 558 (Iowa 1973): "This holding is consistent with
the view expressed in State v. Pilcher," supra.
781. ld., quoting State v. Everett, 157 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 1968).
782. Id., quoting State v. Everett, 157 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 1968).
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"This is particularly true in absence of defendant's timely request therefor."7sa
State v. Youngbear 184 reiterates the principle that "where a defendant is
convicted of the principal offense charged in the indictment and the jury refuses to select a lesser offense submitted, failure to submit still lesser included
offenses is not prejudicial error." 785 Here, defendant was charged with and
convicted of robbery with aggravation although the jury was also instructed
on the next lesser offense of robbery without aggravation. However, the
trial court refused defendant's timely request to submit instructions on the still
lesser offenses of larceny from the person as well as of larceny.
C.
1.

Jury Deliberations786

Misconduct of Jurors

A comprehensive discussion of the rules governing when jury misconduct requires the granting of a new trial is contained in State v. Houston. 787
Pointing out that trial courts have "broad discretion" in determining whether
a new trial is justified under the evidence of claimed jury misconduct, the supreme court dictated: "To justify a new trial for jury misconduct it must appear (independently of what jurors might later say) the misconduct was calculated to, and probably did, influence the verdict." 788 The instant problem
concerned the extra-legal introduction into the jury room of evidence not produced at trial-here, an experiment by jurors in turning off the lights to determine nighttime visibility while looking through window glass as a means
of "testing" the credibility of certain identification testimony at trial. Affirming the trial court's overruling of defendant's motion for a new trial, the supreme court reaffirmed that "[a] juror is not forbidden to consider and pass
upon the evidence in the light of common experience and common observa.
tion. "789
Similarly, no prejudice was found in State v. Jackson, 790 in which one juror
noted during deliberation that defendant, who was being tried for attempted
murder of X, had already been convicted of the murder of Y committed on
the same date as the instant attack on X. The jury foreman thereupon sent a
783. I d. See also State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555, 558 (Iowa 1973): "[This
holding] is not inconsistent with that expressed in State v. Cox . . . which noted a failure
of defendant to make a timely request for an instruction on the included offense." Thus,
it is unclear whether the two-part test for determining reversible error because of failure
to submit lesser included offenses as stated in Cox remains viable after Hawkins. It
would appear to, however, notwithstanding the court's singling out in Hawkins of the aspect of the defendant's untimely objection in Cox.
784. 203 N.W.2d 274 (Iowa 1972).
785. Id. at 278.
786. For a discussion of the scope of judicial discretion in the sentencing process,
see generally Dunahoo, supra note 364 at 1085-91.
787. 209 N.W.2d 42 (Iowa 1973).
788. ld. at 45.
789. Id.
790. 195 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1972).
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note to the presiding judge inquiring as to the nature and date of the undesignated previous felony conviction which had been introduced at trial for impeachment purposes. The judge then recalled the jury and re-instructed them
that defendant's previous felony conviction was not to be considered (other
than presumably for impeachment purposes). Defendant made no other showing of any resultant events and jurors' affidavits indicated that no further
mention of the extra-legal information was made. The fact that "fully five
hours of deliberation ensued" 791 thereafter was prominently mentioned in the
opinion.
2.

Outsiders' Contact With Jurors

State v. Bruno 192 illustrates that a new trial is not required ipso facto by
every outsider's contact with the jurors during their deliberations. Here, the
alleged misconduct was based solely upon the fact that the sheriff appeared to
have spoken once to one of the jurors while un:locking the door to the jury
room. The supreme court opined: "While the sheriff's conduct was objectionable and avoidable, his slight encounter with the jurors [which was not repeated] does not appear to constitute the requisite conduct . that gives rise,
or appears to give rise, to the kind of 'doubt or disrespect' indicating prejudice."793

D.

Sentencing

The sentencing process 794 continues to present major problem areas for
Iowa trial judges. 795
791. ld. at 690.
792. 204 N.W.2d 879 (Iowa 1973).
793. ld. at 885.
794. For a discussion of the scope of judicial discretion in the sentencing process, see
generally Dunahoo, supra note 364, at 1101-16.
795. Summarily, the other sentencing process issues not discussed elsewhere in this
survey include:
(a) ALLOCATION: The CoDE § 789.6 right of allocation is meant only to afford defendant an opportunity to make a statement and does not require verbalization in
the precise words of the statute. State v. Christensen, 201 N.W.2d 457 (Iowa 1972).
(b) AT ARRAIGNMENT: "We cannot conclude here the trial court acted improperly, although arraigning the defendant, accepting his plea, and imposing sentence all
at one hearing and on the same day is not a procedure that should be followed. The
burden is on the defendant here to establish the fact the disposition of his case with such
dispatch is a circumstance entitling him to prevail in this proceeding." State v. Kephart,
202 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Iowa 1972).
(c) EXCESSIVENESS-Juveniles: The trial court does not abuse its discretion ;n
selecting the most severe of the possible sentencing alternatives although CoDE § 237.72
authorizes the court to give "special consideration" when sentencing a juvenile under the
criminal code. State v. Davis, 195 N.W.2d 677 (Iowa 1972).
(d) EXCESSNENESS--Multiplicity: Concurrent sentences of life imprisonment
for "open-charge" murder and "felony" murder convictions, based upon the same homicide, are excessive; one must be set aside. State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 63 (Iowa 1972).
(e) EXCESSNENESS--Severity: "Although the sentence seems quite severe in
view of the amount of the [$7 bad] check, we cannot. say there was an abuse of discretion." State v. Johnson, 196 N.W.2d 563, 571 (Iowa 1972).
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Defe"ed Sentencing

The reportedly widespread practice of deferred sentencing796 was declared invalid in State v. Wright. 797 As succinctly described in Justice McCormick's special concurrence in which he defended deferred sentencing, 798 under this technique "[s]entence in appropriate cases, after plea of guilty, is
deferred for a specified period, usually upon condition defendant submit to
probation. If defendant conforms to the terms of probation he is permitted
to withdraw his guilty plea at its expiration and ask that the case be dismissed
in the interests of justice." 799 Accordingly, a probation-conforming defendant ultimately will have no conviction. The supreme court's majority held:
"The right to defer imposition of a sentence in a criminal case is not inherent
but is regulated by statute and can only be exercised in accordance with
the terms of the statute." 800 The only applicable statutes 801 were construed
as limiting, for a reasonable time, the deferral of imposition of sentence only
for determining motions for a new trial or in arrest of judgment or for the
making of a pre-sentence investigation. Moreover, the probation provision802
is applicable only after the entry of judgment of conviction and the imposition
of sentence. State differently, Code section 247.20 "refers only to a suspended
sentence and has no application to a deferred sentence."803 Therefore,
Wright mandated that trial courts move forward with entry of judgment and
sentencing following a conviction. This meant that, save for convictions for
simple possession under Iowa's Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 804 anyone
pleading guilty or being convicted by a jury would have a conviction of record, the probation provision notwithstanding.
The Iowa General Assembly subsequently granted statutory authority for
deferred sentencing, with numerous enumerated exceptions and procedural
limitations. 805 The new law became effective on August 15, 1973, and expressly
validated all previous deferred sentences except as to "any case in which an
appeal was pending on June 1, 1973." 80 6
796. See Contemporary Studies Project: Perspectives on the Administration of
Criminal Justice in Iowa, 51 IOWA L. REv. 598, 612 (1972).
797. 202 N.W.2d 72 (Iowa 1972) (en bane).
798. Justice McCormick, joined by Justices Harris and Reynoldson, concurred only
in the result in Wright, in which defendant unsuccessfully contested the trial court's
revocation of his probation granted as part of a deferred sentence and his subsequent
sentencing. The six-man majority said there was no authority to grant the deferred sentence in the first instance, while Justices McCormick, Harris and Reynoldson took the
position that the trial court had statutory authority (under CoDE § 789.2) as well as
jnherent power, to grant the deferred sentence, but that the trial court was justified in
subsequently revoking the probation, entering the judgment of conviction, and sentencing.
799. 202 N.W.2d 72, 79 (Iowa 1973).
800. /d. at 76.
801. See IowA CoDE § 789.2 (1973), as construed at 202 N.W.2d 72, 78 (Iowa
1973 ).
802. Id. § 247.20.
.
803. 202 N.W.2d 72, 77 (Iowa 1973).
804. See IOWA CODE§ 204.409 (1973).
805. See Ch. 295 [1973] Iowa Acts..
806. ld. § 14.
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Habitual Criminal

Two survey cases dealt with various aspects of the aggravated sentencing process for a defendant shown to be a habitual criminal. 807
In State v. Houston, 808 the supreme court held, inter alia, that the State
need only show as to previous convictions that defendant was sentenced to a
term of at least three years' imprisonment thus rendering irrelevant the time
actually served. Moreover, the court held that a jury question concerning a
prior commitment is generated "if the State can show a mittimus was issued
ordering the sheriff to deliver defendant to prison" 809 and thus it is unnecessary for the State to show defendant was actually incarcerated in prison. Finally, the court held that "[t]he duly authenticated copy of the mittimus
makes a prima facie case," 810 and accordingly the State need not show that
defendant's prior convictions were not appealed.
In State v. Mason, 811 the supreme court held that the State can carry the
issue of a habitual-criminal defendant's identification to the jury through incourt identification by witnesses "who had known him and connected him with
those [prior] proceedings." 812 Accordingly, "an in-court comparison of defendant's photographs and fingerprints with those taken on the other convictions,"813 while being the best evidence, is not necessary.
3.

Indigent Defendants

The application of recently-revised federal constitutional guidelines for
the sentencing of indigent defendants to imprisonment was one of the major
areas of concern during the survey period.
a. Counsel. In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 814 the United States Supreme
Court held that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense . . . unless he was represented by counsel at his
trial." 815 As a practical matter of procedure, the Court noted that "every
judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits it, unless the accused is
represented by counsel. He will have a measure of the seriousness and gravity
of the offense and therefore know when to name a lawyer to represent the
807. See IOWA CooE § 747.1, .2 & .5 (1973). See also Davis v. Bennett, 400 F.2d
279, 281 (8th Cir. 1968):
The Iowa Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the habitual offender statute
does not create a separate and distinct crime, but is merely relevant in determining the penalty to be imposed should a conviction be obtained on the 'primary'
charge. * * * There is nothing in the [fourteenth amendment] due process clause
which prevents the state of Iowa from making this construction.
808. 209 N.W.2d 42 (Iowa 1973).
809. Id. at 47.
810. Id.
811. 203 N.W.2d 292 (Iowa 1972).
812. Id. at 296.
813. ld.
814. 407 u.s. 25 (1972).
815. Id. at 37.
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accused before the trial starts." 816 Thus, the Supreme Court refused to take
this opportunity to afford a sixth amendment right to counsel on non-felony offenses,817 unlike its ru1e in Gideon v. Wainwright 818 as to felonies. Rather, it
merely precluded a trial court from exercising any statutory authority to sentence a convicted indigent to imprisonment unless he had been effectively
offered counsel-thus leaving an indigent defendant facing only a fine with
no right to counsel.
Argersinger signalled a change in Iowa's general practice of not affording
appointive counsel for indigents charged with simple misdemeanors, 819 although the Iowa supreme court had expressly reserved judgment on the question.820 In Henricks v. Hildreth, 821 the Iowa supreme court held that Argersinger is to be applied prospectively only (i.e., to trials started after June
12, 1972).
b. Default Imprisonment. In Tate v. Short, 822 the United States Supreme
Court held that automatic imprisonment of an indigent defendant merely for
his non-wilful failure to pay in toto a fine violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Rather, the State is to resort to alternative methods of collecting the fine (e.g., installment payments) or exacting some economic equivalent (e.g., civil process against defendant's non-exempt property). The Supreme Court emphasized, however, that Tate was not to be understood "as precluding imprisonment as an enforcement method when alternative means are unsuccessfu1 despite the defendant's reasonable efforts to satisfy the fines by those means; the determination of the constitutionality of imprisonment in that circumstance must await the presentation of a concrete
case."s2a
In State v. Snyder, 824 the Iowa supreme court held that the Tate rules
were violated by the entry of a judgment that defendant was to be jailed if he
failed to pay the imposed fine. Thus, defau1t imprisonment was made the
only alternative to immediate, albeit non-wilfu1, in toto payment of the fine instead of alternative methods being offered. (One such alternative expressly
mentioned by the Iowa supreme court was installment payments). Vacating
the sentenc·e and remanding the cause for resentencing, the supreme court rejected the possible argument that the default imprisonment imposed on defendant was not governed by Tate since the trial court "had authority to levy
a fine or imprisonment on a defendant convicted of violating section
816. ld. at 40.
817. "We need not consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as regards
the right to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved, however, for here, petitioner
was in fact sentenced to jail." Id. at 37.
818. 372 u.s. 335 (1963).
819. But see Wright v. Denato, 178 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1970) (statutory right to appointive counsel for indigents charged with both felonies and indictable misdemeanors).
820. ld. at 342-43.
821. 207 N.W.2d 805 (Iowa 1973).
822. 401 u.s. 395 (1971).
823. ld. at 401.
824. 203 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1972).
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321.281." 825 In other words, it makes no difference that defendant could
originally have been sentenced to imprisonment and any subsequent default
imprisonment would unconstitutionally arise merely because of his indigency.
In an offshoot to Snyder, the Iowa supreme court strongly disapproved of a
sentencing colloquy involving an indigent defendant in State v. Milliken. 826
Sentencing defendant for first-offense O.M.V.U.I. (which is punishable by a
term of imprisonment in the penitentiary or a fine or both) the judge noted on
the record that there was no jail sentence possible "exc'ept possibly to coerce
payment of a fine." 827 Noting further that defendant-pauper probably
could not pay a reasonable fine, the judge indicated he was ·convinced defendant "ought to spend some time in prison or· in jail" 828 and accordingly sentenced him to a penitentiary term. Reversing the instant conviction because
of a faulty instruction, the supreme court declared that no such references are
to be made in any phase of the sentencing process to a defendant's pauperism.
4.

Pacts

The Iowa supreme court made it clear in State v. J ackson 829 that sentencing is to be done on an individualized basis and accordingly trial courts
cannot bind themselves to a group agreement that prescribes uniform minimum
sentences when the applicable criminal statute sets no such limits. Here, the
judges in one judicial district had agreed to impose a minimum penalty of
twenty days' imprisonment in the county jail for every first-offense O.M.V.U.I.
conviction, subject to individualized consideration ·to granting of probationnotwithstanding the fact that the applicable statute 830 neither sets a minimum
period of imprisonment nor even mandates any imprisonment. Sentencing
"under a predetermined fixed policy cannot satisfy a statutory requirement for
the exercise of discretion," 831 the supreme court admonished, adding that the
sentencing judge must exercise his discretion by considering the peculiar facts
and circumstances of each individual case in order to make "a sound, fair and
just determination" of the proper sentence. 8 3 2
5.

Resentencing

Three survey cases dealt with various issues related to resentencing procedures.
a.
825.
826.
827.
828.
829.
830.
831.
832.

Increased punishment.

The Iowa supreme court held in City of

Id. at 290.
204 N.W.2d 594 (Iowa 1973).
I d. at 598.
ld.

204 N.W.2d 915 (Iowa 1973).
See IOWA CODE§ 321.281 (1973).
204 N.W.2d 915, 916 (Iowa 1973 ).
Id.
.
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Cedar Rapids v. Klees8 38 that the federal constitutional bar on harsher punishment after a retrial on remand to the same trial court (except when based on
defendant's record of conduct in the interim between the original sentence and
the resentence) 834 is not applicable to trials de novo on appeal. 835 Here, defendant had been fined $25 in municipal court but given five days in jail after a
trial de novo after conviction on appeal to district court.
b. Multiple sentences. In Cleesen v. Brewer, 836 an exception was
carved out of the rule in Code section 745.1 automatically making a sentence for
escape to run consecutive to the original sentence. The instant defendant
had been sentenced to an indeterminate term of ten years' imprisonment for
breaking and entering and was subsequently sentenced to a three-year term
for escape, with the sentence for escape made to run consecutively to the earlier
sentence (as required by Code section 745.1). Following vacating of the sentence
for breaking and entering in a postconviction proceeding, defendant was resentenced to a term not exceeding ten years, but the court did not specify
whether this term was as to run concurrently with or consecutively to the
three-year term for escape. Claiming the warden was illegally holding him for
a total of thirteen years, defendant commenced another postconviction proceeding claiming that this turn of events brought into play Code section 789.12
which makes multiple sentences run concurrently unless specified to the contrary by the court in pronouncing the second sentence. Agreeing, the supreme court noted that after vacating of defendant's sentence for breaking
and entering, "the only sentence in effect was the one for escape," 837 and the
second sentence for breaking and entering was to be treated merely as the second of multiple sentences, thus making Code section 789.12 govern.
c. Replacement Statute. In a bizarre turn of events, the punishment in
State v. Wiese 838 was, in effect, ordered increased by the Iowa supreme court.
Defendants successfully challenged in a postconviction relief proceeding their
original sentences under Iowa's former Uniform Narcotics Act and they were resentenced to a $2000 fine and a term of imprisonment "not to exceed two
years." By that time, a new penalty provision was applicable under Iowa's
Controlled Substances Act839 which expressly makes the new schedule of penalties, "if they are less than those under prior law," applicable to offenses still
being prosecuted on July 1, 1971 (the effective date of the new act). Defendants sought only to reduce their fines from $2000 to $1000 but not to
change their terms of imprisonment.
833. 201 N.W.2d 920 (Iowa 1972).
834. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 ( 1969); accord State v. Pilcher, 171
N.W.2d 251 (Iowa 1969).
835. 201 N.W.2d 920, 921 (Iowa 1972), citing Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104
(1972).
836. 201 N.W.2d 474 (Iowa 1972).
837. Id. at 477.
838. 201 N.W.2d 734 (Iowa 1972). This case was consolidated on appeiU with
State v. Hatch.
839. See Ch. 148, § 601 [1971] Iowa Acts (S.F. 148). This transitional provision
was not codified in the 1973 Iowa Code. See IowA CoDE ch. 204 (1973).
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The supreme court upheld defendant's contention that the new penalty
provision was applicable, noting that "[a] case which has not reached valid
final judgment is 'being prosecuted."' 840 However, the supreme court then
pointed out that defendants' offenses would constitute possession with intent
to deliver under the new statute and defendants must be resentenced accordingly even though the applicable penalty (imprisonment not to exceed five
years) is greater. Pointing out that the trial court "has no authority to fix a
lesser prison term," 841 the supreme court reversed and remanded for new
sentences.

E.
1.

Posttrial Developments

Postconviction Relief

Two survey cases involved construction of the provlSlon in Iowa's Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act 842 that bars relitigation of any ground "finally adjudicated or not raised, or knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
waived" in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence as well
as any other proceeding taken to secure relief. That is, with the exception of the
abovementioned qualifications, a postconviction proceeding cannot be taken
to relitigate an issue previously raised on appeal, certiorari, habeas corpus,
or an earlier postconviction petition. 843

Horn v. Haugh 844 held that "[t]he failure to raise a defense in the original
trial, unless excused as provided by the section, waives the issue in any
future postconviction proceeding. " 8411 That is, the supreme court rejected defendant's contention that the conditional exception "or not raised" in the nonrelitigation clause "relates only to prior postconviction proceedings and does
not preclude assertion of matters waived in the original trial." 846 Accordingly,
the court refused to permit the use of postconviction relief as a substitute for
the simple statutory remedy of lodging objections at trial.
State v. Masters 841 held that this non-rditigation rule does not apply when
defendant had taken his original appeal pro se and the issues were not adequately raised on that appeal. The supreme court's general conclusion on
the earlier appeal that defendant had a fair trial "is not tantamount to a ruling
on the merits of the errors now asserted" 848 on appeal from denial of postconviction relief, the supreme court determined. (The supreme court thereupon
ruled adversely to defendant on the merits of his "relitigated" issues).
840. 201 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Iowa 1972).
841. Id. at 738.
842. See IOWA CoDE§ 663A.8 (1973).
843. See also Murch v. Mottram, 93 S. Ct. 71 (1972) (federal habeas corpus does
not lie for challenge of issue intentionally waived in State post-<:<>nviction procedure).
844. 209 N.W.2d 119 (Iowa 1973).
845. Id. at 121.
846. Id.
847. 199 N.W.2d 102 (Iowa 1972).
848. Id. at 103.
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Parole Revocation

a. Hearings. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 649 the United States Supreme Court
declared that Iowa's no-hearing parole revocation process 850 violates procedural
due process rights of the fourteenth amendment. In fact, the Court held that a
parolee facing revocation is entitled to two separate hearings-a preliminary
hearing and the revocation hearing. The purpose of the preliminary hearing,
to be held before an impartial hearing officer who need not be a judicial officer, is to determine if there are "reasonable ground[s] to believe that the
arrested parolee has committed acts that would constitute a violation of parole conditions" and thus "probable cause to hold the parolee for the final decision of the parole board on revocation." 851 For this hearing, the
parolee is entitled to notice of the hearing, its purpose, and the alleged parole
violations. At the hearing, he is entitled to appear and present evidence as
well as to cross-examine his accusers (subject to security considerations concerning identity of confidential informants). The purpose of the more formal
revocation hearing, to be held before a body such as the state parole board, is
for making "a final evaluation of any contested relevant facts and consideration of whether the facts as determined warrant revocation." 852
Declaring that "the full panoply of rights due a defendant in [a criminal prosecution] does not apply to parole revocations," the Court nevertheless
formulated "minimum requirements of due process" in the final parole revocation hearing, to wit:
·
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure
to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard
in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d)
the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the
hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation) ; (e) a "neutral and detached" hearing body such as a
traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial
officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders
as to the evidence relied ori and reasons for revoking parole. 853
These new rules were .accorded prospective application only. 854
b. Counsel. In Morrissey, the Supreme Court expressly did not decide
the question "whether the parolee is entitled . to the assistance of retained
counsel or to appointed counsel if he is indigent." 855 However, the Court
subsequently accorded a qualified right to counsel in both ·probation revoca849. 408 u.s. 471 (1972).
850. "The Code [§ 247.11] in prescribing procedure for recommitment does not
require hearing or notice, but simply provides a parole violator may be arrested upon the
written order of the board of parole." Gardels v. Brewer, 190 N.W.2d 803, 807 (Iowa
1971).
851. 408 U.S. at 485-87.
852. Id. at 488.
853. Id. at 489.
854. Id. at 490.
855. Id. at 489.
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tion proceedings and parole revocation proceedings in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 856
as discussed in detail below.s57
3.

Probation Revocation

a. Hearing. The Morrissey v. Brewer rules for parole revocation proceedings were extended by the United States Supreme Court to the probation
revocation process in Gagnon v. Scarpelli. 858 Specifically, the Court held that
"a probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer . . . . " 8 " 9
Being pegged on fourteenth amendment due process grounds, Gagnon overrules, by implication, Cole v. Holliday 860 in which the Iowa supreme court held
that no hearing is required as long as probation is not revoked "arbitrarily,
capriciously, or without any information." 861
Prior to Gagnon, the Iowa supreme court prescribed procedural rules for
a revocation hearing which was held, basing them upon the Morrissey guidelines
without ever specifically stating that Iowa probation revocation hearings must
comport with the Morrissey rules concerning parole revocation proceedings.
(That they must was made clear subsequently in Gagnon). Specifically, the
Iowa supreme court held in State v. Hughes: 862 (1) that the trial court "was
not required to render an opinion or conclusions of law;" (2) that the findings
of a court revoking probation must show "the factual basis for the revocation;"
(3) that the revocation can be based upon an arrest for a subsequent offense
(although there has been no prosecution); (4) that "the strict rules of evidence
in criminal trials do not apply in revocation hearings;" (5) that revocation
"may not rest on rumor or surmise;" (6) that hearsay is admissible "if
the fact of the violation is established by evidence which is competent;" (7)
that "the requisite degree of proof is a preponderance of the evidence" and
thus grounds for revocation "need not be established beyond a reasonable
doubt." 863 The supreme court determined that it did not need to decide
whether the parole officer's report was admissible at the hearing when the
maker of the report was not present (to be confronted for cross examination)
-reasoning that this report was utilized here as a charge rather than as proof
and that revocation rested on the policeman's testimony.
b. Counsel. In Gagnon, the Supreme Court, finally answering the question
expressly left open in Morrissey, held that there is no absolute right to appointive counsel in parole or probation revocation hearings. "We think rather,
that the decision as to the need for counsel must be made on a case-by-case
856.
857.
858.
859.
860.
861.
862.
863.

93 S. Ct. 1756 (1973).
See text accompanying notes 863-65 infra.
93 S. Ct. 1756 (1973).
ld. at 1760.
171 N.W.2d 603 (Iowa 1969).
Id. at 606.
200 N.W.2d 559 (Iowa 1972).
Id. at 562-63.
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basis in the exercise of a sound discretion by the state authority charged with
responsibility for administering the probation and parole system." 864 The
test is:
Presumptively, it may be said that counsel should be provided in
cases where, after being informed of his right to request counsel,
the probationer or parolee makes such a request, based on a timely
and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even
if the violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there
are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and
make revocation inappropriate and that the reasons are complex or
otherwise difficult to develop or present. In passing on a request for
the appointment of counsel, the responsible agency also should consider, especially in doubtful cases, whether the probationer appears
to be capable of speaking effectively for himself. 865
As a procedural matter, the grounds for refusal of a request for counsel at either the preliminary or final hearing "should be stated succinctly in the record."B66
N.

SUMMARY OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS

A.

Specific Crimes

1) State statutes proscribing abortions during all stages of pregnancy except when necessary to save the life of the mother are unconstitutional. (U.S.
Sup. Ct.).
2) Iowa's anti-abortion law is unenforceable. (3-judge fed. dist. ct.).
3) The third part of the first amendment tripartite standard on obscenity is changed from "utterly without social redeeming value" to "lacking in
serious literary . . . value." (U.S. Sup. Ct.).
4) The first amendment test for judging obscenity under contemporary
community standards no longer requires a "national" community. (U.S. Sup.
Ct.).
5) There is a right to a jury trial on multiple contempt of court charges.
(Iowa Sup. Ct.).
6) Placing the burden on defendant in an accommodation hearing under
the Uniform Controlled Substances Act is not unconstitutional. (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
7) Simple possession is not a lesser included offense of the crime of
delivery under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
8) Symbolic political protest is no defense to physical acts of flag desecration. (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
9) An anti-loitering ordinance is constitutional if it is directed with
specificity to persons obstructing free use of public walkways. (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
864. 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1763 (1973).
865. Id. at 1764.
866. Id.
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10) The crime of simulated intoxication requires proof of pretending or
feigning intoxication, i.e., an intentional act. (Iowa Sup. Ct.).

B.

Defenses

The defense of entrapment is not available when defendant denies
the very acts upon which the prosecution is predicated. (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
2) It is constitutional to require a defendant to bring himself within
an exculpatory provision of a statute furnishing an ·excuse for what would otherwise be criminal conduct. (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
1)

C.

Pretrial

1) An application under Code section 775.5 for public funds for a private investigator or experts must "point out with specificity the reasons such
services are necessary." (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
2) The demand-waiver doctrine under the speedy indictment statute has
been abolished. (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
3) Retrial following two mistrials because of hung juries does not per se
constitute double jeopardy. (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
4) A State procedural rule requiring defendant to give pretrial notice of
an alibi defense while not requiring reciprocation by the State as to alibi rebuttal witnesses violates federal due process. (U.S. Sup. Ct.).
5) Miranda-type warnings are not absolutely required in order to make
a (warrantless) consent search valid. (U.S. Sup. Ct.).
6) The United States v. Wade rule of per se exclusion of evidence of a
counselless post-indictment identification procedure does not extend to preindictment identification procedures. (U.S. Sup. Ct.).
7) The sixth amendment right to counsel does not 'extend to either preindictment or post-indictment identification-of-photographs procedures. (U.S.
Sup. Ct.).
8) An application for a change of venue must be considered in the context of the entire affair and not merely the publicity centering on defendant.
(Iowa Sup. Ct.).
9) A demand for a speedy trial is no longer required under Code section 795.2. (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
10) Dismissal of the prosecution is the only remedy for violation of defendant's speedy trial rights. (U.S. Sup. Ct.).
11) A trial court is required to make a personal determination of the
validity of a proffered guilty plea, notwithstanding a prior jury's adjudication
that defendant is competent to stand trial. (Iowa Sup. Ct.).

D.
1)

Trial

It is ipso facto reversible error for defendant to be tried before the
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same jury panel which was previously dismissed and told that defendant, who
was named, had pled guilty. (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
2) The Iowa rule shall continue to be that trial courts have broad discretion in "defin[ing] the ambit of permissible cross examination in an attack
on the credibility of a witness by questions concerning collateral acts of alleged
misconduct"-rather than imposing no limitations upon, or entirely prohibiting,
such examination. (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
3) It is error for the trial court to sustain the State's objections to equivocation and unresponsiveness of a defense witness on direct examination.
(Iowa Sup. Ct.).
4) "The trend is to extend, rather than to narrow, the res gestae doctrine." (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
5) "[E]vidential use of 'tacit admissions' by an accused . . . is no
longer permissible in criminal trials within this jurisdiction." (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
6) Whenever the State has been allowed to introduce nonexpert state
of mind evidence, defendant must be permitted to do the same. (Iowa Sup.
Ct.).
7) The foundation requirements for reputation testimony are the same
as to evidence going to credibility as they are for evidence going to probability
or non-probability of guilt. (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
8) Admissibility of certain types of constitutionally-proscribed evidence (e.g., defendant's involuntary confession) requires a mistrial, rather
than mere striking of the evidence and admonishing of the jury to disregard.
(Iowa Sup. Ct.).
9) It is prejudicial for the prosecutor to say in opening argument that
he knows defendant is guilty.
10) It is prejudicial in jury argument for the prosecutor to inflame the
jury's fears, passion, and prejudice against defendant by asking the jurors to
place themselves and their families "in a hypothetical position of peril created
by a drunken, car operating defendant." (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
11) A trial court now must on motion of either party "question each
juror, out of the presence of the others, about his exposure to [during-trial publicity]." (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
E.

Instructions

1) The evidence of the case must be considered in determining whether
to submit a lesser included offense, thus overruling State v. Everett. (Iowa Sup.
Ct.).
2) Uniform Jury Instruction No. 501.11 (defining reasonable doubt)
is defective in one respect, i.e., it "should limit its reference to the lack or
failure of evidence of such a lack or failure o[f] evidence produced by the
state." (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
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3) The last paragraph of Uniform Jury Instruction No. 520.8 (relating to
O.M.V.U.I.) is an unconstitutional application of the Code section 321.281
so-called "presumption" of intoxication arising from the presence of a specified percentage of alcohol in the accused's blood. (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
4) The "Allen" or "dynamite" verdict-urging charge to a deadlocked
jury does not per se deny a fair trial. (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
5) Trial courts must instruct sua sponte that "consideration of defendant's previous felony convictions must be limited to defendant's credibility as a
witness." (Iowa Sup. Ct.).

F.

Sentencing

1) "[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense . . . unless he was represented by counsel at his
trial." (U.S. Sup. Ct.).
2) The abovementioned rule is to be applied prosepectively only by
Iowa trial courts. (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
3) Default imprisonment as the only alternative to immediate, albeit
non-wilful, in toto payment of a fine denies equal protection to an indigent.
(Iowa Sup. Ct.).
4) Express legislative authority for deferred sentencing is granted effective August 15, 1973, following Iowa supreme court ruling that there was no
such prior legislative authority, nor inherent power to do so. (Iowa Sup.Ct.).
5) Sentencing must be done on an individualized basis rather than pursuant to sentencing pacts. (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
6) The general bar on harsher punishment after a retrial on remand to
the same trial court is not applicable to trials de novo on appeal to a higher
trial court. (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
G.

Posttrial Matters

1) The conditional exception "or not raised" in the non-relitigation clause
in Code section 663A.8 does not permit the use of postconviction relief as a
substitute for the requirement of lodging objections at trial. (Iowa Sup. Ct.).
2) Iowa's no-hearing parole revocation procedure violates due process.
(U.S. Sup. Ct.).
3) States also must provide a two-stage hearing in their probation revocation proceedings. (U.S. Sup. Ct.).
4) There is no absolute sixth amendment right to counsel in either parole revocation hearings or in probation revocation hearings; instead the need
for counsel must be determined on a case-by-case basis. (U.S. Sup. Ct.).
5) The requisite degree of the State's proof for revocation of probation (and presumably parole) is "a preponderance of the evidence." (Iowa
Sup. Ct.).

